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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The IGAD region has one of the largest concentrations of livestock in the whole world. 
However, this resource wealth has not been translated into export revenues for the 
countries and the people who depend for their livelihood on the sector. Indeed, 
livestock producers are often among the poorest sections of society suffering extreme 
poverty and lack of food security.  
Several factors may be responsible for this mismatch between actual resources and 
export revenues from those resources, including prevalence of animal diseases, 
producers’ lack of market orientation, and poor veterinary and administrative 
infrastructure. This study assesses the extent to which the regulatory framework 
governing livestock production and trade at all levels, i.e. national, regional as well as 
international, may have contributed to this gap. The underlying assumption is that 
participation in international trade tends to create more favourable conditions for 
poverty alleviation.  
The regulatory framework: The regulatory framework within which IGAD 
livestock products are traded has an ‘internal’ dimension that is made up of the laws 
and institutions of each IGAD member state and the regional arrangements in which 
they actively participate, and an ‘external’ or ‘global’ dimension made up of laws and 
institutions that exist almost independently of the IGAD region. The fact that virtually 
all IGAD member states are actual or potential exporters of livestock products means 
that the ‘internal’ aspect of the regulatory framework has to be shaped around the 
needs of the ‘external’, thereby creating or requiring a continuous process by which 
the former has to adapt itself to the latter.  
The ‘external’ aspect of the regulatory framework: This is made up of 
international and regional treaty regimes, ‘national’ laws and institutions in export 
markets, and increasingly standards set by the private sector. The major players 
include such multilateral institutions as the WTO, which sets and administers the rules 
of global trade, and the OIE and Codex which set global standards for production and 
trade in the livestock sector. The ‘national’ laws and regulations of states members of 
these organizations normally incorporate these rules and standards. However, while 
big players such as the European Union sometimes manage to effectively transform 
their own rules into international standards through international standard-setting 
institutions, the influence of the poorest countries has remained weak for a variety of 
reasons.  
The ‘internal’ aspect of the regulatory framework: This is made up of the 
laws, institutions and practices of the IGAD member states themselves acting alone or 
as part of a regional initiative. However, IGAD does not yet have a common policy and 
legal framework for trade in livestock products and its members are free to pursue 
their own policies individually or in cooperation with others. The result is a rather 
fragmented regulatory approach to what are fairly similar, if not identical, policy 
challenges. Not only are IGAD member states not developing an IGAD-wide framework, 
different countries are pursuing a multiplicity of different and sometimes overlapping 
bilateral and regional initiatives at closer economic integration in which IGAD as a unit 
plays no role. This can have serious implications for the future of IGAD and its 
livestock industry. The sooner IGAD member states decide what they want to do 
within IGAD in terms of economic policy coordination and integration, the better.  
At the national level, while there are significant differences among the national legal 
systems of the IGAD member states, particularly those of Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, 
there are signs of convergence in their livestock regimes, which reflects the 
commonality of challenges they face and the often identical requirements they have 
to meet in order to participate in the international market. Their internal regulatory 
challenges are also increasingly similar, including incomplete, out-dated and 
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incoherent sanitary and food safety regulations, multiple and excessive taxation of 
livestock destined for export, legal uncertainties, weak and inefficient judiciary, 
disregard for the rule of law in day-to-day administrative decision making, lack of 
effective coordination among different levels of government in the enforcement of 
laws, absence of established communication channels between stakeholders in the 
livestock industry and relevant government institutions, and overall lack of capacity to 
use law as an instrument to implement policy decisions. Most of these problems are 
mere manifestations of the general underdevelopment of the countries’ legal systems 
and they can only be overcome gradually and as part of long-term overall 
development. But, a host of measures can be taken in the short term to address some 
of these.  
What can be done? IGAD member states can do a great deal at IGAD level as well as 
unilaterally and bilaterally. 
• Externally, there is no doubt that the IGAD livestock industry is faced with an 
unfriendly international regulatory environment in the design of which its member 
states have virtually no say. But, their interests also suffer from possibly illegal 
measures taken by governments of actual or potential export markets for IGAD 
livestock products. IGAD member states could consider several options, including:  
(1) Accession to relevant international organizations: those IGAD member 
states that are not members of these organizations should actively seek 
accession and IGAD member states already within those organizations could use 
their powers to support the accession of their fellow IGAD member states, and  
(2) Collective representation in relevant international organizations: while 
this might look rather unrealistic in the current political environment within 
IGAD, their collective interest would be best served if they speak with one voice 
at these organizations, ideally through a single representative with an IGAD-
wide mandate.  
• At the national level, the single most important first step is to conduct a law 
review and possibly law reform process with a view to developing a coherent, up-
to-date, complete, accessible and enforceable set of sanitary and food safety 
regulations for the livestock industry. Kenya, the country with relatively the most 
advanced legal system in the region, is already doing that while the countries that 
need it most are not.  
• Likewise, the law review and reform process suggested above can also be used to 
address the problems of multiple and excessive taxation of the livestock sector and 
any other laws and practices that discourage business and investment in the sector. 
While taxing exports is an easy and tempting way of collecting government 
revenue, we need to realize that export taxes are a thing of the past and the real 
competition among livestock exporting countries has largely been on the amount of 
overt and covert subsidies they can provide to their livestock exporters. IGAD 
members may not need, nor afford, to provide export subsidies, but they can at 
least abstain from actively discouraging businesspeople who may want to operate 
in the field.  
• At a more general level, IGAD member states must look at rule of law as part and 
parcel of the effort to encourage economic activity and achieve economic 
development and poverty reduction. This requires, among other things, cultivating 
an administrative culture in which every decision is based on clearly articulated 
legal authority, and ultimately subject to review by an independent and competent 
administrative or judicial organ. These are complex developmental issues that can 
only evolve over an extended period of time, but we must start somewhere. Two 
actions that can be taken immediately in this respect are:  
(1) compilation of all relevant laws and making them available to 
stakeholders within these countries (preferably in hard copy) as well as 
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publishing them on a dedicated web site to make them available more widely, 
and  
(2) provision of basic legal training to relevant government officials and 
private sector people working in the livestock sector.  
 
Conclusion: It is worth emphasising that in this science-intensive field, regulatory 
issues are only a small part of the problem. Analysis of EU sanitary and food law and 
the generous preferential scheme put in place by the EU for the benefit of IGAD 
livestock exporters shows that even the markets of well-meaning partners that are 
prepared to go out of their way to encourage imports from the IGAD region still 
remain totally closed due to the non-negotiable subject of sanitary standards. The 
conclusion that follows from here is fairly straightforward: until IGAD member states 
somehow manage to satisfy international sanitary requirements, the rhetoric about 
the use of trade as a tool of development will remain illusory and the resource-
intensive negotiations at the WTO to get developed countries to reduce traditional 
market access barriers and subsidies to agricultural products may be difficult to justify 
in economic terms.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TRADE IN IGAD 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS 
This paper aims to look into the regulatory framework within which trade in IGAD 
livestock products operates.1 The study tries to assess whether this framework 
encourages or discourages trade in livestock products within IGAD as well as with third 
countries. The ultimate objective of the study is to identify key regulatory problems, 
national, regional and global, affecting trade in the sector and to provide policy 
recommendations for improvement.  
This is a study in regional and international trade law and policy. A combination of 
methods has been used to collect relevant information, including identification of 
relevant national laws and policies; international treaties, standards, guidelines and 
recommendations; meetings with relevant government officials and non-governmental 
stakeholders in the livestock sector; and a review of existing literature on the subject. 
Quantitative data used in this paper, although usually taken from official sources, are 
not always consistent. The whole purpose of their use is to give a broad idea of how 
significant the livestock sector is in the economy of the IGAD member states.  
Scope of the Study 
The products covered in this paper are those classified as animals and animal products 
in Section I of the Harmonised System (HS) nomenclature except fish and fish 
products. This includes Chapter 1 of the HS on live animals, Chapter 2 on meat and 
edible meat offal, Chapters 4 and 5 on dairy and other edible products of animal 
origin, and Chapter 41, HS Headings 41.01 to 41.03 on raw hides and skins.2 However, 
the IGAD reality also shows that, apart from raw hides and skins for which the 
standards burden is lighter, most cross-border trade in the sector is concentrated in 
live bovine animals (HS Heading 01.02), live sheep and goats (HS Heading 01.04) and 
meat, i.e. HS Headings 02.01 and 02.02 on fresh, chilled and frozen bovine meat and 
02.04 on meat of goats and sheep. As such, while most of the discussion should 
equally apply to all livestock products, the illustrations in this paper will be based 
mainly on the latter two segments of the livestock industry. 
Structure 
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, an introductory chapter will provide some 
quantitative information about the IGAD livestock industry in general and livestock 
trade in particular. Based on available data from the International Trade Centre (ITC), 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and national sources, this chapter aims to 
provide the factual context that informs the subsequent legal analysis. To that end, 
this chapter provides information about the significance of the sector in the economy 
of IGAD member states, its share in their export mix, and its potential for export 
revenue generation, employment and overall economic development in those 
countries.  
                                                 
1  Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term “livestock products” is here used to refer to both live 
animals and animal products. 
2  This choice is based on the WTO definition of agricultural products which excludes fish and fish 
products from its coverage. For an official text of the Harmonised system nomenclature, see World 
Customs Organization, http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Topics_Issues/topics_issues.html.  
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The second chapter then goes into the heart of the paper, which is about the 
regulatory framework within which cross-border trade in general takes place, but with 
a particular emphasis on those aspects of the regulatory framework that have special 
relevance for the IGAD livestock industry. This regulatory framework is made up of 
international and regional treaty regimes and national laws and institutions. The focus 
here will be on the multilateral trading system of the WTO that sets and administers 
the rules of global trade and the OIE and Codex, two technical institutions of decisive 
importance that set global standards for production and trade in livestock products 
and whose role in this capacity is recognized by the WTO itself. IGAD and its member 
countries are subject to this regulatory framework but they are also players in its 
making and continued evolution; they have the right to influence its content and pace 
of development just as they are bound by its system of rules. Chapter 2 will thus 
assess the extent to which IGAD and IGAD member states participate in the 
establishment and administration of these rules and standards at the global level. 
Chapter 2 aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how trade in livestock 
products is regulated by this network of trade and standards institutions.  
Chapter 3 then goes into the regional and national dimensions of this regulatory 
framework at the IGAD and member state level. This part is vital to the paper but it is 
also rather complicated. First of all, there is nothing like an IGAD-wide common policy 
and legal framework for trade in livestock products and all that can be said here is 
limited to whatever there is in the form of general statements of aspiration and non-
binding declarations of intent about the desirability of setting up common policies in 
all sorts of areas including closer economic integration. Secondly, different IGAD 
member states are pursuing a multiplicity of different and sometimes overlapping 
regional initiatives at closer economic integration in which IGAD as a unit plays no 
role. This means that Chapter 3 is largely about the national dimension of the 
regulatory framework. Accordingly, this chapter looks at selected regulatory issues 
that affect the livestock industry in the region focussing on three IGAD member states 
– Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan.  
Chapter 4 attempts to assess the impact of sanitary barriers on the export 
opportunities of IGAD member states with particular reference to the EU livestock 
import regime. The EU has had long-standing preferences for IGAD products and the 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how even the markets of well-meaning 
countries and regions that are prepared to go out of their way to encourage imports 
from the IGAD region still remain totally closed due to the non-negotiable subject of 
sanitary standards.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the study and concludes with a list of policy 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE IGAD LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY: BACKGROUND 
This chapter aims to provide background information about the IGAD livestock sector, 
its importance to the economies of the member countries, and the volume and 
direction of trade in livestock products within the region and with third countries.  
1.1.  The IGAD Livestock Sector 
The IGAD region is particularly well-endowed with livestock resources and a significant 
number of people in the region directly depend on the sector for their livelihood.  
Ethiopia is believed to have the largest livestock population not just in the IGAD 
region but in the whole of Africa. According to a 2004 census from the Ethiopian 
Central Statistical Authority, Ethiopia had about 44.32 million cattle, 23.62 million 
sheep, 23.33 million goats, 2.31 million camels and over 42 million poultry (excluding 
agro–pastoral and pastoral areas).3 According to FAO data, Ethiopia’s livestock sector 
accounts for about 18.8% of GDP and livestock supports and sustains the livelihoods of 
an estimated 80% of the rural poor.4  
Data from the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD) show that Sudan 
has nearly as many livestock resources as Ethiopia.5 According to AOAD data for 2004, 
Sudan had an estimated population of 39.7million cattle, 48.9 million sheep, 42.1 
million goats, 3.7 million camels, 0.88 million horses, and 6.6 million mules and 
asses.6 According to Sudan Government sources, the livestock sector currently 
accounts for about 20% of the national GDP.7 
But, it is in Somalia that the livestock sector occupies the most pre-eminent position. 
FAO estimates put Somalia’s total livestock population at about 37.5 million for 1998 
and at 38.9 million for 1999.8 According to the World Bank, in 1990, the Somalia 
livestock sector “provided employment and livelihoods for about 55% of the population 
and accounted for 80% of the export earnings in a normal year.”9  
The Government of Kenya estimates that, in 2004, Kenya had about 29 million 
chickens, 10 million beef cattle, 3 million dairy and dairy crosses, 9 million goats, 7 
million sheep, 0.8 million camels, 0.52 million donkeys and 0.3 million pigs.10 It is 
worth noting that although the statistics put Kenya far behind Ethiopia and Sudan in 
terms of sheer numbers, Kenya has the highest per capita consumption of milk in 
                                                 
3  See FAO Technical Cooperation Department, “NEPAD – Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme – Ethiopia: ‘Live Animal and Meat Export’ – Preliminary Options Outline”, 
TCP/ETH/2908 (I), (NEPAD Ref. 05/08 E), January 2005, p. 2. 
4  See FAO-AGAL, Livestock Sector Brief: Ethiopia (2004) pp. 1 and 3 
5  See FAO-AGAL, Livestock Sector Brief: Sudan (2005) p. 2 noting that Sudan has the second largest 
livestock wealth in Africa next only to Ethiopia.  
6  See Arab agricultural statistics database, at http://www.aoad.org/aas2/index.htm.  
7  Discussion with Dr Hassan Mohamed Nur, Head, Department of Planning and Livestock Economics, 
Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries, 26 February 2007, Khartoum.  
8  See World Bank, Somalia From Resilience Towards Recovery and Development: A Country Economic 
Memorandum for Somalia (Report No. 34356-SO, January 2006) para. 5.13, p. 77.  
9  See Id. para. 5.11, p. 77. 
10  See Kenya Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, Strategy for 
revitalizing Agriculture 2004-2014 (March 2004), p. 7. 
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Africa.11 The livestock sub–sector contributes 10% of Kenya’s GDP and 30% of the 
national agriculture GDP.12  
In Uganda, the livestock sector represents only about 7.5% of GDP and 17% of 
agricultural GDP. According to a 2004 NEPAD-FAO estimate, the livestock population 
stood at about 5.8 million cattle, 1 million sheep, 6.2 million goats, 1.5 million pigs 
and about 24 million units of poultry.13 The other two countries, Eritrea and Djibouti, 
have much smaller livestock wealth. Eritrea’s livestock population was estimated in 
2003 at about 1.9 million cattle, 2.1 million sheep, 1.7 million goats, 1.3 million birds, 
and 0.1 million camels.14 According to the FAO, Djibouti had an estimated 0.29 million 
cattle and nearly one million sheep and goats in 2002.15  
1.2.  IGAD Livestock Exports 
Information on IGAD livestock exports is both scarce and unreliable. Indeed, according 
to Peter Little, “almost all regional trade (>95 percent) in livestock in eastern Africa is 
carried out via unofficial channels.”16 This means that it is virtually impossible to 
know the exact amount of intra-IGAD trade in particular. Most of the information in 
this section will thus be about IGAD exports to non-IGAD member states, particularly 
the Middle East, and even then the statistics reproduced here should be taken as 
nothing more than broad indicators.17  
In terms of the absolute size of livestock exports, Sudan is the most successful country 
in the IGAD region. According to data from the Sudan Animal Resources Service 
Company, Sudan earned slightly over US$ 181 million from the export of livestock 
products in 2004.18 ITC data for 2005 show that Sudan earned a total of over US$ 145 
million from the export of live animals, meat and raw hides and skins and leather, and 
products of animal origin.19 Sudan’s success in the export of live animals particularly 
to Saudi Arabia is nearly half a century old and has, according to Aklilu, led to the 
establishment of long-standing business relationships for generations.20  
                                                 
11  See Kenya Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, Draft Dairy Policy 2006 – Towards a 
Competitive and Sustainable Dairy Industry for Economic Growth in the 21st Century and Beyond 
(Nairobi, March 2006), p. 5. See also Henning Steinfeld and Pius Chilonda, “Old players, new players”, 
Livestock Report 2006 (FAO Rome 2006), p. 11. See also H. Muriuki et al, The policy environment in 
the Kenya dairy sub-sector: A review (SDP Research and Development Report No. 2, Nairobi 2003).  
12  See “Speech by the Minister for Livestock and Fisheries Development Hon. Joseph Konzollo Munyao 
… during the Official Re-Opening of Kenya Meat Commission” on 26th June 2006, available at 
http://www.livestock.go.ke.  
13  See FAO-NEPAD, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme: Uganda Livestock 
Development Project (TCP/UGA/2910 (I) (NEPAD Ref. 04/03 E) Volume III of VI), November 2004, 
p. 1. See also FAO-AGAL, Livestock Sector Brief: Uganda (2005) p. 2.  
14  See FAO-NEPAD, Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme: Support to NEPAD–
CAADP Implementation, TCP/ERI/3006 (I) (NEPAD Ref. 05/10 E), Volume I of V, National Medium 
Term Investment Programme (NMTIP), January 2005, p. 6. See also FAO-AGAL, Livestock Sector 
Brief: Eritrea (2005) p. 2.  
15  FAO-AGAL, Livestock Sector Brief: Djibouti (2005) p. 2.  
16  See Peter Little, presentation at FAO conference March 1-2, p. 3, available at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/common/ecg/110973_en_LITTLE_Paper_Cross_Border_Trade_and_Food_
security_FAO_Feb_2007.pdf. Note that Little defines eastern Africa to include Sudan, northern Kenya, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, virtually the entire region on which this study focuses.  
17  Note also that the figures used in this section are only export data and do not take into account imports 
of the same products. 
18  See ARSC, Statistics for Livestock Markets in Sudan (10th ed., Khartoum 2004) p. 3.  
19  See: http://www.intracen.org/appli1/TradeCom/TP_TP_CI.aspx?RP=706&YR=2005, hereafter ITC 
(2005). 
20  See Yacob Aklilu, An Audit of the Livestock Marketing Status in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan (Nairobi, 
April 2002, Vol. I), p. 63. 
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Like Sudan, Ethiopia’s main export market for its livestock products is the Middle East, 
largely limited to Saudi Arabia,21 the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. However, 
Ethiopia’s livestock exports are more modest. ITC data for 2005 show that Ethiopia 
earned a total of nearly US$ 90 million from the export of raw hides, skins and 
leather, meat, live animals and products of animal origin.22 The OECD 2007 African 
Economic Outlook noted that Ethiopia earned US$ 18.5 million from meat and meat 
product exports in 2005/06, which was up from US$ 14.6 million in 2004/05.23 This 
reality of today contrasts with the promising developments witnessed in the sector in 
the early 1970s when Ethiopia exported livestock products such as corned beef and 
canned beef to European and Asian countries including Italy, Belgium and Japan.24 The 
same period also witnessed peak live animal exports mainly to the Middle East.25 This 
promising development was nipped in the bud as a result of the 1974 military takeover 
in the country and it was only in the past few years that Ethiopia’s livestock exports 
started showing signs of recovery.26  
The change of fortunes for the Kenyan livestock export industry was even more 
dramatic. Until the 1980s, Kenya not only exported a significant amount of livestock 
products to the Middle East and Europe, its status as a livestock exporting country was 
put on a firm legal footing when it became the only IGAD member state to secure 
quota-guaranteed access to the EU market under the beef/veal protocol to the Lomé 
agreements between the EC and the ACP countries.27 However, Kenya currently 
exports only small amounts of livestock products.28 Indeed, the most significant 
livestock export recently was that of live animals to Mauritius which, according to 
Kenya Export Promotion Council data for 2005, amounted to a mere US$ 866,525.29 
Kenya’s livestock exports today are so low that President Kibaki was happy to cite 
Kenya’s exportation of about 11,800 head of cattle and 9,000 goats, worth about 290 
million Shillings, over an eighteen-month period between 2005 and 2006, as a sign of 
                                                 
21  There are five companies in Ethiopia today that have their own abattoirs approved by the Ethiopian 
veterinary administration for export purposes; they export mainly sheep meat and goat meat to Saudi 
Arabia. These five companies have import licenses issued to them by the Saudi Ministry of Agriculture, 
which did so after physical inspection of their slaughterhouse and other facilities on the ground. 
Besides, the Saudi Embassy in Addis Ababa is also involved in the form of authentication of export 
documents issued by relevant Ethiopian authorities. Interview with H. E. Essam Baitalmal, Ambassador 
of Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia, held on 29 August 2008. 
22  See: ITC (2005).  
23  OECD, African Economic Outlook 2007 (Paris 2007), p. 259.  
24  See Yacob Aklilu, “A Review of Policies and their Impact on Livestock Trade in Ethiopia during Three 
Regimes (1965-2005)”, in John McPeak and Peter Little (eds.) Pastoral Livestock Marketing in Eastern 
Africa: Research and Policy Challenges (Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing, 
2006), pp. 187-202.  
25  Sheep exports however continued to rise even after the mid-1970s. See Id. p. 192. 
26  Aklilu noted that with the entry of the private sector into the market, there has been a steady growth in 
chilled meat (mutton, goat meat and beef) exports, “from 2,508 MT in 1998 to over 5,000 MT in 2004”. 
Aklilu (2006), supra n. 24, p. 199. 
27  For more on this, see infra, Chapter IV, on EC import regime for IGAD livestock products. 
28  It has been reported recently that Kenya exports dairy products to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa 
but this must be quite small. See WTO, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: East African 
Community: Revision, (WT/TPR/S/171/Rev.1 31 January 2007, hereafter WTO (2007)), p. A1-53. 
29  See http://www.epckenya.org/cbik/sum_reports.asp. ITC trade data for 2005 however shows that Kenya 
exported live animals worth US$ 4.03 million (see ITC (2005), indicating either data accuracy problems 
or that Kenya is exporting small numbers of live animals to a large number of countries. Farmers 
Choice, a Kenyan meat-processing company, also claims that it exports “an average of 2000 Metric tons 
of Farmer's Choice processed products annually to about 15 countries across Africa, the GCC … and 
the Indian Subcontinent.”29 ITC data for 2005 show that Kenya earned a total of about US$ 55 million 
from the export of raw hides, skins and leather, meat, live animals and products of animal origin. See 
ITC (2005). 
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resurgence of interest in the sector.30 According to Kenya’s Minister of Livestock, 
Joseph Munyao, the livestock sub-sector “accounts for more than 10% of export 
earnings and employs over 50% of the agricultural labour force.”31 This positive 
assessment does not however seem to be shared by experts who studied the Kenyan 
livestock sector,32 and indeed the Kenyan Ministry of Livestock itself has recently 
acknowledged that Kenya is “currently self-sufficient in most of the animal products 
except in beef and mutton.”33 
Somalia is another IGAD member state with a significant export interest in the 
livestock sector. A World Bank study showed that, as of 2004, the value of sheep and 
goats exports from the ports of Berbera and Bosasso “is estimated at more than US$ 
60 million and of all livestock exports at US$ 79 million.”34 According to ITC data for 
2005, Somalia’s exports of live animals, raw hides, skins and leather, and products of 
animal origin amounted to just under US$ 70 million. Indeed, live animal exports alone 
accounted for about 55% of Somalia’s total export for that year.35  
The figures for the other three IGAD member states are much smaller. ITC data for 
2005 show that Djibouti earned a total of just under US$ 10 million from the export of 
raw hides, skins and leather, live animals and products of animal origin, Eritrea just 
over US$ 2 million and Uganda about US$ 13 million.36  
1.3.  Summary 
As noted earlier, although the data reproduced in this section are more of estimates 
than actual census figures, a few general observations can be deduced from them. 
Firstly, the IGAD region has one of the largest concentrations of livestock in the whole 
world. Secondly, this large resource wealth has not been translated into export 
revenues for the countries and the people who depend for their livelihood on the 
sector. Even for the relatively more successful Sudan, its livestock exports are 
minuscule compared to the resource potential of the country. And thirdly, although 
several factors may be responsible for this mismatch between actual resources and 
export revenues from those resources, the next section will assess the issue from one 
particular angle – the extent to which the regulatory framework governing livestock 
production and trade at all levels – i.e. national, regional as well as international – has 
contributed to this gap.  
 
 
 
                                                 
30  See speech by President Mwai Kibaki on the occasion of his re-opening of the Kenya Meat 
Commission on 26 June 2006, as reported by the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, available at 
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke.  
31  See Munyao speech, supra n. 12.   
32  According to Aklilu, Kenya today is only “broadly self–sufficient” in livestock products, that Kenya 
imports about 50 MT of canned beef annually and small amounts of boneless meat and sausages and “in 
the case of the total beef consumed about 22% is from cattle trekked into Kenya through the porous 
borders with the neighbouring countries of Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Tanzania.” Aklilu (2002, Vol. 
I), supra n. 20, p. 2. 
33  See Kenyan Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, Draft Sessional Paper on National 
Livestock Policy (Nairobi, 2007), p. 3. 
34  See World Bank, supra n. 8, para. 2.29, p. 18.  
35  See ITC (2005). 
36  See ITC (2005).  
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CHAPTER 2. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TRADE IN 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION 
2.1 Introduction 
A country’s or region’s ability to take part in and benefit from trade in a particular 
product depends on its ability to produce goods and services of commercial quality 
and quantity but also on the rules governing its transactions. This is particularly so for 
products in the highly sensitive and tightly regulated food sector. Every time there is a 
food-borne or animal disease outbreak, of which there have been plenty recently,37 
the temptation is almost always to blame it on unsafe foreign food or animals and, 
more often than not, the first measure will take the form of a ban or other restriction 
on imports,38 sometimes followed by similar measures internally. This might of course 
be understandable if we remember society’s alarm at, for example, the suggestion 
from Italian mothers in 1980 that infant food containing beef from hormone-treated 
animals “caused their babies to grow breasts and menstruate” or the revelation that 
the agent that causes the neurodegenerative Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
in cattle also causes its human equivalent, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD).  
It is thus no wonder that the food sector is regulated by high profile national, regional 
and international bodies such as the US Food and Drug Administration and the 
Department of Agriculture, the EU’s Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-
General (often called DG SANCO) and particularly its Food and Veterinary Office 
(FVO), the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Office of 
Epizootics (OIE). While the primary mission of such institutions is to protect the 
consumer against unsafe food or animal imports,39 a number of other regional and 
global institutions, for example IGAD itself, the EAC, the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the WTO, attempt to ensure that such legitimate 
interests do not unnecessarily restrict international trade.  
The relationship between these two groups of institutions and regimes is always a 
tense one. Nobody openly and seriously advocates the complete cessation of trade in 
food and animal products in order to eliminate every imaginable risk of disease 
transmission or food contamination; nor does any one openly advocate the complete 
abolition of regulatory and sanitary controls so as to establish complete free trade in 
such products. But, there is always a state of tension between free trade on the one 
                                                 
37  To mention but a few: the FMD outbreak in Brazil and Argentina in 2005-06; the alarming spread of 
Avian Influenza and outbreaks in 56 African, Asian and European countries since its first detection in 
2003; the discovery in 2003 of BSE-infected cows in North America (see Laura Loppacher and William 
Kerr, “The Efficacy of World Trade Organization Rules on Sanitary Barriers: Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy in North America”, 39(3) Journal of World Trade (2005), pp. 427-743); and the RVF 
outbreak in Kenya in 2006. These have all led to trade restrictions of different magnitudes and 
durations. Cluff notes that “the notification of trade bans for meat has never been higher”. Merritt Cluff, 
Impact of Animal Disease Outbreaks on Livestock Markets: An FAO Analysis, paper presented at an 
FAO Symposium on “Market and Trade Dimensions of Avian Influenza Prevention and Control”, 
Rome 14 November 2006, available at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/en/20953/21014/21574/event_109566en.html.  
38  For data and analysis, see N. Morgan and A. Prakash, “International livestock markets and the impact 
of animal disease”, in 25(2) OIE Scientific and Technical Review (OIE, 2006) pp. 517-528. 
39  To that end, many of these institutions have enormous powers to achieve their goals. Alexei 
Barrionuevo put it very well when he observed that the US Department of Agriculture, which has 
powers in the field of animal and meat imports, can require a foreign country “to duplicate American 
slaughterhouse practices and send inspectors to certify foreign plants.” See “Food Imports often Escape 
Scrutiny”, New York Times, May 1, 2007. Almost exactly the same can be said about the EU’s DG 
SANCO and comparable authorities in other developed countries. 
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hand and protection of health and safety on the other, and the regulatory framework 
that governs regional and international livestock trade at any time reflects the 
balance struck between them for that particular moment. This balance shifts over 
time in response to movements in science and technology, the ever-shifting power of 
interest groups behind every policy option, popular risk perception and tolerance 
level, and the resulting political will of states. International law here serves a vital 
purpose. By providing a set of rules governing the relationship, international law 
provides a bulwark against instability and unpredictability as it lasts, and by providing 
a consultative and negotiating forum for states, it furnishes a framework for the 
orderly introduction of change without unnecessary disruption.  
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the global aspect of this intricate 
regulatory framework. It will focus on the WTO, the OIE and Codex, individually as 
well as in their interaction, and will assess the extent to which IGAD and its member 
states participate in the establishment and administration of the rules and standards 
of these institutions and the degree to which they are able to conform to the 
requirements under the system. 
2.2 WTO Rules Governing Livestock Trade: an Overview 
The WTO sets the rules of global trade, follows up their implementation, serves as a 
forum for further trade negotiations, and provides a rules-based, effective and 
efficient dispute settlement mechanism for its members. Its scope of operation is 
wide and expanding. Its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), started life as an interim arrangement with a set of rules applying to trade in 
goods only, and even then its application to agricultural trade was largely limited, in a 
few but important cases by explicit derogations from GATT’s major principles and, in 
others, through contracting parties’ wilful neglect of their clear obligations in the 
agricultural sector.  
One of the most significant achievements of the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1994) was 
the conclusion of a specific Agreement on Agriculture (AoA),40 whose long-term 
objective is to establish “a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system” while 
its short-term mission was to launch the reform process and take the first steps 
towards that long-term goal. The AoA disciplines on, inter alia, the three pillars of 
agricultural market access, domestic support and export subsidies constituted that 
first step on the path of reform. Thanks to the Uruguay Round, the level of standard 
trade restriction that applies today in the livestock sector is not as high as it used to 
be. To take the bound tariff levels for fresh or chilled beef carcases and half-carcases 
from a selection of WTO members as an example, the EC schedule sets it at 12.8% ad 
valorem plus € 176.8 per 100 kg41; Japan’s is set at 50% ad valorem42; Korea’s at 40% 
                                                 
40  For a comprehensive study of the treatment of agricultural products by the GATT-WTO system, see 
Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: from GATT 1947 to 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (Kluwer, 2002); Bernard O’Connor (ed.) Agriculture in WTO Law 
(Cameron May, London, 2005); and Joseph McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A 
Commentary (Oxford 2007). 
41  This is a reduction from a base period (1986-88) level of 20.0% ad valorem plus a specific duty of 
2,763 ECU/T. See EC schedule to the WTO (Schedule LXXX) for HS Code 0201.10.50, carcases and 
half-carcases. All national schedules of WTO member countries are available on the WTO web site, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm. Incidentally, note that 
EC applied tariff for this product is the same as its bound tariff at the WTO. See Part Two of Annex I to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on 
the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1), Regulation last amended by Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987, and is based on the harmonised system. (OJ L 301, 
31.10.2006), hereafter EC Customs Schedules 2007.  
42  This is a reduction from 93% for the 1986-88 base period. See Japan’s schedule to the WTO (Schedule 
XXXVIII) for fresh or chilled beef carcasses and half-carcasses (0201.10). 
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ad valorem43; Egypt’s at 10% ad valorem44 and Saudi Arabia’s at 7% ad valorem.45 
Similar commitments in the area of domestic support and export subsidies have also 
added further discipline into the system. The three IGAD member states that are 
members of the WTO – Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda – made use of flexibilities under 
the 1993 Modalities Agreement, which allowed them to offer only ceiling bindings.46 
Accordingly, Djibouti bound its tariffs for most agricultural products at 40%, which is 
in addition to a 100% tax that applies at the border47; Kenya has a ceiling binding of 
100% for all agricultural products48 and Uganda put its ceilings at 80%, again for all 
agricultural products.49 The national tariffs of Kenya and Uganda (and also of non-
IGAD Tanzania) have however been replaced by the common external tariff of the EAC 
since 1 January 2005, which led to “a marked reduction” in the applied tariffs of 
Kenya,50 “an overall decrease” of average tariffs on imports into Tanzania,51 and “an 
overall increase” of average duties on imports into Uganda.52 It is noteworthy that 
several countries maintain applied tariffs lower than their bound tariffs – Saudi Arabia 
is a good example here as it applies tariff levels between 0% and 5% for several 
agricultural products including livestock.53  
However, WTO members still maintain a host of trade-restrictive and -distortive 
measures in agriculture that are permissible under the AoA, including trade-distortive 
domestic support and export subsidies. Indeed, this is recognized by the AoA itself. 
Article 20 of the AoA was designed to build an agenda for future negotiations so that 
these AoA disciplines would be only the first step in a reform process that should lead 
to the eventual establishment of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading 
system. The current agriculture negotiations at the WTO are part of the endeavour to 
bring this objective one step closer to reality. While many developed countries are 
working hard in these negotiations to save their agricultural subsidy schemes, which 
are injurious to developing country farmers, “over-taxation” was identified by none 
other than the WTO Secretariat itself as “one of the main constraints for Kenya’s 
agriculture”, the richest of the IGAD member states.54 The so-called world market is 
thus a place where this over-taxed farmer in some of the poorest countries competes 
against farmers who are paid by the public just to stay on the farm.  
Most importantly, the modest-looking tariff levels indicated above and the damaging 
subsidy schemes do not provide a full picture of the level of trade restrictions applying 
in the livestock sector, and the AoA does not cover everything for trade in the 
agricultural sector. On the key subject of what are termed sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, for example, the AoA only cross-refers to the SPS Agreement and 
                                                 
43  This is a reduction from 44.5% for the 1986-88 base period. See Korea’s schedule to the WTO 
(Schedule LX) for fresh or chilled beef carcasses and half-carcasses (0202.10.0000). 
44  See Egypt’s schedule to the WTO (Schedule LXIII). 
45  See Saudi Arabia schedule to the WTO (Schedule CLVIII). 
46  See Uruguay Round Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the 
Reform Programme (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) 20 Dec. 1993. Paragraph 14 of the Modalities Agreement 
provides: “In the case of products subject to unbound ordinary customs duties developing countries shall 
have the flexibility to offer ceiling bindings on these products.”  
47  See Djibouti schedule to the WTO (Schedule CXXXVII). 
48  See Kenya schedule to the WTO (Schedule CXIII). 
49  See Uganda schedule to the WTO (Schedule CXXVI). 
50  See WTO (2007), supra n. 28, p. A1-53.  
51  See Id., p. A2-152. 
52  See Id., p. A3-233. 
53  See USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia: Trade Policy Monitoring Saudi Arabian 
Applied Tariff Rates for Agricultural Products 2006 (GAIN Report Number SA6006, May 2006), p. 3. 
54  See WTO (2007), supra n. 28, p. A1-76. 
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records the fact that WTO members have agreed to give effect to that agreement.55 A 
combination of genuine health and safety considerations and the misuse of such 
concerns for protectionist motives means that IGAD livestock products are often 
banned from entry into many of these markets regardless of what the official tariff 
levels may be.56 An understanding of the SPS Agreement is thus crucial for a fuller 
appreciation of the regulatory framework that governs global trade in livestock 
products. It is notable however that agricultural products are subject to the full-range 
of WTO agreements, including the GATT 1994, the SCM Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement, to mention only a few. The focus in this section on the SPS Agreement is 
only because animal disease and food safety concerns are presently the principal 
challenges facing the IGAD livestock industry. 
2.2.1 SPS Measures under the GATT-WTO System 
Although trade liberalization is the principal mission of the GATT-WTO system, it 
recognizes that trade is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end – the end 
being welfare maximization. In the pursuit of its trade liberalization mission, the 
trading system has always been sensitive towards overriding public policy objectives 
such as food safety and the environment. The general exceptions of GATT Article XX 
that provide justification for violation of such sacred GATT principles as non-
discrimination and ban of quantitative restrictions have been part of the GATT 
architecture from the beginning. The GATT Article XX(b) exceptions for the protection 
of human, animal and plant life or health are of particular relevance to the livestock 
sector.  
The challenge here is fairly easy to understand but rather tricky to resolve: how can 
we encourage trade in all products and enhance opportunities for economic gain 
without at the same time putting at risk human, animal or plant life or health? 
Realizing these twin goals is the most daunting challenge of the multilateral trading 
system and has always been a crucial North-South battleground – the developed 
countries trying to ensure that their trade policy commitments would not compromise 
their right and duty to protect their citizens against the importation of unsafe foods or 
other health hazards in the name of free trade, and the developing countries trying to 
ensure that developed country health and sanitary standards would not come as 
protectionist wolves dressed in health and safety sheepskin. The traditional 
reluctance of developed countries to open their agricultural markets to competition57 
only exacerbates the latter fear. This is what the old GATT Article XX(b) and the new 
WTO SPS Agreement attempt to resolve. Both have been the subject of some of the 
most contentious dispute settlement cases over the years, and the livestock sector has 
been at the centre of many of them.58  
                                                 
55  See Article 14 of the AoA. This totally unnecessary, and indeed meaningless, provision appears to be a 
result of the negotiating history of the SPS Agreement, which started as part of the agriculture 
negotiations but was later taken out as a subject of its own.  
56  This will be demonstrated further in Chapter 4 with the help of EU law and practice in this area. 
57  The structure of GATT-WTO law shows very clearly that its pro-market rules and principles are 
strongest in sectors where developed countries are likely to win the competition on the market, and the 
weakest in sectors where these countries are likely to lose. As Jagdish Bhagwati noted, “[t]he 
willingness to play by the rules of free trade has always been easier … for countries that expect to win 
from Darwinian competition.” See Bhagwati, “The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among 
Trading Nations”, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: 
Prerequisites for Free Trade? (MIT Press, 1997), Vol. I, p.21. For the way this system is structured for 
agricultural products, see Desta, supra n. 40.  
58  See the famous EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (WT/DS26, WT/DS48 1997, hereafter 
EC Hormones). This case is particularly relevant for this study as the issues addressed therein relate to 
the EC’s use of sanitary requirements to ban the importation of US and Canadian beef treated with 
specific types of growth promoting hormones. Other GATT/WTO disputes involving the livestock sub-
sector, although not directly related to health and safety, include European Economic Community - 
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2.2.1.1 GATT Article XX(b) and Livestock Trade 
The approach used to achieve a balance between trade liberalization and protection 
of health and safety has evolved over time. Under GATT 1947, countries were free to 
adopt measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or 
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” provided 
that such measures did not serve as means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries or as disguised restriction on international trade.59 This meant, in 
the case of GATT Article XX(b), that as long as countries were able to demonstrate 
why a certain measure was ‘necessary’ to achieve the specified health objectives, and 
the implementation of such measures was free of the discrimination and disguised 
trade restriction conditions, they could develop their measures with almost unlimited 
discretion.60  
Countries often invoke this exception to justify measures that would otherwise be 
illegal under GATT/WTO, and several trade disputes have revolved around the 
interpretation of Article XX(b). In these disputes, panels as well as the Appellate Body 
(AB) have recognized Article XX(b) as an exception from the rule which “clearly 
allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade 
liberalization”61, with the procedural implication that this is a kind of affirmative 
defence for which the burden of proof rests with the defendant and that the provision 
has to be interpreted restrictively.62 This means that GATT Article XX must be invoked 
as a defence by a responding party before a tribunal may consider it and even then 
only if it has found violation of another provision. GATT/WTO jurisprudence has 
already established that a responding party that invokes GATT Article XX(b) as an 
affirmative defence must show: “(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for 
which the provision was invoked fell within the range of policies designed to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; (2) that the inconsistent measures for which the 
exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfil the policy objective; and (3) that 
the measures were applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory 
clause of Article XX.”63  
In practice, most countries that tried to justify SPS measures on the basis of GATT 
Article XX(b) often failed on the necessity requirement, which is understood to mean 
                                                                                                                                                        
Imports Of Beef from Canada Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Canada: Report of the Panel adopted on 10 
March 1981 (L/5099 - 28S/92); Republic of Korea - Restrictions on Imports of Beef – (Complaint by 
Australia/New Zealand/United States), panel reports adopted on 7 November 1989 (L/6504 - 36S/202; 
L/6505 - 36S/234 and L/6503 - 36S/268); Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef (WT/DS161, WT/DS169, 2000); Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products (WT/DS98, 1999), Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and 
the Exportation of Dairy Products (WT/DS103, WT/DS113 in 1999 but dragged on until 2002). See 
also European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 2006).  
59  See GATT Article XX(b) and (g) respectively. 
60  As Sykes says, under the GATT, regulators were “free to adopt whatever regulations they wished, even 
if the regulations raised the costs of foreign suppliers disproportionately and thus had the effect of 
insulating domestic firms from foreign competition.” Alan Sykes, “Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, 
and Scientific Evidence Requirements: a Pessimistic View”, 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 
(Fall, 2002) p. 355.  
61  See Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes report of the panel 
(DS10/R BISD 37S/200) adopted November 1990, para. 73.  
62  In the words of the WTO Appellate Body, Article XX contains “limited exceptions from obligations 
under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in 
themselves” and that “it is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence should rest on 
the party asserting it”. US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (WT/DS33) AB Report, p. 14. 
63  See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/D02, 1996) AB Report, 
p. 38.  
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the least-trade-restrictive measure available to a country to achieve its policy goals.64 
The only case in which a GATT/WTO member successfully defended a measure on the 
basis of GATT Article XX(b) was EC Asbestos where a French ban on the manufacture, 
importation, exportation, and domestic sale and transfer of certain asbestos products 
on health grounds was found to be “necessary to protect human … life or health” 
within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.65  
GATT Article XX(b) was thus not easy to invoke as a justification for an otherwise 
illegal trade-restrictive measure. This does not however mean that GATT contracting 
parties abstained from the use of SPS measures for protectionist ends; it only means 
that they often did so in complete disregard of their GATT obligations. The frustration 
caused by this practice of using SPS measures for protectionist ends was reflected in 
the Punta del Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round in 1986, whose aim in 
this case was to minimize “the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture”.66 The protectionist aspect 
of SPS measures was so ingrained that many feared the promised agricultural 
liberalization of the Uruguay Round would be thwarted by countries resorting instead 
to SPS measures “as an alternative form of protection.”67 Developing countries tried 
to minimize this risk by pushing for “the widest possible use of international 
standards,”68 while many others, including the EC, argued for the right of countries to 
apply SPS standards more stringent than those agreed internationally, inter alia, 
because “countries which had achieved high health standards would find it difficult to 
accept moving to lower standards.”69 The result of this negotiation process is the SPS 
Agreement.  
Before turning to a brief analysis of the SPS Agreement, it is worthwhile to point out 
that the disagreement between the US and the EC over hormone-treated beef formed 
part of the negotiation background of this Agreement. The EC introduced a ban on the 
use of certain hormones domestically as far back as 1981,70 and imposed an import 
ban on hormone-treated beef effective 1 January 1989, right in the heat of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.71 The hormone dispute was thus seen both as an 
                                                 
64  The established approach to the interpretation of the term ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX, first 
articulated by the panel in US – Section 337 in respect of GATT Article XX(d), has been that “a 
contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as ‘necessary’ in 
terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and 
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it.  By the same token, in cases 
where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party 
is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions.” United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.26. The WTO AB has expressly affirmed this 
standard in Korea – Beef, See AB Report (WT/DS161 and WT/DS169), para. 166.  
65  See WTO, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing Products: 
Report of the Panel (WT/DS135, 2001), AB Report para, 175. 
66  See GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (MIN.DEC) adopted in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, on 20 September 1986, reproduced in GATT, Focus Newsletter, No. 41 (October 1986). 
67  See John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Geneva 
1995) p. 236. 
68  See Id. p. 237. 
69  See Id. p. 237. 
70  See Council Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981 concerning the prohibition of certain substances 
having a hormonal action and of any substances having a thyrostatic action, OJ L 222, 7.8.1981, pp. 32-
33.  
71  See Adrian Halpern, “Comment: The U.S. - E.C. Hormone Beef Controversy and the Standards Code: 
Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade”, 14 North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (1989). 
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indication of the need for GATT reform and an obstacle to that reform.72 In the words 
of one observer, the hormones disagreement “motivated much of the text” of the SPS 
Agreement.73 It was also the hormones dispute that later gave the WTO dispute 
settlement system and the Appellate Body in particular one of the first opportunities 
to clarify the meaning of key principles of the SPS Agreement. The livestock issues 
thus played a very direct role in shaping the text of the SPS Agreement and emerging 
jurisprudence afterwards. 
2.2.1.2 The WTO SPS Agreement 
The SPS Agreement that was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round elaborates the 
provisions of GATT Article XX(b), but also goes beyond that in some senses.74 Like 
GATT Article XX(b), the SPS Agreement also reaffirms that “no Member should be 
prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”. This is however subject to a series of conditions that are 
designed to ensure that such rights are not misused for protectionist purposes.75 Just 
like GATT Article XX, the SPS Agreement is also fundamentally about striking a 
balance between the sovereign right of states to adopt and enforce all measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health on the one hand, 
and the desire to promote international trade on non-discriminatory terms, on the 
other.76 Indeed, the SPS Agreement aims “to improve the human health, animal health 
                                                 
72  Michael B. Froman, “Recent Developments Note: The United States-European Community Hormone 
Treated Beef Conflict”, 30 Harvard International Law Journal (1989), p. 555. 
73  See David Wirth, “The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines”, 27 
Cornell International Law Journal 817 (Summer 1994), p. 824. 
74  The SPS Agreement provides for detailed rules governing the use of SPS measures by WTO members. 
Annex A to the SPS Agreement defines a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to mean “any measure 
applied: (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-
causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs; (c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the  Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests; or (d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the  Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests.” SPS measures thus include “all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production 
methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including 
relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary 
for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and 
methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.” 
75  The first paragraph of the Preamble of the SPS Agreement provides, for example, that such measures 
must not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.” Article 2 goes further and requires that such measures be “not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.” SPS Agreement provisions relevant to this include Article 2.2. which 
requires that SPS measures be “based on scientific principles” and are “not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence”; Article 2.3 which requires that such measures “not be applied in a 
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade”, and Article 5 which 
requires that such measures are based on risk assessment (“taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations”). 
76  The point at which the SPS Agreement strikes this balance and its interpretation by WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body has caused divisions among WTO law experts. Sykes agrees with the AB on its strict 
construction of particularly the scientific evidence requirement of the SPS Agreement as an only way to 
prevent such conditions being reduced to mere “window dressing” (see Sykes 2002, supra n. 60, p. 
368). Guzman, on the other hand, argues that the WTO’s approach is “inappropriately intrusive” and 
that all reviews of national measures by panels and the AB must be limited to transparency and 
procedural requirements of the SPS Agreement. Andrew Guzman, “Food Fears: Health and Safety at the 
WTO”, 45(1) Virginia Journal of International Law (2004), pp. 1-39. See also J. Wagner, “The WTO's 
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and phytosanitary situation in all Members”,77 an objective that is often forgotten in 
the commercially-centred debate that often characterizes this subject. Finally, the 
SPS Agreement also aims to establish “a multilateral framework of rules and 
disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade”.78  
The WTO’s approach to the twin objectives of respecting, and even supporting, 
member countries’ rights to protect human, animal and plant health and safety on the 
one hand, and minimizing the adverse trade effects of such safety measures on the 
other, is effectively to trust science and leave countries free to do whatever they like 
provided they can find scientific justification for it.79 In practice, this has meant two 
things: (1) to encourage the harmonization of SPS measures around international 
standards80 and (2) to recognize the right of countries to set their standards at 
whatever level they deem appropriate, even higher than the level of corresponding 
international standards, provided, inter alia, that they are based on scientific 
principles and have scientific justification. 
In pursuing its objective of encouraging the harmonization of SPS standards, the SPS 
Agreement identified a non-exhaustive list of three international organizations – the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for food standards,81 the OIE for animal 
health82 and the institutions under the auspices of the International Plant Protection 
Convention83 for plant health – often called the “three sisters”. The standards set by 
the OIE and Codex are particularly relevant to the livestock industry and this chapter 
aims to provide an overview of how these institutions affect trade in this sector and 
the effectiveness of IGAD and its member states’ representation in these institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Interpretation of the SPS Agreement has Undermined the Right of Governments to Establish 
Appropriate Levels of Protection Against Risk”, 31 Law & Policy International Business (2000), pp. 
855-860; and Bruce Silverglade, “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?”, 55 Food and Drug Law Journal (2000), pp. 
517-524. Victor thinks the very concern is misplaced, arguing instead that “the latitude afforded to 
nations in setting their own food safety standards is so large that nearly all bona fide attempts to protect 
food safety will be consistent with the SPS Agreement.” See David Victor, “The Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment after Five Years”, 32 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2000), pp. 865-937, at 872.  
77  See SPS Agreement preamble, para. 2. 
78  See SPS Agreement preamble, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
79  Note that the use of science as the arbiter in cases involving product standards was first introduced into 
the multilateral trading system by the Tokyo Round standards code. See in particular Article 14 of the 
Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Geneva: GATT, 12 April 1979) calling on 
technical expert groups to examine the ‘detailed scientific judgements involved’ in a dispute. For more 
on this, see Doaa Abdel Motaal, “The ‘Multilateral Scientific Consensus’ and the World Trade 
Organization”, 38(5) Journal of World Trade (2004), pp. 855-876. 
80  Annex A (para. 2) to the SPS Agreement defines harmonization to mean: “The establishment, 
recognition and application of common sanitary and phytosanitary measures by different Members.” 
For a discussion of harmonization as understood in the field of international trade law more broadly, see 
David Leeborn, “Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims”, in Bhagwati 
and Hudec (1997), Vol. I, supra n. 56, pp. 41-117. 
81  Codex food safety standards, guidelines and recommendations recognized by the SPS Agreement are 
those relating to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of 
analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice. See Annex A:3(a) of the SPS 
Agreement. 
82  OIE sets standards, guidelines and recommendations for animal health and zoonoses. See Annex A:3(b) 
of the SPS Agreement. 
83  The IPPC system sets standards, guidelines and recommendations for plant health. See Annex A:3(c) of 
the SPS Agreement. 
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2.2.2 The SPS Agreement, Harmonization of Standards and Livestock Trade 
The harmonization of food standards has unquestionable trade-enhancing potential. A 
World Bank study in 2001 attempted to quantify the estimated effect of aflatoxin 
standards in 15 importing (four developing) countries on exports from 31 countries (21 
developing).84 The authors concluded that “adopting a worldwide standard for 
aflatoxin B1 … based on current international guidelines is found to increase the 
cereal and nut trade among the countries studied by US$ 6.1 billion from the 1998 
levels. … total world exports would rise by US$ 38.8 billion if an international standard 
(Codex) were adopted, compared to the current divergent national standards in 
place.”85 They further concluded that harmonization of this food safety standard at a 
level more stringent than one suggested by international standards indicates that 
“food safety standards can severely limit developing country exports.”86 This study 
thus provides some empirical proof to the long-standing belief that harmonized 
standards would facilitate international trade.87  
As noted earlier, Article 3 of the SPS Agreement requires of members to “base” their 
SPS measures “on international standards, guidelines or recommendations” developed 
by institutions like Codex and OIE. The purpose of Article 3 is to harmonize SPS 
measures on as wide a basis as possible, a purpose that has been identified in the 
preamble of the SPS Agreement. Article 12 of the SPS Agreement also establishes a 
Committee on SPS Measures whose tasks include “furtherance of [the Agreement’s] 
objectives, in particular with respect to harmonization” and “encourag[ing] the use of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations by all Members”.88 The 
Committee is explicitly required to develop a procedure to monitor the process of 
international harmonization and coordinate efforts in this regard with the relevant 
international organizations.89  
This way, it was hoped that “a roster of objective, scientifically based” standards 
would be developed which would then serve as “a potential safeguard for developing 
countries against developed nation efforts to disguise trade barriers as safety 
standards.”90 In the words of the WTO Appellate Body, “[t]he ultimate goal of the 
harmonization of SPS measures is to prevent the use of such measures for arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between Members or as a disguised restriction on 
international trade, without preventing Members from adopting or enforcing measures 
which are both ‘necessary to protect’ human life or health and ‘based on scientific 
principles’, and without requiring them to change their appropriate level of 
protection.”91 
                                                 
84  Aflatoxins are toxic compounds that contaminate foods such as cereals and nuts and “have been 
associated with acute liver carcinogens in humans”. See John Wilson and Tsunehiro Otsuki, Global 
Trade and Food Safety: Winners and Losers in a Fragmented System, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2689, (October 2001). 
85  See Id.  
86  See Id. p. 20. 
87  Already in the early 1900s, food trade associations made attempts “to facilitate world trade through the 
use of harmonized standards”. See FAO/WHO, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius (1999), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e03.htm. This incidentally appears to have 
happened soon after the so-called “new era of long-distance food transportation” was ushered in by “the 
first international shipments of frozen meat from Australia and New Zealand to the United Kingdom” in 
the late 1800s. Id.  
88  See Article 12:1 and 2 of SPS Agreement.  
89  See Articles 3(5) and 12(4) of the SPS Agreement. 
90  See James Steinberg and Michael Mazarr, Developing Country Participation in Transnational 
Decision-making: Lessons for IT Governance, pp. 5-6, available at 
www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/lessons_it_governance.pdf. The authors add, however, that “in 
practice … developing nation influence has remained weak.”  
91  See AB report in Hormones, para. 177. 
 25
The practical significance of this requirement has been clarified by the WTO AB in the 
EC Beef Hormones case, where it highlighted the distinction between national 
standards based on international standards and those that conform to international 
standards. The AB ruled that the SPS Agreement only imposes a requirement to base 
national measures on international standards and not necessarily to conform to such 
standards. As long as members demonstrate that their measures are built upon 
international standards such as by incorporating “only some, not all, of the elements 
of the standard”, they have satisfied their requirements under Article 3.92 Interpreting 
a similar language under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement,93 the AB further clarified 
that “there must be a very strong and very close relationship between two things in 
order to be able to say that one is ‘the basis for’ the other.”94 According to the AB, a 
national measure that contradicts with an international standard cannot be said to 
have been based on that international standard.95  
However, although the SPS Agreement does not oblige countries to incorporate 
international standards in full, it has an in-built incentive scheme designed to 
encourage them to do exactly that. This incentive comes in the shape of a favourable 
legal presumption under Article 3.2, which provides that national measures that 
conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations “shall be deemed 
to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.”  
In cases where countries decide to maintain sanitary measures that result in a higher 
level of protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards, they will need to base them on risk assessment96 and have “a 
scientific justification”.97 Indeed, Article 5:7 of the SPS Agreement contemplates a 
situation in which countries may adopt provisional SPS measures on a precautionary 
basis “in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”. This is an expression 
of the precautionary principle in the field of health regulation.98 Under such 
circumstances, countries are required to be actively seeking additional information 
necessary for an objective assessment that would lead to a definitive determination of 
                                                 
92  See AB report in Hormones, para. 164.  
93  The TBT Agreement also recognizes the importance of international standards and, like the SPS 
Agreement, requires that Members use relevant international standards “as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.” See TBT 
Agreement preamble paras. 3 and 4 and Art. 2.4. 
94  AB report in Sardines, para. 245. 
95  AB report in Sardines, para. 249. 
96  The SPS Agreement defines risk assessment to mean the following: “The evaluation of the likelihood of 
entry,  establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member 
according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated 
potential biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects 
on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.” See Paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement. 
97  See SPS Agreement Article 3.3. 
98  The AB observed in EC Beef Hormones that the precautionary principle “finds reflection in Article 5.7 
of the SPS Agreement” but that it “has not been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for 
justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in 
particular provisions of that Agreement.” Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 123-124. 
More recently, the EC Biotech panel recognized that “provisions explicitly or implicitly applying the 
precautionary principle have been incorporated into numerous international conventions and 
declarations” but concluded that the question of whether the precautionary principle constitutes a 
recognized principle of general or customary international law is still a matter of ongoing debate on 
which it refrained from taking a position. See EC Biotech panel report, paras. 7.88-7.89. 
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the issues within a reasonable time. Neither the precautionary measures nor those 
that go beyond international standards will benefit from the legal presumption of 
consistency with the SPS Agreement.  
The importance of the distinction between presumption of consistency of measures 
based on international standards and recognition of members’ right to introduce 
standards stricter than those based on international standards and its implications for 
the standard-setting institutions of OIE and Codex was obvious from the outset, but its 
practical ramifications became clearer only gradually. Not only did the SPS Agreement 
recognize them as institutions that set their standards, guidelines and 
recommendations as scientifically justified benchmarks ‘against which national 
measures and regulations are evaluated’, it also effectively transformed the status of 
these instruments to international standards with potential serious legal 
consequences. In the words of Codex, since 1995 its standards “have become an 
integral part of the legal framework within which international trade is being 
facilitated through harmonization. Already, they have been used as the benchmark in 
international trade disputes, and it is expected that they will be used increasingly in 
this regard.”99  
As the Appellate Body has shown in EC Beef Hormones, this does not mean that the 
SPS Agreement has made Codex or OIE standards mandatory rules that every WTO 
member country must adopt.100 Yet, the recognition still carries serious legal 
consequences. At the procedural level, conformity with international standards 
automatically results in a legal presumption that it is consistent with the relevant 
provisions of the SPS Agreement and of the GATT. This in effect means that the 
burden to rebut this legal presumption, i.e. to prove that the measures, despite being 
in full conformity with the international standards, are inconsistent with any 
provisions of the SPS Agreement or GATT, will shift from the respondent back to the 
complainant. Although theoretically possible, this is unlikely to succeed in WTO 
dispute settlement and a WTO Member that adopts an international standard in its 
entirety is likely to survive any WTO legal challenge whatsoever. However, the only 
obligation under the SPS Agreement is for WTO members to “base” their national 
standards on international standards, and not necessarily to fully adopt, and therefore 
conform to, such international standards. To the extent they limit themselves only to 
the former, they do not benefit from any presumption of conformity and the standard 
procedure in terms of burden of proof, etc. will apply.  
To sum up, from the perspective of IGAD and other developing countries, three points 
are worth emphasising here. Firstly, despite its aim “to improve the human health, 
animal health and phytosanitary situation in all Members”,101 the SPS Agreement does 
not require WTO members to have any SPS laws, let alone impose a minimum SPS 
standard that they have to put in place. Secondly, despite its aim to minimize the 
negative effects of standards on trade through establishment of “a multilateral 
framework of rules and disciplines” to guide their development, adoption and 
enforcement, countries are still free to adopt their standards unilaterally, going 
beyond what is provided by the recognized international standard setting institutions. 
                                                 
99  See Understanding Codex (1999) supra n. 87. 
100  Reversing the EC Beef Hormones panel ruling on this subject, the AB observed that harmonization of 
WTO Members’ SPS measures on the basis of international standards is only “a goal, yet to be realized in 
the future” and “to read Article 3.1 as requiring Members to harmonize their SPS measures by conforming 
those measures with international standards, guidelines and recommendations, in the here and now, is, in 
effect, to vest such international standards, guidelines and recommendations (which are by the terms of the 
Codex recommendatory in form and nature) with obligatory force and effect.  The Panel's interpretation of 
Article 3.1 would, in other words, transform those standards, guidelines and recommendations into 
binding norms.  But, as already noted, the SPS Agreement itself sets out no indication of any intent on the 
part of the Members to do so.” See AB report in Hormones, para. 165.  
101  See SPS Agreement preamble, para. 2. 
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And, finally, the AB has specifically recognized a WTO member’s right to “determine 
its own appropriate level of protection to be ‘zero risk’”,102 which by definition rules 
out the concept of proportionality between the interest pursued (i.e. 100% protection 
from risk) and the harm that this could inflict (e.g. its impact on the economic 
condition of those countries that are not able to satisfy every SPS requirement that 
may be imposed in the pursuit of such goals).103 
As will be demonstrated below, IGAD member states lack the technical capacity to 
satisfy Codex and OIE standards. The moment different developed countries impose 
different standards of their own that go beyond these international standards, as they 
have already done in several areas,104 the challenge for IGAD member states becomes 
insurmountable. The IGAD livestock sector has been particularly a victim of such 
development. To this extent, efforts by IGAD member states to raise the health 
standards of their livestock products with a view to meeting importing country 
standards could be illusory and perhaps not worth the effort. Developed countries still 
set standards with a view as much to protecting their consumers against unsafe food 
as protecting the domestic food producer from foreign competition. Seen from this 
perspective, one wonders whether the SPS Agreement has done anything at all to 
resolve developing country concerns.  
 
2.3 IGAD and International Standard-Setting Institutions Relevant to 
Livestock 
The livestock industry is one in which two of the three standard-setting scientific 
institutions identified by the SPS Agreement directly converge – the OIE on animal 
health and Codex on food safety standards.105 In general terms, the OIE deals primarily 
with animal health and Codex with food safety. But, sometimes, it can be difficult to 
draw the line in the livestock product chain between where OIE standards end and 
Codex standards begin. A simple example is the case of zoonoses, i.e. diseases that 
can be transmitted from animals to humans including through food. The OIE has the 
primary mandate for zoonoses but, to the extent these can also affect food safety, 
they also fall under the Codex mandate. Another example would be animal feed. 
While it appears at first sight that animal feed is a matter for the OIE, it is also 
obvious that what the animals are fed may ultimately determine whether the meat of 
                                                 
102  See AB report in Australia Salmon, para. 125. 
103  A World Bank paper quantifies the impact of standards on aflatoxins implemented by the EU on food 
exports from African countries. The authors find that the implementation of new EU standards that are 
higher than those suggested by Codex “will have a significant negative impact on African exports of 
cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe. The EU standard, which would reduce health risk by 
approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, will decrease these African exports by 64% or US$ 670 
million in contrast to regulation set at an international standard.” See John Wilson, Tsunehiro Otsuki, 
and Mirvat Sewadeh, A Race to the Top? A Case Study of Food Safety Standards and African Exports, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2563 (February 2001). For similar observations, see 
Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden, Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open 
Global System (Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 2004), p. 47.  
104  For example, “US and Canadian regulations regarding meat and cattle imports from countries with BSE 
were, and still are, much stricter” than those recommended by the OIE. See Loppacher and Kerr, supra 
n. 37, p. 430. At a Codex review meeting, several developing countries complained that “many of their 
problems in trade arose from the fact that trading partners did not apply Codex standards and that as a 
result they had to meet a variety of different national requirements applied by importing countries.” See 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/W9809E/w9809e08.htm.  
105  Note that the TBT Agreement also recognizes international standard-setting organizations such as Codex 
provided their membership is “open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members” of the WTO. Codex 
has thus been recognized as an international body within the meaning of paragraph 4 of Annex 1 of the 
TBT Agreement by the Sardines panel and its Standard for Canned Sardines and Sardine-type Product 
as relevant standard for purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. See Sardines panel report, paras. 
7.65-7.70. 
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the animals could cause any food hazards down the food chain. Codex thus has a code 
of practice on good animal feeding whose aim is “to help ensure the safety of food for 
human consumption through adherence to good animal feeding practice at the farm 
level and good manufacturing practices (GMPs) during the procurement, handling, 
storage, processing and distribution of animal feed and feed ingredients for food 
producing animals.”106 Likewise, it is no wonder that the OIE identified food safety as 
a “high priority area” for its 2001-2005 strategic plan.107 Thus, although the OIE and 
Codex are supposed to deal respectively with the farm and fork ends of the food 
chain,108 these two ends may not always be easy to separate and the risks of overlap 
and duplication of standards and the possibility of inconsistent standards coming from 
these two institutions have been recognized. It was in appreciation of these 
challenges that the OIE established in 2002 a permanent Working Group on Animal 
Production Food Safety (APFS) in order to “coordinate the food safety activities of the 
OIE and to ensure a seamless cooperation with Codex”.109 This section provides a 
general background about these two institutions using relevant standards to illustrate 
the nature and effect of such standards and the extent to which IGAD member states 
are able to make use of them to enhance their export opportunities. 
2.3.1 The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
Established in 1924, the OIE is an important player in the field of international trade 
in animals and animal products. The OIE was created in response to the rinderpest 
outbreak in Europe in the early 1920s, but its disease coverage has always been 
broader and open-ended. The Organic Statute of the OIE identified nine types of 
animal diseases: rinderpest, rabies, foot and mouth disease (FMD), glanders, 
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), dourine, anthrax, swine fever, and sheep 
pox. Of these, rinderpest and FMD were singled out as diseases of the highest priority 
and members undertook the obligation to notify immediately the first outbreak of 
these two diseases. The overall list of diseases as well as the priority list has come a 
long way since 1924.110 The OIE membership has also grown from 28 in 1924 to 168 
countries today. Although no sub-Saharan country was present at its founding,111 all 
seven IGAD member states are now members of the OIE.  
The highest decision making organ in the OIE is the International Committee that is 
composed of “technical representatives” of member countries and every member has 
one vote. The Committee meets at least once a year and its day-to-day operation is 
managed by the Central Bureau headed by a Director General. An Administrative 
Commission made up of the President and vice-President of the International 
                                                 
106  See Codex, Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding (CAC/RCP 54-2004)  
107  See Willem Droppers, “OIE philosophy, policy and procedures for the development of food safety 
standards”, in 25(2) OIE Scientific and Technical Review (OIE, 2006) pp. 805-812.  
108  Willem Droppers noted that, in the farm to fork animal product chain, the OIE focuses on “protecting 
consumers from food-borne hazards arising from animals at the primary production level of the food 
chain (‘farm’)” while Codex is “focusing on human health outcomes (‘fork’)”. Id. p. 806. 
109  See Droppers, Id. P. 806. For further information on the collaborative activities of the OIE and Codex in 
the development of food standards, see S. Slorach, “Assuring food safety: the complementary tasks and 
standards of the World Organisation for Animal Health and the Codex Alimentarius Commission”, in 
25(2) OIE Scientific and Technical Review (OIE, 2006) pp. 813-821.  
110  The OIE notifiable diseases list for terrestrial animals today contains 23 multiple species diseases, 15 
cattle diseases, 11 sheep and goat diseases, 13 equine diseases, seven swine diseases, 14 avian diseases, 
two lagomorph (e.g. rabbits) diseases, six bee diseases and two other diseases. See OIE listed diseases 
2007 set out in Chapter 2.1.1. of the Terrestrial Code. 
111  The founding members are: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Finland, 
France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Morocco, Mexico, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, the Czechoslovak Republic, 
and Tunisia. See preamble to the OIE Agreement of 1924. 
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Committee, the immediate Past-President, two auditors and four representatives of 
member countries elected by the Committee represents the Committee during the 
intervals.112  
Article 4 of the 1924 OIE Statute lists three main objectives for the Office: “[1] to 
promote and co-ordinate all experimental and other research work concerning the 
pathology or prophylaxis of contagious diseases of livestock for which international 
collaboration is deemed desirable; [2] to collect and bring to the attention of the 
Governments or their sanitary services, all facts and documents of general interest 
concerning the spread of epizootic diseases and the means used to control them; and 
[3]to examine international draft agreements regarding animal sanitary measures and 
to provide signatory Governments with the means of supervising their 
enforcement.”113 These objectives have evolved over time and the OIE official website 
identifies five areas of work today: (1) to ensure transparency in the global animal 
disease situation; (2) to collect, analyse and disseminate veterinary scientific 
information; (3) to provide expertise and encourage international solidarity in the 
control of animal diseases; (4) to safeguard world trade by publishing health standards 
for international trade in animals and animal products; and (5) to improve the legal 
framework and resources of national veterinary services. Indeed, as noted earlier, the 
OIE has gradually expanded its sphere of activity beyond animal health and has 
increasingly become a player in the development of food safety standards. The 
development of “standards aimed at protecting consumers from food-borne hazards 
arising from animals at the primary production level of the food chain”114 is thus 
currently one of its major responsibilities. 
The role of the OIE in international trade has always been significant, but its mandate 
in this field received a huge boost from the WTO SPS Agreement which specifically 
refers to the OIE as one of three scientific institutions compliance with whose 
standards creates several legal implications within the WTO system itself. A key player 
in the development of sanitary standards relevant for the livestock industry is the OIE 
Terrestrial Animal Health Commission. The first task listed in the Commission’s terms 
of reference is “to promote the adoption by the International Committee of animal 
health (including zoonoses), animal welfare and animal production food safety 
standards, guidelines and recommendations concerning trade or international 
movement of mammals, birds and bees, and their products.” These standards, 
guidelines and recommendations are “designed to minimise the risks of transmitting 
diseases … while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers.”115 The key challenge for the 
OIE thus lies here – how to minimise the genuine risk of disease transmission without 
creating an excuse for otherwise protectionist measures. The tool used by the OIE to 
achieve this goal lies, in principle, with science, but many observers agree that 
science may not always be used as neutrally as would be assumed; several factors, 
including commercial interests, also play a significant role in the standard 
development process.116 
In its fight against animal diseases, the OIE until recently maintained a classification 
of diseases into two broad categories based on their risk gravity – Category A diseases, 
which covered some 15 of the most dangerous ones, including rinderpest, FMD and Rift 
                                                 
112  See Article 8 of the Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties (appended to, and an 
integral part of, the International Agreement for the Creation of an Office International des Epizooties 
in Paris, Done in Paris, 25 January 1924) and Article 8 of the General Rules of the OIE of 24 May 
1973.  
113  See Id. Article 4 of the Organic Statutes of the OIE. 
114  See Droppers, supra n. 107, P. 810.  
115  See http://www.oie.int/tahsc/eng/en_tahsc.htm. 
116  See for example Thorsten Hüller and Matthias L. Maier, “Fixing the Codex? Global Food-Safety 
Governance Under Review” in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.) Constitutionalism, 
Multilateral Trade Governance and Social regulation (Oxford 2006) pp. 267-299.  
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Valley fever, and Category B diseases, which included such other diseases as anthrax 
and rabies. This has changed now and all diseases are put in a single OIE list of 
notifiable diseases. For almost all notifiable diseases, the OIE, through its Specialist 
Commissions, develops two types of animal health standards – trade standards and 
biological standards.117 The most important standard for our purposes is what is called 
the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, which aims “to assure the sanitary safety of 
international trade in terrestrial animals (mammals, birds and bees) … and their 
products.” It does this “through the detailing of health measures to be used by the 
veterinary services or other competent authorities of importing and exporting 
countries in establishing health regulations for the safe importation of animals and 
animal products. Such measures aim to avoid the transfer of agents pathogenic for 
animals and/or humans, without the imposition of unjustified trade restrictions.”118  
Pursuing its philosophy that disease freedom is the best guarantee of safety, the OIE 
has since the 1990s developed detailed procedures by which countries or parts thereof 
could be recognized as free of some of the most contagious and economically 
damaging animal diseases, thereby becoming the only international body that can 
confer a disease-free status on countries or zones within countries for such diseases. 
OIE recognition of a country or part of it as disease-free is considered “essential” for 
countries that engage in international trade; indeed this can be the single most 
important factor in an otherwise resource-rich country’s ability to export its animals 
and animal products.  
The OIE has so far established an official list of disease-free countries for four of the 
most important animal diseases – FMD, rinderpest, CBPP and BSE. Three of these 
diseases (i.e. except BSE), together with RVF, have effectively crippled IGAD member 
states’ ability to export livestock products for a long time. The challenge posed by 
sanitary standards is best illustrated by the fact that “producers in most of the world, 
including China, Mexico, and Japan, cannot export chicken meat to the United States 
because of the danger of infecting U.S. flocks with Exotic Newcastle disease.”119 If 
such highly developed countries as Japan cannot satisfy US sanitary requirements, one 
has to wonder whether it makes any sense to think about potential livestock exports 
from the IGAD region to the advanced countries.  
Precisely because of this problem, a growing number of experts question the very 
philosophy of the global approach to animal health and food safety. They argue that 
disease-free status, while certainly a worthy goal in itself, is not necessarily the most 
efficient way to achieve food safety. Product safety rather than disease control 
and/or eradication is the goal of existing rules of international trade, and an 
acceptable degree of safety can be achieved by following a commodity-based 
approach with proper sanitary and hygiene regulation, certification and inspection 
mechanisms. An acceptable level of product safety can be achieved without 
necessarily achieving a disease-free status.120  
                                                 
117  The biological standard for terrestrial animals is called the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for 
Terrestrial Animals which provides “a harmonised approach to disease diagnosis by describing 
internationally agreed laboratory diagnostic techniques.” See OIE International Standards, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/guide%20to%20OIE%20intl%20standards%20v6.pdf.  
118  Id. 
119  Id. John Dyck and Kenneth Nelson, “Structure of the Global Markets for Meat”, Economic Research 
Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 785, 2003, p. 8. 
120  See for example G. Thomson et al., “International trade in livestock and livestock products: the need for 
a commodity-based approach”, 55 (14) The Veterinary Record (2004) pp. 429-433. See also Ian 
Scoones and William Wolmer, Livestock, Disease, Trade and Markets: Policy Choices for the Livestock 
Sector in Africa, IDS Working Paper 269 (June 2006). According to AU-IBAR, “there are simple, 
realistic and achievable alternatives to improving access to high value livestock commodity markets 
without the necessity of first eradicating all ‘epizootic diseases’.” AU-IBAR, “Improved Market Access 
for African Livestock Commodities”, Policy Briefing Paper No. 11. 
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2.3.1.1 Animal Diseases and IGAD Livestock Trade  
As noted earlier, the animal disease situation of the IGAD region is perhaps the single 
most important reason why the livestock wealth of the region has not been translated 
into meaningful export revenues for those countries. Kenya’s Livestock Minister 
Joseph Munyao identified animal disease as one of two “major challenges” affecting 
Kenya’s export opportunities in the sector, the other being marketing infrastructure, 
and considers the “creation of disease-free zones as one of the vital strategies for 
addressing the issues of access to international markets.”121 The same policy direction 
is being pursued by Ethiopia and Sudan. 
Many of the most contagious animal diseases are already endemic in the IGAD region. 
This section provides a summary of the status of IGAD member states in terms of just 
three livestock diseases: rinderpest, FMD, and Rift Valley fever. The purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate how the OIE approach to particular diseases works and how 
IGAD member states are affected by this approach. The three diseases discussed here 
have been selected due to their significance to the region, but a number of other 
almost equally significant diseases are not covered.122  
2.3.1.1.1 Rinderpest  
Rinderpest is one of the most contagious viral animal diseases whose severity 
persuaded the world to get together and establish the OIE in 1924. As a disease of the 
highest priority, rinderpest also received the most attention and perhaps resources 
over the past several decades and is the animal disease that is closest to complete 
eradication from the world.123  
The OIE has a three-step process by which countries achieve the status of freedom 
from rinderpest: (1) self-declaration by a country that it is provisionally free from 
rinderpest (which can be done after the country is ‘satisfied that it is free from 
rinderpest and that the disease is unlikely to be re-introduced’); (2) OIE declaration 
that a country is free from rinderpest disease following international verification of 
the claims of countries (which takes place at least three years after a country has 
declared itself provisionally free from rinderpest); and (3)  OIE declaration that a 
country is free from rinderpest infection (which takes place at least one year later and 
subject to stricter criteria).124 Any country or zone that does not qualify for any one of 
the above categories of disease freedom is considered a rinderpest-infected 
country.125 
From the perspective of international trade, the OIE has detailed guidelines on what 
veterinary authorities of importing countries need to do in respect of rinderpest 
                                                 
121  See Munyao speech, supra n. 12.  
122  For example, prevalence of CBPP in Africa is believed to be one of the obstacles against livestock 
exports from the continent so much so that, according to some experts, it is “either the first or second 
most important disease in pastoral systems of the Masai and Afar and ranked as second or third in 
importance by the agropastoralists in Ethiopia”. See Jonathan Rushton, Anni McLeod and Juan 
Lubroth, “Managing transboundary animal disease”, FAO Livestock Report 2006 (Rome 2006), pp. 29-
44. Kenya’s Ministry of Livestock lists the following as “the most important notifiable diseases in 
Kenya”: FMD, Anthrax, CBPP, Rabies, Lumpy Skin Disease, Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia 
(CCPP), New Castle Disease, East Coast Fever and Trypanosomiasis. It also noted that rinderpest has 
not been reported for over ten years. See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 26. 
123  The FAO currently has what is called the Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme (GREP) which 
aims to eliminate rinderpest from the world by the year 2010. For more information on this project, see 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGAInfo/programmes/en/grep/home.html.   
124  For the details, see Chapter 2.2.12 and Appendix 3.8.2 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code – 2006. 
125  Article 2.2.12.5. of the Terrestrial Code provides: “When the requirements for acceptance as an 
infection free country, a disease free country or zone, or a provisionally free country or zone are not 
fulfilled, a country or zone shall be considered as infected.” 
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depending on the disease status of the exporting country – i.e. infection free, disease 
free, provisionally disease-free or infected. For example, according to Article 2.2.12.7 
of the Terrestrial Code, when importing from infection-free countries, veterinary 
administrations should require, for ruminants and swine, the presentation of an 
international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals showed no clinical sign 
of rinderpest on the day of shipment and remained in an infection-free country since 
birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment. If the imports come from a disease-free 
rather than an infection-free country or zone, however, additional conditions have to 
be met, such as the requirement that they be subjected to a diagnostic test on two 
occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days.126 The 
conditions get more stringent for imports from countries that are declared 
provisionally free or still infected. The conditions applying to the importation of 
livestock products such as meat are different from those applying to live animals, in 
many cases requiring that the animals be slaughtered in an approved abattoir and 
prescribing transport conditions and removal of lymphatic glands.127  
Rinderpest is believed to have been eradicated from the whole of Africa except a 
corner of the IGAD region along the common border region of Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Somalia.128 However, only Eritrea has so far achieved OIE recognition as being free 
from rinderpest infection; Sudan and Uganda have achieved the second level, i.e. 
status of being free from rinderpest disease and are presumably now working towards 
achieving recognition for freedom from rinderpest infection.129 Djibouti, Ethiopia and 
Kenya130 have the status of self-declared provisional freedom from rinderpest disease 
either for the whole country or for specified zones according to the provisions of 
Chapter 2.2.12. of the Terrestrial Code.131 This means that livestock products from 
major IGAD exporters like Ethiopia and Somalia will have to satisfy the more stringent 
requirements set by the OIE for countries that are considered either infected or only 
provisionally free. The effect very often is total denial of access to a large number of 
foreign markets, including virtually all developed countries. 
The irony is inescapable when one considers the role of rinderpest in IGAD livestock 
export trade, particularly to Europe. History has recorded that the disease first 
entered Ethiopia in 1887 through Massawa on the Red Sea coast “from Indian cattle for 
the Italian army”, which had established its colony over the coastal province of 
Ethiopia at the time, which it renamed Eritrea in 1890.132 The effect was devastating; 
Ethiopia is believed to have lost about 95% of its cattle, which triggered one of the 
                                                 
126  See Article 2.2.12.8 of the Terrestrial Code.  
127  See Articles 2.2.12.18 to 2.2.12.22 of the Terrestrial Code.  
128  Discussions with officials of the AU-IBAR, Nairobi, on 06 September 2006.  
129  See Bryony Jones, “The OIE Pathway to Freedom from Rinderpest: current status of Southern Sudan”, 
October 2006, p. 23, available at http://www.vsf-belgium.org/dzf/view/en/395.  
130  According to Aklilu, Kenya once had OIE-recognized disease-free zones in the Central regions, but this 
status was later lost because much of the infrastructure built by the Livestock Marketing Department 
(LMD) and the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) fell into disrepair. See Yacob Aklilu, An Audit of the 
Livestock Marketing Status in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan (Nairobi, April 2002, Vol. II), p. 6. 
According to Professor Leonard, the more serious problem was corrupt movement of animals from 
diseased to disease-free zones. He argued that maintenance of the disease-free zone was difficult, inter 
alia, because: “Livestock prices were higher inside it because of the privileged access to market that it 
brought. The temptations to evade the quarantine were high. … [T]here were too many incentives for 
too many people to use influence or bribes to evade the quarantine.” David Leonard, African Successes: 
Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
 c1991) available at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft8p3008fh, p. 165. 
131  See OIE, OIE official 'disease-free' status, http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_peste.htm?e1d6#free.  
132  According to Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde, “the famine started as a result of the outbreak of a 
rinderpest epidemic triggered by Italian importation of infected cattle through Massawa.” See Zewde, A 
History of Modern Ethiopia 1855—1974 (Ohio University Press, Ohio 1991) p. 72. 
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worst human tragedies in the country’s history. The degree of starvation and famine 
that this disease triggered, which was exacerbated by drought, is such that it is still 
remembered as kefu qan, which literally means the ‘evil days’.133 Italian colonialism 
in the region ended with World War II, but the disease it introduced over a century 
ago remains to this day as one of the main obstacles against IGAD livestock exports to 
Europe and beyond.  
2.3.1.1.2 Foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
According to the OIE, FMD is one of the most contagious viral diseases that affects 
cloven-hoofed mammals and has a great potential to cause severe economic loss.134 
FMD has always been a priority disease for the OIE. Not only was this one of two high-
priority diseases identified by the OIE constituent document in 1924, the other being 
rinderpest,135 it was also the first disease for which the OIE established an official list 
of disease free countries without vaccination in 1996. This, according to the OIE, is 
“due to its highly contagious nature and economic importance for many countries”.136 
The impact of an FMD outbreak can be devastating to the economy of a country. The 
2001 FMD outbreak in the UK was estimated to have cost over US$ 9.2 billion to the 
British economy.137 A 2001 USDA study put FMD as one of the two “most serious” 
animal diseases today, along with BSE.138 
The OIE has a procedure by which a country or a zone within a country can be 
recognized as FMD-free without vaccination or FMD-free with vaccination. Any country 
or zone that does not satisfy the requirements for either of these options is considered 
an FMD-infected country.139 To be recognized as FMD-free without vaccination, a 
country must have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting and send a 
declaration to the OIE stating that: there has been no outbreak of FMD during the past 
12 months; no evidence of FMDV infection has been found during the past 12 months; 
and no vaccination against FMD has been carried out during the past 12 months. 
Furthermore, such a country must also supply documented evidence that surveillance 
for both FMD and FMDV infection is in operation, regulatory measures for the 
prevention and control of FMD have been implemented and that it has not imported, 
since the cessation of vaccination, any animals vaccinated against FMD.140 The trade 
reward for such an achievement comes in the form of lighter demands from the 
veterinary authorities of importing countries, such as, for live animal imports, the 
presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals 
showed no clinical sign of FMD on the day of shipment, were kept in an FMD-free 
country or zone, where vaccination is not practised, since birth or for at least the past 
three months, and have not been vaccinated.141 FMD-infected countries, on the other 
hand, must provide a veterinary certificate with several additional requirements 
                                                 
133  International Atomic Energy Agency, History of battle against rinderpest, available at http://www-
naweb.iaea.org/nafa/aph/stories/2005-rinderpest-history.html.  
134  See http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_fmd.htm. The impact of FMD on livestock differs from place to 
place and species to species. For more on this, see B. Perry and K. Rich, “Poverty impacts of foot-and-
mouth disease and the poverty reduction implications of its control”, 160 The Veterinary Record 
(2007), pp. 238-241. 
135  See Article 5 the Organic Statutes of the OIE, supra n. 112. 
136  See http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_fmd.htm?e1d6.  
137  See N. Morgan and A. Prakash, “International livestock markets and the impact of animal disease”, in 
25(2) OIE Scientific and Technical Review (OIE, 2006) p. 520. 
138  See Dale Leuck, The New Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Background and Issues for the U.S. Beef 
Sector (US Economic Research Service, 2001) p. 6, available at 
http://www.ers.US.gov/publications/ldp/dec01/ldp8901.pdf.  
139  See Articles 2.2.10.2 to 2.2.10.6 of the Terrestrial Code.  
140  See Article 2.2.10.2 of the Terrestrial Code. 
141  See Article 2.2.10.9 of the Terrestrial Code. 
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including proof of isolation in an establishment or quarantine station for 30 days prior 
to shipment and proof of diagnostic tests on all animals for evidence of FMDV infection 
with negative results at the end of that period.142 The difference in the sanitary 
requirement for the importation of fresh meat products between those coming from 
FMD-free countries and those from FMD-infected countries is even starker.143  
As of November 2007, about 59 countries are recognised as FMD-free, where 
vaccination is not practised, and two others as FMD–free with vaccination. No African 
country appears in either list except the islands of Madagascar and Mauritius. 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are the only African countries in a list of eight 
with FMD-free zones where vaccination is not practised. No African country appears in 
the list of five countries having FMD free zones with vaccination.144  
The FMD status of a country plays a decisive role in its livestock export performance 
so much so that the market is effectively controlled by those countries that have 
acquired disease-free status. As reiterated, there is no guarantee that developed 
countries in particular necessarily allow imports from other countries just because the 
latter satisfy the OIE requirements in respect of a particular disease. The EU, for 
example, does not allow any imports of live domestic biungulate animals from 
countries that vaccinate against FMD, or where the disease is present, regardless of 
any preventive measures taken by the country of origin.145 This, by definition, means 
that no live domestic biungulates can be imported to the EU from virtually the entire 
African continent. As a 2003 USDA study observed, the distinction between countries 
judged FMD-free and those judged not free “largely defines world trade in fresh, 
chilled, or frozen beef and pork. For most of the last 50 years, the FMD-free zone 
consisted chiefly of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Denmark. Most trade in uncooked beef and pork occurred among 
these areas….”146  
The OIE’s World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID), although not up-to-
date, gives a broad picture of the FMD situation in the IGAD region. WAHID contains 
information for 2006 only for Eritrea and Ethiopia and, in both cases, there were 
confirmed FMD infections but no clinical disease was found. On Kenya there is 
information only until 2005, and there was a confirmed clinical disease in that year, 
albeit limited to certain zones. Kenya reported in 2004 that FMD was the most 
important disease restricting its trade in livestock products and it was establishing 
export processing zones (areas of low disease risk) in order to address this problem.147 
For Sudan, too, there is information only up to 2005 and there were only suspected 
cases in that year without confirmation. But Sudan reported two FMD outbreaks in 
2004.148 There was no FMD information on Somalia or Uganda149 for 2005 and 2006 
while no FMD was reported in Djibouti in 2006.150  
                                                 
142  See Article 2.2.10.11 of the Terrestrial Code. 
143  Compare Article 2.2.10.19 against Article 2.2.10.22 of the Terrestrial Code: the former deals with 
importation of fresh meat from FMD-free countries without vaccination and sets only two conditions; 
the latter deals with importation of fresh meat from FMD-infected countries and has about ten detailed 
and onerous conditions attached to it.  
144  For the latest information, see http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_fmd.htm?e1d6#Liste.   
145  See EC Commission, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General, General guidance on EU 
import and transit rules for live animals and animal products from third countries, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/guide_thirdcountries2006_en.pdf, p. 7. 
146  Dyck and Nelson, supra n. 119, p. 8. 
147  See OIE, World Animal Health 2004 (Paris 2004), p. 211. In the same year, Kenya reported 95 new 
outbreaks of SAT1, SAT2 and O types of foot and mouth disease. Id. p. 210.  
148  See Id. p. 316. According to the report of Sudan to the OIE, “Four of the seven known serotypes of foot 
and mouth disease (FMD) have been reported in Sudan: the European types O in 1989 and A in 1983 
and the South African Territories virus types SAT1 in 1981 and SAT2 in 1979. In 1990, the virus was 
not typed.” Id.  
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Despite several efforts,151 the IGAD member states remain obvious victims of this 
disease. We shall see in Chapter 3 that many countries invoke FMD as their reason for 
banning imports from the IGAD region. But it is worthwhile to mention here that 
several actual or potential export markets for IGAD livestock products are officially 
FMD-infected countries. For example, there were confirmed clinical cases of FMD in 
Kuwait in 2006, and in Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in 2005, the most recent year 
for which WAHID has information for these countries.152 Interestingly, the OIE’s 
comparison of countries’ sanitary situations puts FMD as one of the diseases that are 
present in both exporting (e.g. Ethiopia) and importing countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia) 
and “therefore unlikely to be trade hazards”.153 We shall see in the next section 
however that Saudi Arabia invoked FMD as one of two reasons for banning livestock 
imports from virtually all African countries.154  
2.3.1.1.3 Rift Valley Fever 
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is one of the most dangerous zoonotic diseases that is endemic 
to the IGAD region with a “historic distribution” in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula. According to the WHO, RVF is a viral disease that spreads amongst animals 
primarily by the bite of infected mosquitoes. The RVF virus may then infect people 
either when they are bitten by infected mosquitoes, or through contact with the 
blood, other body fluids or organs of infected animals.155  
The OIE has procedures through which a country or zone within the historic 
distribution regions of the world could be considered free of RVF infection or RVF-
infected but without disease.156 Once again, the RVF status of a country determines 
the type of conditions set and information required by the authorities in importing 
countries.  
A country or zone is RVF infection-free if it lies outside of and not adjacent to the 
historically infected regions, or if a surveillance programme has demonstrated no 
evidence of RVF infection in humans, animals or mosquitoes in the country or zone 
during the past 4 years following a RVF epidemic. An RVF-infected country could be 
considered a country without the disease provided the disease has not occurred in 
humans or animals in the past 6 months and provided further that climatic changes 
predisposing to outbreaks of RVF have not occurred during this time. Unlike the cases 
of rinderpest or FMD, a country is considered to be infected with the disease only if a 
clinical disease in humans or animals has occurred within the past 6 months.157 In 
other words, while a country is presumed infected with FMD and rinderpest until it 
proves its freedom, a country is presumed RVF-free until infection is proven. Also, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
149  But Uganda reported disease outbreak in 2004 including foot and mouth disease, Newcastle disease, 
African swine fever, rabies, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, lumpy skin disease, blackquarter, 
trypanosomosis, anthrax and brucellosis. The outbreaks were “associated with movement of livestock in 
search of water and pastures.” World Animal Health 2004, supra n. 147, p. 349. 
150  See WAHID Interface at http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=home.   
151  For example, Kenya had special legislation on how to deal with FMD since at least 1948 (see The 
Animal Diseases (Foot-and-Mouth Disease) Rules, Cap. 213 (1948), Sub. Leg.) and since 1966, 
Kenya’s DVS has had power to declare whole regions as compulsory FMD vaccination zones under the 
1966 Animal Diseases (Compulsory Foot and Mouth Vaccination) Rules (as amended). See 
L.N.185/1966, L.N.252/1967, L.N.229/1970, L.N.158/1975, L.N.100/1980. 
152  See WAHID, supra n. 150. 
153  See http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=trade_status.  
154  See table from Saudi Arabia’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO, infra at Chapter 3.  
155  For more on the disease, see the WHO Fact Sheet at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs207/en/index.html.  
156  See Article 2.2.14.2 of the Terrestrial Code.  
157  See Articles 2.2.14.2 to 2.2.14.4 of the Terrestrial Code. 
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OIE maintains a list of countries declared free of FMD and rinderpest, as it does for 
BSE and CBPP, but there is no such official list for RVF. Although this is partly a result 
of the gravity of the problem at the global level, and partly RVF’s limited historical 
and geographical distribution, it is clear that RVF sits near the top of the priority list 
of IGAD member states while, for example, BSE – one of the most high profile and 
devastating diseases at the global level – does not have any history of occurrence in 
the IGAD region. This is another indication of the fact that diseases that cause the 
highest damage for a region such as IGAD may not necessarily be the priorities for the 
OIE.  
The RVF virus was first identified in Kenya in the 1930s158 and has since served as one 
of the most recurring and damaging causes of trade restrictions against IGAD livestock 
exports to the Middle East and other regions. RVF was for the first time reported 
outside of the African Continent in September 2000, when it caused several animal 
and human deaths in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. According to the WHO, by late October 
2000, 85 deaths had been reported in Saudi Arabia and 80 in Yemen.159 It is thus 
hardly surprising that this incident led to the imposition of the longest livestock 
import bans by six Middle Eastern countries – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, 
Yemen and the United Arab Emirates – from mainly IGAD member states.160 The ban 
was lifted the following year in all countries except Saudi Arabia,161 where it remained 
in place until December 2006. Strangely enough, the lifting of the Saudi ban coincided 
closely with another outbreak in Kenya. According to WHO reports, as of 30 January 
2007, this outbreak had caused 121 deaths in northern Kenya alone.162 Once again, 
this outbreak was also immediately followed by meat and live animal import bans 
from many of the same Middle East countries, a move that affected virtually all IGAD 
member states despite the fact that the outbreak was confined to Kenya and the 
adjoining areas of Somalia. Although many Middle East countries are believed to have 
imposed a ban on live animal imports, Oman is the only country that reported the 
measure to the WTO as required under the SPS Agreement.163 According to this report, 
Oman imposed the ban as an emergency measure effective 10 January 2007 in order 
to prevent the entry of Rift Valley fever virus. This is an open-ended measure that is 
meant to remain in place “until the danger ceases to exist”. All IGAD member states 
but Djibouti have been specifically identified as countries affected by the measure. At 
the time of writing (June 2007), all indications are that this latest ban is still in 
place.164 The effect of such bans is felt by everyone in the livestock food chain, and 
                                                 
158  Pan-African News Agency, 31 January 2007, as reported in Africa Research Bulletin (January 16th–
February 15th 2007 issue) at p. 17270. 
159  See WHO, “Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia - Update 3”, 25 October 2000 available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2000_10_25/en/index.html’ and “2000 - Rift Valley fever in Yemen - 
Update 4”, 26 October 2000 available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2000_10_26/en/index.html.  
160  See Horn of Africa Food Security Update: October 20, 2000, available at 
http://www.fews.net/centers/files/East_200009en.pdf. This is believed to be the first ever reported RVF 
outbreak outside Africa.  
161  See FAO, Support to Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa (EXCELEX) Project 
(GCP/INT/811/ITA): Tripartite Evaluation Report (August 2005), p. 1, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/212289/GCPINT811ITA_2005l.doc. 
162  See WHO, “Rift Valley Fever in Kenya and Somalia - update 3”, 31 January 2007, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2007_01_31/en/index.html. See also PANA 31 January 2007, as reported in 
Africa Research Bulletin (January 16th–February 15th 2007 issue) at p. 17270. 
163  See WTO, Notification of Emergency Measures by Oman (G/SPS/N/OMN/10) 16 January 2007. 
164  Note that in an effort to arrest the spread of disease, it is common and generally accepted practice that 
import bans are also imposed by IGAD member countries against livestock products coming from 
fellow IGAD members. For example, Kenya reportedly imposed quarantine restrictions on certain parts 
of the country and banned livestock and meat imports from Ethiopia and Somalia following the RVF 
outbreak in late 2006. See “Kenya bans meat imports from Ethiopia, Somalia”, The Reporter (Addis 
Ababa, 10 February 2007). 
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particularly the poor producers. Companies engaged in meat exports from Ethiopia 
reported a loss of as much as 80% of their export business, while the price of beef, 
mutton and goat meat on the domestic market reportedly went down by as much as 
15-25% within a matter of months following the import ban.165  
2.3.2 Codex Alimentarius Commission 
Set up in 1963 jointly by FAO and WHO, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (hereafter 
Codex) is one of the key players in international food trade. It is the principal global 
institution that has the mandate to develop international food safety and hygiene 
standards. Codex was set up to implement the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme whose purposes include protecting consumer health, ensuring fair 
practices in the food trade and coordinating the development and harmonization of 
food standards.166 Codex today has 169 member countries.  
Since its creation, Codex had the twin objectives of protecting the consumer against 
food-borne diseases and encouraging international trade in safe food through the 
harmonization of food standards.167 The first FAO Regional Conference for Europe in 
October 1960, which played a central role in the creation of Codex, stated that it 
recognized: “[t]he desirability of international agreement on minimum food standards 
and related questions (including labelling requirements, methods of analysis, etc.) ... 
as an important means of protecting the consumer’s health, of ensuring quality and of 
reducing trade barriers, particularly in the rapidly integrating market of Europe”.168 
The Codex Commission normally holds one regular session each year and its work in 
the interim is carried out by an Executive Committee composed of the Chairperson 
and three vice-chairpersons of the Commission, seven regional coordinators (for 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, North America and 
South-West Pacific) and another seven people, one selected from each of these 
regions.169 Each Codex member has one vote and decisions are taken by a majority of 
votes cast.170 Most of the actual work of the Commission is however carried out 
through a number of subsidiary bodies, called Codex Committees and sometimes 
mainly ad hoc intergovernmental task forces. The committees are generally of three 
types: (1) general or horizontal committees (with relevance for all or most types of 
food); (2) commodity or vertical committees (for specific foods or classes of foods); 
and (3) regional coordination committees that deal with standards of particular 
interest for particular regions.  
The way the Committees are run is quite unique to Codex. The Committees are 
normally hosted by individual member countries that are ‘willing’ “to accept financial 
and all other responsibility, as having responsibility for appointing a chairperson of the 
Committee.”171 Furthermore, such a host country “is responsible for providing all 
conference services” including a secretariat with adequate administrative support 
staff, translation facilities, and other logistics at its own expense. Such a costly 
undertaking however comes with its own privileges. As host to a Codex committee, 
such country has every opportunity to shape the agenda and influence the outcome of 
the Committee’s activities. And the Committees have important powers, including 
                                                 
165  See Wudineh Zenebe, “Meat Market Hits Bottom of the Barrel”, Addis Fortune (Addis Ababa) March 
27, 2007. 
166  See Codex Statute and its Rules of Procedure available in the Codex Procedural Manual at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_15e.pdf.   
167  A full list of Codex Official standards is available at: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do?lang=en.   
168  See http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e03.htm (emphasis added).  
169  See Articles IV and V of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Commission. 
170  See Article VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Commission.  
171  FAO/WHO, Codex Procedural Manual p. 49.  
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everything from the drawing up of a list of priorities for their activities down to 
preparation of draft Codex standards within their terms of reference to the review 
and revision of existing standards.172 Hence, the observation that “the SPS Agreement 
has politicized decision making within Codex more than in the other standards 
organizations.”173 
Codex rules of procedure provide that decisions are taken by a simple majority of 
members present at a meeting, although, in practice, it usually decides by consensus. 
Indeed, Codex never resorted to a vote to adopt a standard until 1995,174 when it 
adopted the standard on maximum residue limits for five growth hormones (beef) by a 
tight margin of 33 votes in favour, 29 against and 7 abstentions.175 It is no coincidence 
that this happened on hormones that were (1) already at the centre of a bitter dispute 
between the US and the EC, and (2) in the year of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreements that significantly enhanced the legal status of the otherwise voluntary 
Codex standards, thereby putting the long-standing US-EC dispute in a different legal 
landscape.176   
2.3.2.1 Codex Standards and IGAD Livestock Trade  
Pursuing its objective of promoting trade in safe food, Codex has over the past four 
decades developed over 300 product-specific and general standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. These standards are often extremely technical and detailed. The 
Codex General Standard for Food Additives177 is a good example here. This standard is 
the authoritative source for the type of additives that are “recognized as suitable for 
use in foods”. For each additive that is so recognized, the standard sets the conditions 
under which they may be used, assigns an Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) level, and 
prescribes maximum use levels for food additives in various food groups with a view to 
ensuring that the intake of an additive from all its uses does not exceed its ADI. To 
illustrate this with examples from livestock products, the maximum use level for 
Ascorbyl Esters, an antioxidant, in edible casings such as sausage casings, is limited to 
5000 mg/kg. Likewise, the maximum use level for Benzoates, a preservative, in cured 
(including salted) and dried non-heat treated processed comminuted meat, poultry, 
and game products is set at 1000 mg/kg. Finally, the maximum use level for Carmines, 
a colouring additive, in fresh meat, poultry, and game is 500 mg/kg while the 
maximum use level for the same additive in fermented non-heat treated processed 
comminuted meat, poultry, and game products is 100 mg/kg.178 The Maximum Use 
                                                 
172  Id.  
173  See Josling et al, supra n. 103, p. 43. 
174  See Michael Livermore, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional 
Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81:2 New York University Law Review (2006), pp. 766-
801. 
175  See UNCTAD, A Positive Agenda for Developing Countries: Issues for Future Trade Negotiations 
(New York and Geneva, 2000), p. 321, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsb10_en.pdf.   
176  Note that consensus is generally the rule in the international standardization community, but for 
purposes of the WTO, the procedure by which a standard is set – i.e. whether by majority voting or by 
consensus – does not matter as regards its relevance for purposes of the TBT Agreement. See Sardines 
panel report (para. 7.90) and AB report (para. 227).  
177  See Codex Stan 192-1995. A food additive is defined to mean “any substance not normally consumed 
as a food by itself and not normally used as a typical ingredient of the food, whether or not it has 
nutritive value, the intentional addition of which to food for a technological (including organoleptic) 
purpose in the manufacture, processing, preparation, treatment, packing, packaging, transport or holding 
of such food results, or may be reasonably expected to result (directly or indirectly), in it or its 
byproducts becoming a component of or otherwise affecting the characteristics of such foods. The term 
does not include contaminants or substances added to food for maintaining or improving nutritional 
qualities.” Id. Para 2(a). 
178  For the full list of standards, see “Additives Permitted for Use Under Specified Conditions in Certain 
Food Categories or Individual Food Items”, Table One of Codex Stan 192-1995, pp. 67-141.  
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Level for each additive is the highest concentration of the additive “determined to be 
functionally effective in a food or food category and agreed to be safe by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission.”179 Another example, which has more to do with promoting 
standardization and fair trade than food safety, would be the standard for ‘cooked 
cured chopped meat’ in which 50% of the meat used is required to be in the form of 
coarsely cut pieces “equivalent to meat ground through holes of not less than 8 mm in 
diameter” and no piece “greater than 15 mm in any one dimension”.180  
But, Codex guidelines could also be general and sometimes full of constitutional-
sounding provisions. A good example could be the Codex general guidelines for food 
import control systems, which suggest that national systems should have, inter alia, 
requirements for imported food that are consistent with requirements for domestic 
foods; competent authorities with clearly defined responsibilities; clearly defined and 
transparent legislation and operating procedures; and precedence to the protection of 
consumers.181 The Codex Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and 
Certification182 could be another example where Codex appears to prescribe principles 
of due process in public administration. Written in the year of the entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement, these principles seem to echo the language of the SPS 
Agreement. They provide, inter alia, that: food inspection and certification systems 
should be designed and operated on the basis of objective risk assessment183; in 
undertaking a risk assessment or in applying the principles of equivalence, importing 
countries should give due consideration to statements by exporting countries on a 
national or area basis of freedom from food-related disease; countries should avoid 
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the level of risk deemed to be appropriate in 
different circumstances so as to avoid discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade; countries should be prepared to recognise the equivalence of other 
inspection/certification systems provided the exporting countries demonstrate such 
equivalence; and finally and most directly, in the design and application of food 
inspection and certification systems, importing countries should provide some form of 
special and differential treatment for the benefit of developing countries. Other 
general standards of horizontal application include those on food labelling, maximum 
residue levels for pesticides and veterinary drugs, and guidelines for the establishment 
of regulatory programmes.184  
It is worth pointing out that livestock and livestock product exports from the IGAD 
region are still largely in the form of live animals and fresh or chilled meat. Codex 
does not have any standards for such products. To this extent, one could argue that 
these products are subject only to OIE standards and Codex standards are irrelevant 
for this study. This is however only partly true.  
Firstly, IGAD member states have a vested interest in adding value to their exports 
from a commercial perspective.185 Secondly and more importantly, the export of 
processed livestock products also has the potential to mitigate the adverse effect of 
their animal disease status as live animals and fresh meat are more likely to be 
banned for reasons of disease transmission than processed products. The fact that 
Codex also sets more general standards, such as the Code of Hygienic Practice for 
                                                 
179  Id. P. 2. 
180  See Codex Standard for Cooked Cured Chopped Meat Codex Stan 98-1981 (Rev.1 1991). Such 
standards would fall under the TBT Agreement rather than the SPS Agreement.  
181  See Codex, Guidelines For Food Import Control Systems (CAC/GL 47-2003, REV.1-2006).  
182  See CAC/GL 20-1995, adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission at its 21st Session, 1995, 
available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/37/CXG_020e.pdf.  
183  The Principles define risk assessment to mean “the evaluation of the likelihood and severity of adverse 
effects on public health arising, for example, from the presence in foodstuffs of additives, contaminants, 
residues, toxins or disease-causing organisms.” See Id. para. 5.  
184  See www.codexalimentarius.net.  
185  For more on this, see infra Chapter 3. 
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Meat, also means that Codex is an extremely relevant institution for IGAD today and 
not just in the remote future. This Code covers everything from the hygiene of the 
environment in which animals grow, the feed they eat, their manner of transportation 
to slaughterhouses to the design and construction of the slaughter area, the entire 
food chain after slaughter and a traceability requirement back to the beginning.186 
Finally, Codex standards that set detailed requirements for animal feed or the 
maximum veterinary residue levels are also directly relevant for the exportation of 
live animals and fresh meat.187 
2.4 IGAD and the Global Regulatory Framework  
We have seen that international trade in food products in general and livestock 
products in particular is subject to an intricate network of binding international 
treaties, soft law international standards, guidelines and recommendations and 
national regulatory regimes. In this section, we will attempt to assess the extent to 
which IGAD member states participate in the rule-setting process whether at the WTO 
or the standards institutions of the OIE and Codex. We will also highlight that IGAD 
member states have been unable to meet most of the requirements set by these 
regulatory instruments. 
2.4.1 IGAD membership in the WTO, Codex and OIE 
A country must first become a member of an international organization before it can 
legitimately influence the process and outcome of decision making in that 
organization. In principle, it also works the other way round – i.e. no decision of an 
international organization can have effect on a sovereign country unless that country 
wilfully decides to become a member thereof. In reality, however, the latter is easier 
said than done, and the more so in the field of international trade rules and 
standards. Compliance with product standards set by international organizations can 
become a precondition to access foreign markets, de facto if not de jure. Indeed, this 
is an area where even standards set by non-governmental international organizations 
could determine a country’s ability to participate in international trade. As the OECD 
put it, “although … private standards are voluntary and not required by law, they are 
required for doing business, thus de facto mandatory.”188 For developing countries, 
non-compliance with international standards almost inevitably leads to complete 
marginalization from the trade-led process of globalization.  
Of the three principal organizations covered here, the OIE enjoys the membership of 
all seven IGAD member states, Codex stands second with five IGAD members and the 
WTO has only three of them.  
 
                                                 
186  A closer look at the Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat shows that compliance with its requirements 
would significantly enhance the export opportunities of IGAD countries for live animals and fresh meat. 
The Code covers hygiene provisions for raw meat, meat preparations and manufactured meat from the 
time of live animal production up to the point of retail sale. See Codex, Code of Hygienic Practice for 
Meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005), para. 6. On traceability, the Code stipulates that “Animal identification 
systems, to the extent practicable, should be in place at primary production level so that the origin of 
meat can be traced back from the abattoir or establishment to the place of production of the animals.” 
See Id. para. 20. 
187  See for example Codex, Maximum Residue Limits for Veterinary Drugs in Foods (updated July 2006) 
CAC/MRL 02-2006; and Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding, CAC/RCP 54-2004. 
188  See WTO, Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country: Market Access (preliminary results) 
Communication from OECD (G/SPS/GEN/763, 27 February 2007), para. 1. An FAO report also pointed 
out that large retailer and processor standards and certification schemes simply “require compliance, or 
the market is closed. Thus these private schemes become de facto mandatory schemes for certain types 
of products in certain markets.” See FAO, Food Safety and Animal and Plant Health: Trends and 
Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (LARC/06/3, 2006), para. 38. 
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IGAD Membership in the WTO, Codex and OIE 
 
Country WTO Codex OIE 
Djibouti X  X 
Eritrea  X X 
Ethiopia  X X 
Kenya X X X 
Somalia   X 
Sudan  X X 
Uganda X X X 
2.4.2 Participation of IGAD Member States in the WTO, Codex and OIE 
Membership is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a country to influence the 
process and outcome of decision making in international organizations. Each of these 
organizations deals with highly technical and complex issues in its own right, but a full 
understanding of the role played by each of these institutions in the livestock sector 
also requires an appreciation of how they interact amongst themselves, as well as 
with other global institutions operating in the field. The interaction among institutions 
operating at global, regional, national and local levels adds another dimension to the 
issues. It is thus easy to appreciate that the effectiveness of individual IGAD member 
states’ participation in the establishment and evolution of this global regulatory 
framework is significantly constrained by the poor state of their human, financial, 
technological and institutional capacity.189  
A regional forum such as IGAD could play a crucial role in the effort to address many 
of these problems. For example, we have seen that the animal disease status of IGAD 
member states is one reason why IGAD livestock wealth has not been able to generate 
proportionate export revenues for these countries. Thanks partly to ecological 
characteristics that nearly all IGAD member states share in common, the main animal 
diseases are also equally shared among these countries. An IGAD-wide approach to 
address the impact of such diseases would go a long way towards addressing many of 
the problems, ranging from pooling of technical expertise and establishment of well-
resourced regional technical institutions and laboratories to the coordination of 
diplomatic positions potentially as far as collective accreditation of diplomats to act 
on behalf of the region. This is an approach that is already being encouraged by the 
international organizations under examination here.190 
This is, however, more of a distant dream for the region at present. IGAD as a bloc 
plays virtually no role at the international level in the field of international trade. 
Apart from possible informal and casual coordination between two or more countries 
that may happen on occasion, each member state speaks on its own behalf in such 
fora. Indeed, there is nothing like an IGAD-wide common policy and legal framework 
for trade in livestock products and all that can be said here is limited to whatever 
there is in the form of general statements of aspiration and non-binding declarations 
of intent about the desirability of setting up common policies in all sorts of areas 
                                                 
189  The Codex evaluation report in 2002 found that 96% of low-income countries and 87% of middle-
income countries “do not participate in Codex to the extent they think desirable, the overwhelming 
reason given being lack of financial resources”. See FAO/WHO, Report of the Evaluation of the Codex 
Alimentarius and Other FAO and WHO Food Standards Work (2002), available at 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/codex/en/codex_eval_report_en.pdf, p. 14, para. 24. 
190  The 2002 Codex evaluation report recommended, for example, that “to enhance developing country 
involvement, as well as that of other countries, encouragement should be given to regional economic 
groupings and other groups of countries with common interests to develop common positions. In this 
context, the possibility for one country to speak in meetings on behalf of several countries should also 
be encouraged, as should committee co-chairs and meetings held in developing countries.” Id. p. 8, 
para. 18. 
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including closer economic integration.191 Article 13A(h) of the IGAD Agreement 
provides, inter alia, that members undertake to “work towards the promotion of trade 
and gradual harmonization of their trade policies and practices and the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade so that it can lead to regional economic 
integration.” The areas of potential cooperation identified by this provision are wide-
ranging, covering agriculture and food security, different dimensions of the 
environment, fiscal, investment and monetary policies, energy and scientific policies 
and many more. However, a strategy document adopted by the Summit of Heads of 
State and Government in October 2003 identified three priority areas as “the 
immediate entry points for cooperation”. These are: (1) food security and 
environmental protection; (2) conflict prevention, management and resolution; and 
(3) economic cooperation and integration.192 Although each of these three priority 
areas will have direct or indirect bearing on the livestock sector, there are no specific 
plans for policy coordination in the sector.  
2.4.3 IGAD and the International Standard-Setting Organizations 
The OIE and Codex, just like most other international organizations of any political or 
economic significance, are dominated by the developed countries. Out of a 
membership of about 169 countries in Codex today, around 30% do not normally send 
a delegation to its plenary meetings.193 The OIE traditionally gets a better attendance 
record from developing countries, partly because it normally covers the participation 
costs of representatives from these countries, but the effectiveness of their 
participation is often weak.194  
The main factors behind the ineffective representation of developing countries in such 
key institutions include weak scientific, technical and institutional capacities, which 
ultimately reflect the meagre human and financial resources of many of these 
countries. Several multilateral and bilateral initiatives have been launched to address 
this problem, such as the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF),195 the 
FAO/WHO Trust Fund for Participation in Codex,196 and the Integrated Framework 
                                                 
191  See Agreement establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development of March 1996 
(hereafter the IGAD Agreement), available at 
http://www.igad.org/docs/agreement_establishing_igad.pdf. 
192  See IGAD Strategy (Djibouti, October 2003), p. 2, available at 
http://www.igad.org/docs/igad_strategy.pdf. 
193  See Hüller and Maier, supra n. 116, p. 272. Hüller and Maier further noted that “In many instances that 
have been investigated to date, the making of Codex standards and guidelines has been dominated by 
the United States on the one hand, and the EU and its member states on the other, with countries from 
other regions of the world playing only a secondary role as allies to one or the other camp.” Id. P. 273. 
They nonetheless conclude that “the extent to which developing countries are disadvantaged in Codex 
decision-making is difficult to gauge.” Id. P. 275. 
194  For more on this, see Michael Nelson, International Rules, Food Safety, and the Poor Developing 
Country Livestock Producer (PPLPI Working Paper No. 25, 2005).  
195  The STDF was established by the FAO, the OIE, the World Bank, the WHO and the WTO as “a global 
programme in capacity building and technical assistance to assist developing countries in trade and SPS 
measures.” See http://www.standardsfacility.org. All IGAD countries except Somalia have benefited 
from some form of assistance from the STDF. For a list of all beneficiary countries, see 
http://stdfdb.wto.org/ben_dcs.asp.  
196  The main objective of the Codex Fund is “to help developing countries and those with economies in 
transition to enhance their level of effective participation in the development of global food safety and 
quality standards by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.” See 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/codex/trustfund/en/index1.html. Again, all IGAD countries except 
Somalia have received support to participate in Codex meetings and other activities over the past few 
years. For a list of the countries that participated in Codex activities supported by the Codex Fund, see 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/codex/prog5e.pdf.  
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(IF).197 Each of these and the many other initiatives are certainly steps in the right 
direction. However, the problems of developing countries in general, and those of 
IGAD in particular, in the standards area are only one manifestation of broader 
economic and social problems that cannot be overcome through piecemeal projects 
and initiatives. A lasting solution can only come from, and as part of, overall economic 
development.  
In an attempt to get a broad picture of the extent of participation of IGAD member 
states in the standard-setting process at the international level, this section looks at 
two specific subjects: the extent of their representation in Codex committees and 
their attendance records at Codex Commission198 meetings over the past five years for 
which annual reports are available (for the years 2001 to 2006, except 2002). The 
assumption is that, in broad terms, the higher the number of people representing a 
country in such fora, the better its chances to participate more effectively in the 
process and even influence the outcome in its favour. This can be further enhanced or 
diminished by the expertise of individual delegates, the continuity of people making 
up the national delegations as well as the relevance of the particular section of 
government they come from. 
As noted earlier, Codex operates mainly through committees that prepare draft 
standards for submission to the Commission. These committees can be general subject 
committees or commodity committees. Each committee is hosted by a member 
country, “which is chiefly responsible for the cost of the committee’s maintenance 
and administration and for providing its chairperson.”199 Only one of 13 Codex 
commodity committees listed on the Codex web page is hosted by a developing 
country – Mexico – while some developed countries host more than one.200 The 
horizontal committees, i.e. those dealing with general subjects, are hosted fully by 
developed countries.201 The significance of hosting commodity or other committees 
can hardly be overstated. It is the host country that administers the whole standard 
setting process including the privileged position of permanently chairing the 
Committees. 
                                                 
197  The IF was first established in 1997 by six multilateral institutions (IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, 
World Bank and the WTO) to support LDCs in the multilateral trading system by helping them 
integrate trade into their national development plans and “to assist in the co-ordinated delivery of trade-
related technical assistance in response to needs identified by the LDC.” See 
http://www.integratedframework.org/about.htm. The role played by the IF in the IGAD countries is 
already significant. Given that all IGAD countries except Kenya are LDCs, we now have extremely 
valuable studies, known as Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTIS), completed for Djibouti, 
Ethiopia and Uganda and a concept paper done for Sudan. All these studies are freely available for 
download at: http://www.integratedframework.org/index.html.  
198  As noted earlier, two of the seven IGAD countries – Djibouti and Somalia – are not members of Codex. 
See WTO, G/SPS/GEN/49/Rev.7, 26 July 2006. 
199  See http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm.  
200  The following committees are listed on the Codex website: Cereals, Pulses and Legumes (United 
States), Fats and Oils (United Kingdom), Fish and Fishery Products (Norway), Fresh Fruits and 
Vegetables (Mexico), Meat Hygiene (New Zealand), Milk and Milk Products (New Zealand), Processed 
Fruits and Vegetables (United States), Cocoa Products and Chocolate (Switzerland), Natural Mineral 
Waters (Switzerland), Processed Fruits and Vegetables (United States), Vegetable Proteins (Canada), 
Sugars (United Kingdom), Processed Meat and Poultry Products (Denmark), Soups and Broths 
(Switzerland), and Vegetable Proteins Canada). See 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm.  
201  The list includes the following committees: on General Principles (hosted by France), on Food 
Labelling (Canada), Methods of Analysis and Sampling (Hungary), on Food Hygiene (United States), 
on Pesticide Residues hosted by the Netherlands, on Food Additives and Contaminants (the 
Netherlands), on Import/Export Inspection and Certification Systems (Australia), on Nutrition and 
Foods for Special Dietary Uses (Germany), and on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Food (United 
States). See http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm.  
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In Appendix I, an attempt has been made to tabulate information on IGAD member 
states’ representation at Codex Commission annual meetings for the five year period 
(between 2001 and 2006 except 2002).202 The attendance records of IGAD member 
states show that Kenya, Sudan and Uganda attended all five sessions; Eritrea attended 
three of the five (i.e. except the 27th and 24th sessions) and Ethiopia attended only 
two of them (the 28th and 26th).203 
However, the data on attendance tell us only part of the story and, in this technical 
field, the number of people as well as their professional qualification or expertise in 
the field matter even more. While, admittedly, it is difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of each member’s participation in Codex activities by simply looking at 
the number of people, it can nonetheless provide some rough indications. Accordingly, 
in terms of the number of people in each delegation, Sudan leads with an average of 
six people for each of the last four years (2003-06 inclusive) and two in 2001; Kenya 
follows with between two people in 2001 and seven people in 2006; Uganda comes 
third with two people in four of the five years, and four people in 2006; Eritrea sent 
one person in 2003 and 2006 and two in 2005; and finally comes Ethiopia with just one 
delegate for 2003 and 2005.  
In terms of continuity – i.e. how repeatedly a country sends the same officials to 
Codex Commission sessions – Uganda is notable in that it was represented by the same 
two people for four of the five years covered here, possibly indicating institutional 
stability, continuity and expert representation. Ethiopia once again comes last on this 
as a country that sent different people each time while the other three countries fall 
somewhere between these two.  
Finally, Codex being a technical organization, the extent to which people working in 
relevant fields are delegated to participate in its annual sessions is indicative of the 
degree to which a country has made an effort to benefit from its membership and 
exercise a certain degree of influence in its decisions. So, in terms of the relevance of 
the government department where delegates come from, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda 
appear to have done relatively well, while Eritrea and Ethiopia do not seem to have 
taken the forum seriously. Eritrea sent a qualified delegate, a Director-General in 
charge of Codex matters in its Ministry of Agriculture, in 2005 and 2006, while Ethiopia 
appears to have done this only once – i.e. in 2005 when it sent the Director-General of 
its Quality and Standards Authority. In other cases, both countries sent diplomats who 
were less likely to have the specialized technical expertise to participate effectively 
in Codex activities. 
We can see just from this brief exercise that the challenge facing IGAD’s livestock 
industry is not just the unfavourable global regulatory framework, whose terms are 
dictated by the rich; but that IGAD member states themselves have contributed to 
their declining influence in the making of this global framework. The reasons are 
understandable, but so also are the solutions. It is clear beyond doubt that the 
financial, human and technical constraints to effective participation may be 
insurmountable to individual member states, acting on their own. That is where a 
regional organization such as IGAD could, and should, be used to pool resources and 
deploy them for the common good. This can be done at both the technical-scientific 
level and at the level of diplomatic representation in the relevant global fora. 
                                                 
202  The usefulness of the table has been limited by several factors. Firstly, although the Commission is the 
highest decision-making organ, most of the work is in fact done at the committee stage, which has not 
been covered in this table. Secondly, inconsistent spelling of names in the Codex reports has sometimes 
made it necessary to exercise the author’s discretion on the basis of other relevant information, which 
may not always be accurate. 
203  See ALINORM 06/29/41 for the 29th session (3-7 July 2006), ALINORM 05/28/41 for the 28th session 
(4-9 July 2005), ALINORM 04/27/41 for the 27th session (28 June – 3 July 2004), ALINORM 03/41 for 
the 26th session (30 June – 7 July 2003), and ALINORM 01/41 for the 24th session (2-7 July 2001). All 
reports are available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/archives.jsp?lang=en.   
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2.4.4 IGAD and the WTO 
Three IGAD member states (Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda) are members of the WTO, 
two (Ethiopia and Sudan) are negotiating entry and the remaining two (Eritrea and 
Somalia) are completely outside the system.204 Whatever one’s views about the 
benefit of WTO membership for poor countries such as these, the rules set at the WTO 
affect the trade interests even of countries that are not its members. Moreover, no 
country can defend its interests in the WTO without becoming a member. But, again, 
membership alone is not enough to exercise influence in the WTO, and we shall see 
that even those IGAD member states that are also members of the WTO do not seem 
to play an active role in terms of coordinating positions and reflecting the broader 
interests of IGAD as a regional grouping. This certainly needs to change, and change 
urgently. Even some of the biggest players in global trade such as Australia, Brazil, 
Canada and India have long realized that coalitions and alliances are the only route to 
influence GATT/WTO negotiations – as was evidenced in the creation of the Cairns 
Group during the Uruguay Round and the G20 in the Doha process.  
We shall see that IGAD-wide trade interests in the livestock sector are totally 
neglected at the WTO and the rules of the trading system are being shaped by those 
who have a vested interest in escalating standards that may not even be scientifically 
justified.205 The complete absence of an IGAD voice throughout the ten-year-long work 
of the WTO Working Party for the accession of Saudi Arabia, a natural and prosperous 
export market for the livestock products of the IGAD member states,206 epitomizes 
this complete absence of representation for IGAD interests in WTO activities.  
The following table is adapted from the Report of the Saudi Arabia WTO Accession 
Working Party, which provides a complete list of those SPS measures that have been 
included in the Saudi terms of accession to the WTO in 2005.207  
                                                 
204  There is one official WTO document publicly available about Eritrea and that is a request submitted by 
Eritrea to participate in the Seattle ministerial 1999 as an observer. See WTO, Eritrea - Request for 
Observer Status at the 1999 Ministerial Conference (WT/L/331, 28/10/1999). There is no document 
whatsoever on Somalia for understandable reasons to do with the political instability of the country 
since already before the creation of the WTO. 
205  It has been observed, for example, that “the food sector in Argentina and Brazil is confident of its 
capacity to respond to all EU technical and sanitary requirements in the near future, even if those on 
traceability pose some problems for Argentina exporters (it is also problematic for other developed 
countries).” See Jean-Christophe Bureau, Sebastien Jean, and Alan Matthews, “The Consequences of 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization for Developing Countries: Distinguishing between Genuine Benefits 
and False Hopes”, 5(2) World Trade Review (2006) p. 244.  
206  The Saudi market is known as “the largest and fastest growing market for high value foodstuffs in the 
gulf region”. See USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Saudi Arabia: Food and Agricultural Import 
Regulations and Standards Update 2006 (GAIN Report Number SA6008, Jul 2006), p. 4. 
207  See WTO, Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Decision of 11 November 2005 (WT/L/627, 11 
November 2005). Paragraph 2 of this Protocol incorporates specific commitments referred to in 
paragraph 315 of the Working Party Report and makes them an integral part of the WTO Agreement. 
Paragraph 216 of the Working Party Report includes a reference to Annex L of the same report and is 
included in the list of paragraphs referred to in para 315 of the same. The effect is that the list of SPS 
measures included in Annex L of the Working Party report is an integral part of the WTO agreement 
applying to Saudi Arabia’s relations with all other member countries. 
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List of SPS Measures Maintained by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
H.S. 
No. 
Description of 
product 
Nature of SPS 
Measure 
Justification  WTO Members and non-Member 
Country(ies) 
0102 
 
010410 
 
010420 
Live Bovine Animals 
 
Live Sheep  
 
Live Goats  
 
Banned because 
of FMD (Foot and 
Mouth Disease) 
Article 5 of 
SPS 
Agreement 
All African Countries other than South 
Africa, South Africa (Northern Province 
and Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, North 
West and Kwazulu-Natal), China, India, 
Malaysia, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Chinese 
Taipei, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon 
0201 Live Bovine Animals Banned because 
of Render Pest 
[sic] 
Article 5 of 
SPS 
Agreement 
All African Countries (except South 
Africa), Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Mongolia 
0201 
0202 
0206…  
All types of Bovine 
Meat and its 
Products 
Banned because 
of Render Pest 
[sic] 
Article 5 of 
SPS 
Agreement 
All African Countries (except South 
Africa), Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Mongolia 
0201 
0202 
0206… 
All types of Bovine 
Meat and Its 
Products 
Banned because 
of FMD (Foot and 
Mouth Disease) 
Article 5 of 
SPS 
Agreement 
All African Countries (except South 
Africa), All European Countries, China, 
Malaysia, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Chinese Taipei, Pakistan, Lebanon  
0204 
0206… 
All types of Sheep 
and Goat Meat and 
Their Products 
Banned because 
of FMD (Foot and 
Mouth Disease) 
Article 5 of 
SPS 
Agreement 
All African Countries (except South 
Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia ), All European 
Countries, China, Malaysia, Yemen, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Chinese Taipei, 
Lebanon   
Source: Adapted from: Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the 
World Trade Organization, WT/ACC/SAU/61, 1 November 2005, Annex L.  
It is notable from this that Saudi Arabia had an unconditional ban on imports of 
livestock products from virtually the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (except South Africa, 
and in the case of sheep and goat meat, Ethiopia and Sudan). FMD and rinderpest are 
mentioned as reasons for the ban on live animals. This does not however appear to 
tally with the OIE disease status of these countries. For example, all bovine animals 
are banned from Africa, except South Africa, allegedly because of rinderpest, but 
Eritrea has been declared rinderpest disease-free by the OIE since May 2004, as are 
several other sub-Saharan African countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi 
Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.208 Nobody challenged Saudi Arabia as to why it 
banned bovine animal imports from the whole of Africa in the name of rinderpest 
while so many African countries had already secured a clean bill of health from the 
only international organization that has the mandate to do this, the OIE.  
The same observations could be made about FMD, the other major disease Saudi 
Arabia invoked as grounds for its import prohibition, but the effectiveness of the WTO 
forum could be seen from the following simple example. The Saudi list of sanitary 
measures above includes a ban on the importation of all types of bovine meat and 
meat products from all African and European countries on FMD grounds. The EC was 
the only member that challenged Saudi Arabia during the accession process arguing 
that the EU was free of FMD and asking why all EU countries were included in the ban. 
This forced Saudi Arabia to undertake a binding commitment to remove the ban from 
all European countries citing a May 2004 OIE Resolution which restored the EU’s FMD-
free status.209 The same OIE general session also recognized the rinderpest freedom of 
several African countries, but there is no record in the Working Party report of any 
                                                 
208  See OIE, Recognition of Member Countries Free from Rinderpest Infection and Rinderpest Disease 
(Resolution No. XXII, 25 May 2004), available at 
http://www.oie.int/downld/SG/2004/A_RESO_2004_WP.pdf.  
209  The Saudi commitment reads as follows: “in pursuance of Resolution No. XX of the International 
Committee of the OIE, adopted during the 72nd general session (23-28 May 2004), Saudi Arabia had 
decided to remove the ban on imports of live bovine, ovine and caprine animals, due to Foot and Mouth 
Disease, from all European countries.” See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the World Trade Organization, WT/ACC/SAU/61, 1 November 2005, 
para. 221. 
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African country ever challenging the measures. This fact alone appears to constitute, 
prima facie, an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination among different members 
where the same conditions prevail and thereby also violating the MFN principle as 
prescribed in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.210 Even within IGAD, and given the 
identical status of all IGAD member states as FMD-infected countries, the selective 
permission of sheep and goat meat imports from Ethiopia and Sudan and its apparent 
prohibition from other IGAD member states on grounds of FMD further strengthens our 
contention that the Saudi bans are discriminatory as between countries where the 
same conditions prevail.211 Furthermore, the diseases invoked by Saudi Arabia to 
justify the ban are also endemic in the Kingdom, thereby arguably raising questions of 
whether Saudi Arabia is in breach of the national treatment requirement contained in 
the same Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.  
Also notable is the fact that Saudi Arabia did not include Rift Valley fever as one of 
the grounds for the ban on livestock imports from the IGAD region which the country 
has maintained almost continuously since 2000. The silence of Saudi Arabia on RVF 
particularly since its accession to the WTO in 2005 contravenes the transparency 
provisions of Article 7 of SPS Agreement and its Annex B.212 Although it is impossible to 
be certain about the reasons, this may be because of the total absence of effective 
participation by IGAD member states at the accession negotiations.  
All this can have implications for the future of relevant Saudi measures in dispute 
settlement terms. This is not however to advise IGAD member states to follow the 
adjudication route. Not only does such advice require a deeper, more careful and 
more comprehensive legal and political-economy analysis than that which has been 
done in this paper; such a move is not necessarily in the best interest of the IGAD 
member states. The purpose of the speculation is more to sensitize IGAD member 
states about their rights in this respect so they can study the matter further, not just 
vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia but also all other potential export destinations, and use resulting 
knowledge to strengthen their bargaining position and, at least, put pressure on such 
countries to take IGAD concerns more seriously. 
In sum, the type of restrictions as well as the commitments contained in the Saudi 
protocol of accession indicates that IGAD member states with an interest in livestock 
exports did not play any part in the Saudi negotiations for accession to the WTO.213 
This has deprived IGAD member states of a one-off opportunity to influence Saudi 
policy in the field of livestock trade. The countries that negotiated the bilateral 
concessions contained in the animals and animal products section of the Saudi 
                                                 
210  Article 2.3 of SPS Agreement provides: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade.” 
211  There are also reports that the livestock products from the banned countries have been entering the 
Saudi market through Yemen with full knowledge of the Saudi authorities. Somaliland Minister of 
Pastoral Development and Environment, Fu'ad Adan Adde, complained that “the Saudis are taking our 
animals from Yemen, knowing that the cattle are from the Horn. What they want is an unorganized and 
cheap supply of animals from the Horn of Africa.” See The Reporter (Addis Ababa) 22 July 2006. 
212  SPS Agreement Article 7 provides: “Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures and shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with 
the provisions of Annex B.” On transparency in the SPS Agreement and how it works, see Robert 
Wolfe, “Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO” 2(2) World Trade Review 
(2003) 157–182.  
213  The membership list of the working party for the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO did not have a 
single country from IGAD, and indeed only two from Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), i.e. 
Nigeria and Senegal, both of which are net-importers of livestock products. See 2005 ITC data for these 
two countries at ITC (2005).  
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schedule of concessions214 at the WTO, thereby currently holding the Initial 
Negotiating Rights (INRs) on most of these products, include Australia, Canada, the 
EC, New Zealand, the US and Uruguay. This could seriously limit the rights of IGAD 
member states in respect of future changes to Saudi livestock import policy even after 
all IGAD member states become full members of the WTO.215 
The bottom line, however, is that the countries that have special interest in this, 
particularly Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, remain outside the WTO, thereby depriving 
themselves of a credible international forum through which they could protect their 
interests in this sector. Moreover, the three IGAD member states that are members of 
the WTO do not seem to be pursuing an aggressive enough approach to protect their 
present and potential export markets.216 A good starting point should be for those 
IGAD member states still outside the WTO to complete their accession as soon as 
practicable and for the three IGAD-cum-WTO members to use their status as WTO 
members to actively support the WTO accession of their fellow IGAD member states.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the livestock sector is subject to an intricate web of 
regulations and standards emanating from a multiplicity of sources. The two scientific 
institutions serve a vital purpose in international economic relations – the setting of 
science-based standards on animal health and food safety as well as creating a 
benchmark based on which national standards could be developed but also evaluated. 
The importance of these twin services is beyond doubt but many developing countries 
are struggling to cope with the system while their trade interests continue to suffer. 
The influence of the poorest countries on international standard-setting institutions 
has remained weak for reasons including the following: (1) poor level of attendance in 
key meetings; (2) inadequate representation in committee leadership as well as 
secretariat staff positions; and (3) technical complexity of the nature of standards 
work and the difficulty of implementing such international standards at the national 
level.217 In short, the science-intensive nature of the work of these organizations, 
coupled with established working mechanisms that blatantly discriminate against 
developing countries (e.g. the hosting of the Codex committees, which are almost 
always permanently in the hands of individual developed countries), make meaningful 
participation practically impossible for IGAD member states. The cumulative result of 
this inadequate representation and its exclusionary effect on the products of 
developing countries is that many countries see the two standards institutions as the 
institutional embodiment of the use of science as a tool to exclude their products 
from rich country markets.  
                                                 
214  See Schedule CLVIII – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Nov. 2005, reproduced in Annex II. 
215  That a WTO member country does not have INRs in another WTO member’s tariff concessions on a 
particular product means, in principle, that the latter may change or withdraw its concessions without 
consulting the former. See GATT Article XXVIII. The effect of this provision on members without 
INRs has been tempered down by the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXVIII which 
introduces mechanisms by which members could be given INRs retrospectively but it is difficult to 
have much hope in this exceptional route for IGAD.  
216  Gathii argues that Kenya is not paying enough attention to the enforcement of its rights under WTO 
law. According to Gathii, Kenya, “by failing to take seriously the application and enforcement of 
trading rules by its trading partners” has also “failed to engage a significant barrier of access to its 
products.” Gathii (2003), p. 200. Gathii illustrates this failure on the basis of EU restrictions imposed on 
flower imports from Kenya invoking non-compliance with the EU’s pesticide maximum residue levels, 
which Gathii argues is probably inconsistent with the WTO SPS Agreement. Id. pp. 205-208. 
217  See Steinberg and Mazarr, supra n. 90, pp. 5-6. It is worthy of note at the same time that the current 
Chairperson of the Codex Commission is Tanzania’s Claude Mosha while the three vice-chairpersons 
are from the US, Malaysia and the Netherlands. See Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
report of the Codex Alimentarius Commission Twenty-ninth Session (ALINORM 06/29/41, Geneva 3-7 
July 2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Alinorm06/al29_41e.pdf.  
 49
IGAD member states do not however just face the technical difficulty to meet Codex 
and OIE standards; many developed countries in fact impose standards that go beyond 
these international standards.218 This already erodes part of the assumption behind the 
acceptance of the “three sisters” as the international standard setting organizations 
by the WTO. What is worse, these already superior and nationally divergent standards 
are supplemented by company- or industry-specific private standards set mainly by 
supermarkets and groups of companies operating in similar areas.219 These standards 
can be even more complex and difficult to comply with than those set by 
governments.220 Researchers have already found that “increasingly, private players are 
imposing their own standards on importers and producers from developing countries … 
[and t]hese requirements exceed public regulations, particularly regarding production 
processes, certification, and traceability, three areas where the poorest countries are 
especially handicapped by the lack of capital, infrastructure, and skilled workers.”221  
IGAD member states must learn from their experiences in international economic 
decision-making circles in general that, as Steinberg and Mazarr put it, “coalitions can 
serve as a route to power.”222 An IGAD-level collaboration in this field would enable 
them to: (1) identify sectors of common interest; (2) identify common challenges; (3) 
create a mechanism by which they can develop common positions; and (4) speak in 
one voice at these organizations, ideally through a single representative with an IGAD-
wide mandate. There may be problems about multiple accreditation as was identified 
by the Codex review report, but informal coordination of positions and de facto 
representation of a group of countries by the same person(s) could provide a practical 
way around such formalistic and procedural hurdles.223  
 
                                                 
218  At a Codex review meeting, several developing countries complained that “many of their problems in 
trade arose from the fact that trading partners did not apply Codex standards and that as a result they 
had to meet a variety of different national requirements applied by importing countries.” See 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/W9809E/w9809e08.htm.  
219  According to UNCTAD, there are over 400 private schemes that range from firm-specific standards to 
those set by industry-wide and international associations. See WTO, Private Standards and the SPS 
Agreement: Note by the Secretariat (G/SPS/GEN/746) 24 January 2007, para. 3. 
220  See WTO, Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country: Market Access (preliminary results) 
Communication from OECD (G/SPS/GEN/763, 27 February 2007). 
221  See Jean-Christophe Bureau, Sebastien Jean, and Alan Matthews, “The Consequences of Agricultural 
Trade Liberalization for Developing Countries: Distinguishing between Genuine Benefits and False 
Hopes”, 5(2) World Trade Review (2006) p. 244.  
222  See Steinberg and Mazarr, supra n. 90, p. 5. 
223  The Codex review report of 2002 has, in this respect, noted that “greater inclusiveness can arise through 
more homogeneous groupings of countries focusing on common issues. Such work allows expertise to 
be brought together by countries which cannot adequately tackle issues on their own. Codex does not 
presently accept multiple accreditation at meetings (i.e. one delegation speaking for several countries), 
and we recognize objections to formal multiple accreditation. Informally though, we would encourage 
procedures whereby groups of members coordinate their positions and communicate these to facilitators 
and during committee meetings (as is already done by certain groups e.g. the EU and Quads for Codex 
and is widespread in FAO fora). This would not extend to voting at the Commission.” See Codex 
Evaluation, supra n. 188, p. 8, para. 18. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR IGAD LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTS: THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL DIMENSIONS  
We have seen in Chapter 1 that IGAD, both as a region and as a collection of individual 
countries, is highly dependent on the livestock sector for economic growth and for the 
livelihoods of a large portion of the population. It follows that whatever happens to 
the prices of such products internationally is bound to affect their chances of progress 
severely. However, as shown in Chapter 2, the participation of these countries in the 
international market entirely depends on their ability to produce and trade according 
to certain national and international rules in whose making IGAD member states 
hardly have a say. This chapter will survey the regulatory and institutional structure of 
selected IGAD member states and its implications for regional and extra-regional trade 
in livestock products. The trade relations of the IGAD region with one potential crucial 
export market – the EC – will be investigated here. The discussion will focus on the 
role of sanitary standards on IGAD livestock trade opportunities.  
3.1 Regional Integration, Preferences and IGAD Livestock Trade 
We have seen in Chapter 2 that there is no IGAD-wide common policy or legal 
framework for trade in livestock products.224 We shall see in this section that almost 
every IGAD member state is party to other regional and/or bilateral agreements that 
are aimed at closer integration, thus raising issues as to the viability of IGAD as a 
regional economic integration organization. 
3.1.1 Overlapping and Competing Regional Initiatives and Preferential Schemes 
3.1.1.1 Regional Initiatives  
Different IGAD member states are pursuing a multiplicity of different and sometimes 
overlapping regional initiatives in which IGAD as a unit plays no role. Indeed, an IGAD-
wide policy initiative could be undermined by policies and laws adopted by some of 
the IGAD member states within the umbrella of other regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) to which different groupings of IGAD member states belong. Apart from the 
long-term plan to create a continent-wide African Economic Community (AEC),225 only 
one of these RTAs, the COMESA, covers the whole of IGAD (except Somalia) and more, 
while many others are specific to one or just a few IGAD member states. Examples 
include the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) in which Sudan is the only IGAD 
member state that participates in a big regional initiative involving countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa226; Kenya is the only IGAD member state that is also a 
member of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) 
which brings together about 18 countries in and around the Indian Ocean227; and 
                                                 
224  See Chapter 2 supra, section 2.4.4. 
225  All IGAD countries are members of the African Economic Community (AEC), which was established 
by the Abuja Treaty in June 1991. The treaty provides for the creation of an African Common Market in 
six stages over a 34-year period. The EAC, IGAD and COMESA are all accredited by the AU as 
regional blocks for this purpose. See WTO (2007) supra n. 28.  
226  Also known as Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), this was established by the Arab League in 
1997 and currently has 17 members: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and UAE. Intra-RTA trade 
liberalization appears to have been progressing well since its establishment and, as of January 2007, all 
agricultural and industrial products have been subject to duty-free treatment. For more on this, see 
(WT/REG223/N/1, 20 November 2006). 
227  IOR-ARC member states are Australia; Bangladesh; India; Indonesia; Iran; Kenya; Madagascar; 
Malaysia; Mauritius; Mozambique; Oman; Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Tanzania; Thailand; 
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Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan participate with 19 other countries of north, 
central and west Africa in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which 
aims to establish an economic union.228 Of all these initiatives, COMESA and the EAC 
appear to be the most relevant, each in its own way, for the IGAD livestock sector. 
COMESA is made up of 19 countries of north, northeast and southern Africa, including 
six of the seven IGAD countries, i.e. except Somalia.229 The COMESA Treaty, which 
entered into force in December 1994, provided for the establishment of a customs 
union, including a common external tariff, within a transitional period of ten years. 
COMESA missed its ten year target for the formation a fully-fledged customs union, 
which it now aims to realize in 2008.230 COMESA is therefore the principal forum in the 
region for trade matters and the COMESA Secretariat runs a number of relevant 
initiatives such as the Livestock Sector Development programme in collaboration with 
the AU and USAID. However, the fact that nearly all IGAD member states are also 
COMESA members means that, in principle, IGAD member states can work within 
COMESA and also go beyond the rest of the COMESA membership towards closer 
collaboration in some specific policy areas. This is not the case with the East African 
Community (EAC), for example, making it perhaps the most important and most 
promising RTA with serious implications for IGAD’s future.231  
The EAC is a customs union, pursuing closer economic integration among its members, 
which include Kenya and Uganda from IGAD and Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda from 
outside IGAD. The EAC was reported to the WTO under the 1979 Enabling Clause232 as 
an agreement “for the progressive establishment of the East African Trade Régime, 
Customs Union and Common Market” with the long-term ambition of establishing a 
Monetary Union and ultimately a political federation.233 The EAC is making progress 
towards harmonization of its sanitary requirements on the basis, inter alia, of OIE 
standards.234 Indeed, adoption of joint standards is “an important objective for the 
EAC” and as at September 2005, the EAC had 566 joint standards in place.235 The 
Protocol establishing the East African Customs Union entered into force on 1 January 
2005,236 and the EAC (with its three original members) got its first joint trade policy 
review under the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in early 2007. 
                                                                                                                                                        
UAE and Yemen. The Association aims to facilitate trade and investment in the region. See 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/iorarc/index.html.  
228  CEN-SAD was established in 1998 with ambitious objectives, including “establishment of a 
comprehensive economic union” by, inter alia, facilitating the free movement of gods, services, persons 
and capital. The members of CEN-SAD are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia. See http://www.cen-sad.org.   
229  The other COMESA members are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For more 
information, see http://www.comesa.int/index_html/view.  
230  The COMESA treaty was notified to the WTO as a South-South economic integration agreement under 
the provisions of the Enabling Clause. See WTO, WT/COMTD/N/3, 29 June 1995. 
231   For a comprehensive and up-to-date information on the EAC, see WTO (2007) supra n. 28.  
232  GATT Decision of 28 Nov. 1979 on “Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries” (L/4903). 
233  See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, East African Community: Notification by the Parties 
to the Agreement, WT/COMTD/N/14, 11 October 2000.  
234  In its annual report to the OIE for 2004, Kenya made the following important point: “The harmonisation 
of standards/measures on terrestrial animals and fish modelled on the OIE standards, guidelines and 
recommendations to cover the East African Community (EAC) has been completed and is awaiting 
ratification by the governments of the three EAC partner States. This harmonisation process is aimed at 
trade facilitation within and outside the EAC.” See World Animal Health 2004, supra n. 147, p. 210. 
235  WTO (2007), supra n. 28, p. 24. 
236  See OECD, African Economic Outlook 2007 (Paris 2007), p. 306. 
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3.1.1.2 Preferential Schemes  
All IGAD member states except Kenya are least-developed countries (LDCs). This 
means that the WTO-authorised unilateral preferential schemes of developed 
countries in favour of LDCs, such as the EU’s Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, 
cannot easily and blindly apply to all IGAD goods as such. This is because WTO law 
requires that measures for the benefit of LDCs are available exclusively to goods and 
services originating in such LDCs and cannot be extended to benefit non-LDC 
developing countries like Kenya. This has potentially adverse implications in terms of 
the policy options available to IGAD as a unit. For example, IGAD member states may 
not be able to use IGAD as “the country of origin” for their goods given that goods 
from six of the seven IGAD member states will often be subject to duty-free treatment 
while those from Kenya may be subject to a duty as is the case in the EU for livestock 
products. The WTO does not yet have a harmonized system of rules for the 
determination of origin and each member country decides on the basis of their own 
laws.237 Livestock in particular should normally be among the least controversial in the 
determination of origin,238 but animal movements across borders within the IGAD 
region are quite common, thus making determination of origin potentially difficult. 
The Cotonou Agreement resolves this problem favourably as it recognizes all ACP 
countries as a unit in the determination of origin.239  
3.1.2 Intra-IGAD Arrangements 
There has always been significant cross-border trade in livestock among the member 
states of IGAD. According to Peter Little, cross-border trade with Somalia in 2003 
“encompasses an estimated 16% of beef consumed in Nairobi.”240 It appears that most 
of this trade may take the form of unofficial or informal cross-border trade, usually 
dubbed as smuggling by governments that are keen to enforce their customs and other 
regulations on such trade. Governments naturally want to ensure such trade is 
properly recorded, pays the necessary taxes and other fees, and does not create the 
conditions for trade in illicit products, such as drugs and arms.241 From a poverty 
                                                 
237  The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin only lays down certain general principles that should be 
observed in the determination of origin during the transition period, i.e. pending the harmonization of 
(non-preferential) rules of origin across all members, which was scheduled to be concluded within the 
first three years of the WTO’s creation. However, that harmonization agenda has yet to be finalized, the 
latest schedule having been July 2007. See WTO, Twelfth Annual Review of the Implementation and 
Operation of the Agreement on Rules of Origin: Note by the Secretariat, G/RO/63, 3 November 2006.  
238  There is consensus at the WTO that live animals born and raised in one country and products obtained 
from them are to be “considered as being wholly obtained in one country”. See WTO, Integrated 
Negotiation Text for the Harmonization Work Programme – Overall Architecture: Note by the 
Secretariat, G/RO/45/Rev.2, 25 June 2002, p. 6. 
239  See Cotonou Agreement, Protocol 1 concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ 
and methods of administrative cooperation, Article 3. 
240  See Peter Little and Hussein Mahmoud, “Pastoral Risk Management Project Cross-border Cattle Trade 
Along the Somalia/Kenya and Ethiopia/Kenya Borderlands”, Global Livestock CRSP, Research brief 
05-03-PARIMA, December 2005, available at http://glcrsp.ucdavis.edu/publications/parima/05-03-
PARIMA.pdf) 
241  This is however a difficult challenge for many of the countries of the region for several reasons: ill-
defined and rather artificial boundaries that sometimes seem to divide members of the same clan; 
tradition of free movement across borders by herdsmen following their cattle in search of pasture and 
water, and of course lack of effective control of often long and inhospitable border areas. A good 
example of this is the nomadic region between eastern and south-eastern Ethiopia, western and north-
western Somalia and northern and north-eastern Kenya which has the largest concentration of livestock 
in the whole IGAD region. See Little, supra n. 16. 
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alleviation perspective, however, cross-border trade, whether formal or otherwise, is 
almost always beneficial to the poor animal herders and the community at large.242  
3.1.2.1 Bilateral Arrangements: Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan 
It is not surprising therefore that there is quite a number of intra-IGAD arrangements 
of a bilateral nature. For example, Ethiopia and Sudan have a bilateral agreement243 
which aims to promote trade and broader economic relations between the two 
countries. The parties to this agreement however agreed to grant only Most-Favoured-
Nations (MFN) treatment to each others’ goods. Likewise, Ethiopia and Kenya also 
have a bilateral trade agreement244 with effectively the same objectives as the Ethio-
Sudan agreement except that the former has a broader scope. In both cases, the key 
trade commitment only requires of the parties MFN treatment for each other’s trade 
in goods and services. Given that all three countries are members of COMESA, which 
naturally aims to deliver preferential terms of access that are more favourable than 
MFN, it is difficult to find a trade rationale behind such agreements.  
Both agreements underline the common objective to discourage informal cross-border 
trade, but, it is only the agreement between Sudan and Ethiopia that led to further 
steps towards trade liberalization, half-hearted though it may look, as it was soon 
supplemented by a border protocol between the two countries (2001, with a revised 
version signed in December 2005).245 The protocol aims to promote official small-scale 
cross-border trade by issuing border trade licenses in accordance with a harmonized 
Border Trade License Directive. This arrangement however sets two forms of 
quantitative restrictions on the amount of trade that can be transacted in this way. 
Firstly, a licensed trader under the protocol is allowed to make only a single trip per 
week, and secondly, the value of each export-import transaction may not exceed 
about US$ 250 worth of goods – hardly an encouragement to official cross-border trade 
in the region. Indeed, as Peter Little pointed out in the context of the Horn of Africa, 
in cases where cross-border trade restrictions have been eased, “the amount of paper 
work and time required246  to qualify under new regulations is so cumbersome that 
most traders do not bother with it.”247 
Perhaps more importantly from the trade liberalization perspective, Sudan and 
Ethiopia also signed the 2002 “Preferential Trade Agreement” in which they agreed to 
eliminate all import duties on industrial and agricultural products traded between the 
two countries, applying the COMESA rules of origin for the purpose of determining 
which products are genuinely from the parties. However, the status of this Agreement 
and its practical significance remains unclear.  
3.1.2.2 The Djibouti Regional Quarantine Facility (RQF)  
Although not based on any inter-governmental agreement as such, a potentially 
significant player in IGAD livestock exports is Djibouti’s new Regional Quarantine 
Facility (RQF). Djibouti has a very small livestock resource base and its role lies in its 
vital geographical position as a transit port for livestock exports from the neighbouring 
countries, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. Building on this geographical 
                                                 
242  For a comprehensive bibliography on this and the positive impact of cross-border trade on the food 
security of the livestock producers, see Little supra n. 16, pp. 20-25.  
243  See Trade Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Government of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, signed at Khartoum on 6th March 2000, on file with author. 
244  See Trade Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Government of the Republic of Kenya, signed at Addis Ababa on 23rd July 1997, on file with author. 
245  See Border Protocol between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Government of the Republic of Sudan, signed at Khartoum on 15 December 2005, on file with author. 
246  The agreement was signed at Addis Ababa on 25 April 2002 (on file with author).  
247  Little supra n. 16, pp. 29-30. 
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advantage, Djibouti established the RQF with support from the USAID and a private 
investor from Saudi Arabia who signed a concession contract with the Djibouti 
government.248 This Company, known as Abu Yaser International Est., had its first 
shipment of livestock from the facility to Saudi Arabia in December 2006, just in time 
for the Hajji.249  
The RQF is a quarantine and certification service provider for livestock exporters from 
the region but Abu Yaser, its operator, is also a livestock exporter itself. As a service 
provider, the RQF has two main attractions for other exporters – excellent 
geographical location and recognition of its certificates by pertinent authorities in the 
Middle East.250 This second point in particular constitutes a significant positive step 
forward for the whole livestock industry within the catchment area of Djibouti. The 
Arabian Peninsula is by far the largest and the most natural export market for IGAD 
livestock products. Geographical proximity, historical relations and consequent 
cultural affinities underlie this commercial relationship, and sanitary measures have 
long been the main obstacle against IGAD livestock exports to this region. The 
establishment of a state-of-the-art quarantine facility within the IGAD region is thus 
to be welcomed.  
The RQF operates as follows251: independent livestock exporters from the region can 
bring their animals to the RQF only after they have found a buyer in the country of 
destination, and the animals must be accompanied by necessary documentation, 
effectively an export-import contract. The RQF then admits the animals for a fee of 
US$ 5 per head for small ruminants and US$ 10 per head for large ruminants. This fee 
covers everything from segregation of the animals to clinical inspection, treatment, 
vaccination, tagging all the way to certification and final exit. The entry fee does not 
however cover the cost of keeping the animals within the Facility until the day of exit; 
there is a daily charge of US$ 0.7 per small ruminant and US$ 1.6 per large ruminant 
for every passing day after the day of entry into the Facility. The number of days that 
an animal has to stay within the quarantine facility depends mainly on the 
requirements set by the importing country, and it is worth pointing out that different 
countries in the Arabian Peninsula maintain different requirements for the importation 
of live animals.252 This means that, under normal circumstances, the RQF cost per 
sheep destined for the Saudi market is about US$ 26; the same sheep would incur 
about US$ 20 if destined for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) market, and US$ 10 when 
going to Yemen. Such significant variations are a result of the number of days the 
animals are required to stay within the Facility under the laws of the importing 
country.  
From the legal perspective, there are two potential issues arising out of the operation 
of the RQF. Firstly, Abu Yaser International Est., the Saudi company that currently 
runs the RQF, is not just a quarantine service provider but also a direct player in the 
exportation of livestock from the IGAD region. As a trader, Abu Yaser competes 
directly with other livestock traders in the IGAD region; as an operator of the RQF, 
those other traders become Abu Yaser’s clients who invariably need to pass through its 
                                                 
248  It is regrettable that all efforts to obtain a copy of the concession agreement ended in failure. 
249  Meeting with the technical director of the RQF, Professor Abubaker Abbas, 7 March 2007, Djibouti. 
250  RQF officials stress that the facility has been recognized by all importing countries in the Middle East. 
Meeting with Dr Abdullah Fadhil Mohammed of the RQF, held on 7 March 2007, Djibouti. 
251  This section is based on interviews and discussions with RQF officials held in Djibouti on 6-7 March 
2007. See also Appendix II.  
252  Saudi Arabia apparently has the strictest sanitary requirements, Yemen has the least strict, and the other 
Middle Eastern countries such as the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar fall somewhere in the middle. For 
example, RQF officials say that the Saudis require vaccination of animals against Rift Valley Fever 
regardless of outbreak, while the other countries generally do not require such routine treatment. In 
terms of the number of days required for animals to stay in the quarantine facility, Saudi Arabia 
requires a minimum of 30 days, the UAE 21 and Yemen 7 days.  
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quarantine facility. Secondly, Abu Yaser is also a corporation with “similar 
investments in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen” and “other countries in the world”.253 
Abu Yaser has about 70 slaughter facilities and several factories processing hides and 
skins as well as bone meal for pet food throughout the Middle East.254 This makes Abu 
Yaser a direct competitor in the IGAD livestock sector on both the export and import 
sides. This creates a real conflict of interest between Abu Yaser as a trader that 
competes with all livestock traders in the region and Abu Yaser as a service provider 
with monopoly control over an essential facility.255 The legal issue effectively comes 
down to the potential for abuse of a monopoly position on the part of Abu Yaser. This 
potential conflict of interest is fully recognized by the technical director of the RQF 
who nonetheless dismisses the fear by pointing out that the RQF is not just a 
commercial establishment, but a public-private partnership that operates under the 
direction of the Djibouti Ministry of Agriculture. The fear, however, is that the 
interests of Djibouti and Abu Yaser could easily converge around a common goal to 
capture the livestock trade of the region and work out a revenue-sharing formula 
between them.  
Moreover, there are fears that the use of the Facility may become compulsory for all 
animals that pass through the port of Djibouti regardless of prior quarantine and 
certification by, for example, Ethiopian authorities, potentially leading to duplication 
of tests, doubling of quarantine waiting requirements, feed costs and the like. The 
only way to overcome this is either for Ethiopia to stop its quarantine services and rely 
completely on the RQF or for Djibouti to recognize the quarantine certificates of 
Ethiopia and let its animals pass through its ports without further quarantine 
requirement within Djibouti. This has already proven to be a politically difficult 
matter between the two countries. As the main supplier of animals exported via 
Djibouti, Ethiopia holds that it has a vested interest in the quality, health and safety 
of the animals it exports; indeed, its reputation and the reputation of its products in 
the eyes of the importing countries entirely depends on that. As such, Ethiopia will 
not easily give up such vital powers in favour of a third country. The second option is 
even less likely for one very simple reason – the RQF is currently run more like a 
purely private facility that operates mainly on commercial considerations. The 
solution can be found only through a high-level negotiation between the governments 
of the two countries as well as the RQF operators. Any resolution of this issue must 
ensure the continued operation of the RQF which represents a significant step forward 
for the livestock industry of the region. 
3.2 The National Dimension 
We have seen earlier that IGAD member states’ large livestock resources have not 
translated to significant export revenues for these countries. Several factors have 
been identified to explain the gap between this obvious export potential in the sector 
and the reality on the ground.256 But, it is clear beyond doubt that inability to meet 
importers’ requirements with respect to animal health and food safety standards is “a 
key factor affecting live animal and meat exports” from the region.257 This section 
                                                 
253  See  http://www.ets-abuyaser.com.   
254  Discussion with Professor Abbas, supra n. 249. 
255  The potential conflict of interest here could be anything from using the facility to put pressure on 
competing exporters to sell their animals to the operators of the quarantine facility to possible delays 
and added costs in processing the clearance of animals from competing traders while within the facility.  
256  These include the traditional, i.e. non-commercial, nature of animal husbandry in the region, poor 
breeding stock, high incidence of animal diseases, poor market and information infrastructure, and so 
on. 
257  See FAO Technical Cooperation Department, “NEPAD – Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme: Ethiopia: Investment Project Profile ‘Live Animal and Meat Export’ – 
Preliminary Options Outline”, January 2005, p. 1, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/ae669e/ae669e00.pdf. 
 56
aims to provide a survey of the legislative framework for trade in livestock products 
(to the extent information is available) in three of the IGAD member states – Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Sudan – with a view to analysing the problem areas that adversely affect 
the growth of cross-border trade within IGAD and with other countries. It is obviously 
impossible to describe the entire legal systems in these countries within the limits of 
this study, and the approach adopted here is to first provide a highlight of the three 
legal systems focusing on those laws and institutions that have direct relevance for 
international trade in general, and trade in livestock and livestock products in 
particular. This will then be followed by analysis of selected legal issues identified or 
implied as problems during interviews and discussions held with stakeholders in the 
countries and in the available literature on the subject. The principal sources of 
information for this purpose are the laws of the countries, which are supplemented by 
information gathered through interviews and meetings designed to identify the real 
concerns of people working in the field either as producers, traders or regulators in 
different ministries within governments. Based on this information, the following six 
issues have been identified for closer analysis: (1) legal uncertainties, (2) multiple 
taxation, (3) access to legal information, (4) institutional rivalry among different 
government departments, (5) inadequate capacity to respond to market failures, and 
(6) inadequate formal communication channels between government and private 
sector interest groups.  
3.2.1 Ethiopia 
3.2.1.1 Highlights of the Ethiopian Legal System 
Ethiopia is a federal state comprising nine states, also called regions, largely defined 
along ethnic lines,258 and two so-called Chartered cities.259 The 1994 Federal 
Constitution260 apportions legislative power between federal and state authorities. 
While the federal legislature is empowered to make laws on matters of federal 
jurisdiction, state legislatures make laws on matters of state jurisdiction. In general, 
the Constitution specifically and exhaustively lists federal powers while all powers not 
so listed are, in principle, reserved for states. Powers reserved exclusively for federal 
jurisdiction include those to formulate and implement the country’s overall economic, 
social and development policies, strategies and plans; to establish and implement 
national standards and basic policy criteria for public health, education, science and 
technology; to formulate and execute the country’s financial, monetary and foreign 
investment policies and strategies; to negotiate and ratify international agreements; 
to levy taxes and collect duties on revenue sources reserved to the Federal 
Government; and, most importantly for purposes of this paper, to regulate inter-State 
and foreign commerce.261 Powers not given expressly to the Federal Government – 
alone or concurrently with the states – are reserved exclusively to the States. 
However, Article 52 of the constitution also provides a long list of matters expressly 
given to the States, including those to establish a State administration that best 
advances self-government and a democratic order based on the rule of law; to 
formulate and execute economic, social and development policies of the State; and 
                                                 
258  The nine member States are: Tigray; Afar; Amhara; Oromia; Somalia; Benshangul/Gumuz; Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples; Gambela Peoples; and, Harari People. See Proclamation of the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1/1995, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, 1st Year, No. 1, 21st August 1995, Article 47(1). 
259  These are the capital Addis Ababa (Article 49 of the Federal Constitution and See “Addis Ababa City 
Government Revised Charter Proclamation No. 311/2003”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 9th Year, No. 24, 
16th January 2003, as amended) and Diredawa (See “The Diredawa Administration Charter 
Proclamation No. 4162004”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 10th Year, No.).  
260  Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 
1/1995, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1st Year, No. 1, 21st August 1995, hereafter the Federal Constitution. 
261  See Article 52 of the Federal Constitution.  
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again importantly for our purposes here, to administer land and other natural 
resources ‘in accordance with Federal laws’ as well as levy and collect taxes and 
duties on revenue sources reserved to the States. From the revenue sources reserved 
to the Federal Government that are of direct relevance for this paper are the power 
to levy and collect customs duties, taxes and other charges on all imports and exports 
and stamp duties.262 Likewise, from the revenue sources reserved for the states, the 
following are particularly relevant: fees for land usufractuary rights, taxes on the 
incomes of farmers, and taxes on individual traders within the state.263 Company 
profits and dividend payments fall under the concurrent tax jurisdiction of both the 
federation and the States while the two federal houses of parliament are given the 
power to allocate taxation powers between the two in cases where a revenue sources 
has not been specifically assigned to either of them by the Constitution.264 We shall 
see later on that some of these constitutional rules have caused serious problems for 
the Ethiopian livestock industry. 
International agreements concluded by the executive and ratified by the lower House 
of parliament265 become “an integral part of the law of the land”.266 Ethiopia is 
already a party to a large number of international treaties of a multilateral, regional 
and bilateral nature. The Constitution does not however specifically provide for the 
relative status of ratified international agreements within the hierarchy of laws. The 
fact that international agreements are addressed under Article 9 of the Constitution, 
entitled “supremacy of the constitution”, appears to suggest that such international 
agreements are of the same status as the Constitution itself. However, this is far from 
settled.  
The Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers that he chairs, are primarily 
responsible for ensuring the implementation of laws, policies, directives and other 
decisions adopted by parliament and the Council of Ministers. All matters relating to 
international trade are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. 
The Federal Government created the Export Promotion Agency (EPA) in 1998 with the 
primary object of enhancing the competitiveness of Ethiopian exports on the 
international market.267 Import-export business is open to any person, natural or 
juridical, with the required licence to do so. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), 
to which the EPA is now accountable, is primarily responsible for the issuance of 
foreign trade licences and supervision of their activities.268 To that end, a commercial 
register has been established by law and no one is allowed to engage in a commercial 
activity unless entered in the commercial register.269 The power to set the exchange 
rate and allocate foreign currency as well as to regulate banks and insurance and 
other financial institutions is given to the National Bank of Ethiopia.270  
The division of powers between federal and state authorities is also replicated in the 
structure of the judiciary.  In principle, therefore, the Constitution envisages a 
parallel system of federal and state courts, each with its own respective supreme 
courts invested with final judicial power, complete with high and first-instance courts. 
                                                 
262  See Article 96 of the Federal Constitution. 
263  See Article 97 of the Federal Constitution. 
264  See Articles 98 and 99 of the Federal Constitution. 
265  See Article 55 (12) of the Federal Constitution. 
266  See Article 9 (4) of the Federal Constitution. 
267  See “Ethiopian Export Promotion Agency Establishment Proclamation No. 132/1998”, Federal Negarit 
Gazeta 5th Year, No. 9. 
268  See “Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Proclamation No. 4/1995”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 1st Year, No. 4, art. 14, par. 7. 
269  See “Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 67/1997”, Federal Negarit 
Gazeta 3rd Year, No. 25, art. 4, 5. 
270  See “Monetary and Banking Proclamation No. 83/1994”, Negarit Gazeta, 53rd Year, No. 43. 
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Article 78 of the Federal Constitution declares the establishment of “an independent 
judiciary”. Furthermore, all courts are declared free from any interference or 
influence of any governmental body or other source. Judges are empowered and 
required to exercise their functions in full independence directed solely by the law. 
The Federal First Instance court is the lowest federal court in the land and has both 
civil and criminal jurisdictions. It also has both civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
cases arising in the two chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Diredawa. The Federal 
High Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal 
matters. The Federal High court also has original criminal jurisdiction on offences 
against the Constitutional order or the internal security of the state, against foreign 
states, the law of nations, aviation safety, and trafficking in dangerous drugs.271 The 
Federal Supreme Court, too, has both original and appellate jurisdiction. It has 
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases where federal government officials (defined to 
mean members of parliament, people with ministerial or higher rank, Supreme Court 
judges and others of equivalent ranking) are accused of offences committed in 
connection with their official duties and for offences involving foreign diplomats. The 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the Federal High 
Court. Finally, it is notable that the Supreme Court also has “power of cassation over 
any final court decision containing a basic error of law”.272 Accordingly, even if State 
Supreme Courts have in principle the highest and final judicial powers on matters 
falling within their jurisdictions, the Federal Supreme Court still retains power that 
would allow it to review such state cases on cassation, presumably with the power to 
affirm, modify or reverse such court decisions. The only requirement is that the court 
can exercise this power only in cases “containing a basic error of law”, whatever that 
may mean. The Federal Supreme Court also has power to decide cases in which two or 
more federal and/or state courts claim to have jurisdiction on the same case.  
Ethiopian courts do not have the power to rule on issues of constitutionality of laws; 
this power is reserved to the Upper House.273 As soon as a constitutional issue is raised 
in any judicial forum, presumably in the form of a challenge to the constitutionality of 
any law, it will be referred to the Upper House for decision. To assist the House in its 
task of constitutional interpretation, it has the power to organize what is called the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry, which is also established by the Constitution.274  
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry is somewhat odd in both its composition as well 
as its powers and functions. Article 82.1 of the Constitution, which establishes the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry, smacks of a constitutional court for the following 
reasons: (1) it is placed in chapter nine of the Constitution which is entitled ‘structure 
and powers of the courts’; (2) the President and Vice-President of the Federal 
Supreme Court are ex officio members and President and Vice-President of the 
Constitutional Council; (3) of the other nine members, six are required to be legal 
experts with proven professional competence and high moral standing while the 
remaining three are designated by the Upper House from among its members; (4) it 
has the power to receive cases involving issues of constitutionality of laws and/or acts 
from courts as well as any interested party; and (5) it has investigatory powers over 
such disputes and could even remand cases back to courts if it is convinced that no 
constitutional issue is involved. However, it is not a full-blown constitutional court 
mainly because the power to interpret the constitution is given exclusively to the 
Upper House and the role of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry is limited to making 
non-binding recommendations to this House.275  
                                                 
271  See Articles 4 and 12 of the Federal Constitution.  
272  See Article 80(3)(a) of the Federal Constitution. 
273  See Articles 83 and 84 of the Federal Constitution.  
274  See Article 62(2) of the Federal Constitution. 
275  See “Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No. 250/2001”, Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 40, 
7th Year, 6th July 2001.   
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The relevant laws in the area of foreign trade reflect the present Government’s 
liberal and market-oriented economic policy and its commitment to the promotion of 
free competition in the marketplace. This is reflected in the different incentives 
available to investors, both foreign as well as domestic, the growing number of 
bilateral investment agreements being negotiated by the Government with other 
countries, and its active involvement in several regional economic arrangements (such 
as IGAD and COMESA). Ethiopia is a member of both Codex and the OIE and the 
Government is currently in the process of negotiating accession to the WTO.  
3.2.1.2 Livestock-Related Laws and Institutions 
Ethiopia has a good number of laws providing for the prevention and control of animal 
diseases, sanitary standards for animals and animal products, specifications for 
slaughterhouses and other processing facilities, food safety standards, and the like. 
The 1964 proclamation that set up the Livestock and Meat Board,276 the establishment 
of a National Veterinary Institute in the same year, the 1970 Meat Inspection 
Proclamation277 (followed by the 1972 meat inspection regulations), the 1975 
Livestock Market and Stockroute regulation,278 the 1998 law establishing the Livestock 
Marketing Authority (amended in 2000 but repealed in 2004), and the 2002 law on 
animal disease prevention and control279 are only some of them.280 Many of these laws, 
such as the 2002 animal disease law, are designed to implement the country’s 
obligations under the OIE. The principal executive organ responsible for the livestock 
sector today is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD). At least 
since the 1970 Meat Inspection Proclamation, the Ministry of Agriculture (as it then 
was) has had the power to establish standards and inspect meat to ensure that 
livestock products exported from, or imported into, Ethiopia are ‘wholesome’ and fit 
for human consumption.281  
After several institutional experiments during the Derg period (1974-91), a Livestock 
Marketing Authority (LMA) was established in 1998 with the principal mission of 
promoting the domestic and export marketing of livestock products “through 
increasing their supply and improved quality.”282 Realizing that the sector had no 
specific body responsible to lead its development, the LMA was given a wide-ranging 
mandate including: (1) to issue quality control directives on exportable and 
importable livestock products; (2) to establish and encourage the establishment of 
staging points for domestic and export trade stock, with the necessary facilities; (3) to 
establish quarantine stations for use in the export and import of livestock; (4) to 
provide quarantine services in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture; (5) to 
promote the organization of livestock markets, abattoirs, hides and skins sheds and 
expansion of their services; (6) to encourage construction of export standard livestock 
                                                 
276  See Proclamation No. 212/1964; (b) Livestock and Meat Board Order No. 34/1964. 
277  See Meat Inspection Proclamation No. 274 of 1970, Negarit Gazeta, 29th Year, No. 15, 6th April 1970. 
278  See Meat Inspection regulations No. 428 of 1972, Negarit Gazeta, 32nd Year, No. 14, 13the November 
1972. 
279  Animal Diseases Prevention and Control Proclamation No. 26712002, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 8th 
Year No. 14, 31st January 2002. During my last visit to Addis Ababa in August 2006, I have received a 
copy of draft animal disease prevention and control regulations that had been submitted to the Council 
of Ministers for adoption. 
280  There are many others, too, but getting hold of them all is next to impossible. This is a problem shared 
by virtually all IGAD countries with the possible exception of Kenya.  
281  See Article 4 of the Meat Inspection Proclamation No. 274 of 1970, Negarit Gazeta, 29th Year, No. 15, 
6th April 1970. 
282   This was originally called the “Animal, Animal Products and By-Products Marketing Development 
Authority” (see Proclamation No. 117/1998) and renamed in 2000 as The Livestock Marketing 
Authority. See the “Animal, Animal products, and By-products Marketing Development Authority 
Establishment (Amendment) Proclamation No. 198/2000.”  
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product processing plants in accordance with international requirements; (7) to issue 
certificates of competence; (8) to set criteria that must be fulfilled by domestic, 
import and export traders in livestock products; (9) to promote and expand livestock 
export markets; (10) to collect, analyze and disseminate information on the current 
demands and international animal, animal products and by-products market situation 
to producers, domestic and foreign consumers and traders; and (11) to give technical 
support and advice to the Regions.  
The LMA was put under the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2001,283 and barely three 
years later, it was abolished altogether and its powers transferred to the newly 
restructured Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.284 This is a ministry with 
extensive powers and responsibilities to, inter alia: (1) promote rapid and sustainable 
agricultural and rural development; (2) encourage and assist in the provision of 
agricultural extension services and credit facilities to peasants and pastoralists; (3) 
conduct quarantine controls on plants, seeds, animals and animal products brought 
into the country or destined for exportation; (4) take the necessary measures to 
prevent the outbreak of animal and plant diseases and migratory pests; (5) closely 
monitor international markets and provide producers with comprehensive, up-to-date 
and accurate information to enable them identify those agricultural products which 
they can produce at competitive prices and quality; (6) cooperate with the Quality 
and Standard Authority of Ethiopia in standardization of agricultural products; (7) set 
criteria to be fulfilled by traders engaged in the production, supply and distribution of 
agricultural inputs and the processing, grading and export of agricultural products; 
and (8) issue import and export permit for agricultural inputs. 
The other important player in the livestock sector, particularly as related to food 
products containing livestock products, is the Ministry of Health. Article 22 of the 
proclamation that defines the powers and responsibilities of the executive gives this 
ministry powers to, inter alia, devise and follow up the implementation of ways and 
means of preventing and eradicating communicable diseases, undertake the necessary 
quarantine controls to protect public health, and conduct studies with a view to 
determining the nutritional value of foods.285 There is also the Drug Administration 
and Control Authority that was established in 1999 with wide-ranging powers to set 
and enforce drug-related standards relating to their quality, safety and efficacy as 
well as setting the standards of competence for organizations to be involved in drug 
trade.286 Article 8 of the Public Health Proclamation requires, inter alia, that no 
unhygienic, contaminated, unwholesome or mislabelled food shall be prepared, 
imported, distributed, or made available to consumers and that all food intended for 
human consumption “shall meet the standards of food quality”.287  
3.2.2 Kenya 
3.2.2.1 Highlights of the Kenyan Legal System 
Kenya enjoys the oldest, most stable and best-developed constitutional system in the 
IGAD region. Kenya has known only one constitution since its birth as an independent 
nation in December 1963, which has since remained the supreme law of the land, and 
                                                 
283  See Article 5 of “Reorganization of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Proclamation No. 256/2001”.  
284  See "Reorganization of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(Amendment) Proclamation No. 380/2004, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 10thYear No. 15, 13 January 2004.  
285  See “Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Proclamation No. 4/1995”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 1st Year, No. 4. 
286  See Drug Administration and Control Proclamation No.176/1999, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 5th Yar, No. 
60, 29 June 1999. 
287  See "Public Health Proclamation No. 200/2000”, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 6th Yar, No. 28, 9th March 
2000. 
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any law inconsistent with it is deemed to be void.288 This constitution has certainly 
undergone several amendments, in some cases drastic, but all that was done without 
losing the continuity and stability that characterize a mature legal system.289 
Kenya is a unitary state made up of eight provinces,290 with a unicameral legislature291 
and a powerful president.292 This has not always been the case, though. The original 
version of the constitution established a bicameral parliament (a Senate and a House 
of Representatives), a prime minister-led cabinet, and regional assemblies with 
significant powers.293 All these three key features of the original constitution were 
changed quickly after independence as the Upper House of Parliament was abolished, 
the post of Prime Minister replaced by a president who became both the head of state 
and government, and the regional assemblies that had given Kenya a federal state 
structure reduced to mere provinces. Most of these changes happened in the very first 
two years of independence.294  
It is notable for our purposes here that agriculture was one of the sectors put within 
the jurisdiction of the regions either exclusively or in concurrence with the centre 
under the 1963 constitution.295 But, as Okoth-Ogendo wrote in 1972, already in the 
first amendment of the constitution in 1964, “[n]early all the non-entrenched regional 
provisions, and in particular Schedule 2 which dealt largely with areas of concurrent 
central and regional powers over some agricultural and veterinary matters … were 
deleted.”296 The wisdom of this move to centralize power could always be debated, 
but this development has had some positive implications for the livestock sector. We 
shall see later on that multiple taxation by regional and central authorities and lack of 
coordination between these two levels of government in the fight against animal 
diseases have been identified by many as two of the most important regulatory 
obstacles to livestock trade in the IGAD region. Kenya’s unitary structure and 
centralized veterinary and fiscal systems should, at least in theory, mean a more 
favourable regulatory climate for livestock trade than the as yet undeveloped federal 
systems of neighbouring Ethiopia and Sudan. That does not of course mean that animal 
movements within Kenya are necessarily free; quarantine and animal disease control 
requirements often make this difficult in practice. It only means that, at least de 
                                                 
288  See Section 3 of the 1963 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, as amended. The text of the 
Constitution as well as other laws is available at Kenya Law Reports, 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/eKLR/index.php.   
289  The Kenyan electorate rejected a proposed new constitution in a referendum held in November 2005. 
290  These are the Nairobi Area plus the seven provinces of Central, Coast, Eastern, North East, Nyanza, 
Rift Valley and Western. See The Districts and Provinces Act of 1992, Chapter 5.  
291  This is the National Assembly and has 224 members; 210 are elected directly by the people, 12 are 
“nominated members” appointed by the president (the nomination being made by the parliamentary 
parties according to their share of seats in the National Assembly and the President presents this for 
approval by the Assembly; see section 33 of the Constitution of Kenya) and two are ex-officio 
members: the attorney general who is a non-voting member appointed by the president and for whom 
he is the principal legal advisor, and the speaker of parliament appointed by parliament as a voting 
member who may not necessarily be an already elected member of parliament. 
292  The President and the National Assembly constitute the parliament, the organ that has all legislative 
power of the Republic. See section 30 of the Constitution of Kenya.  
293  This changed almost immediately as the first set of amendments to the Constitution entered into force 
when Kenya was celebrating its first anniversary of independence in December 1964, at which time 
Kenya became a Republic. For the early history of Kenya’s constitutional developments, see Chanan 
Singh, “The Republican Constitution of Kenya: Historical Background and Analysis” 14(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (July 1965), pp. 878-949. 
294  See Okoth-Ogendo, “The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya since Independence, 1963-1969”, 
African Affairs, 9-34 (1972) pp. 19-20.  
295  See Id. p. 15.  
296  See Id. 
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jure, there is a country-wide system that operates to tackle the problems of the 
sector and any taxes levied by local authorities are easier to challenge as illegal in a 
unitary system than in a federal system where the division of power between central 
and regional authorities may not always be clear.297  
Members of the judiciary are appointed by the President. Courts have the power to 
interpret the constitution, the High Court being the ‘superior court of record’ with 
‘unlimited original jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters and such other jurisdiction 
and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law.’298 A Court 
of Appeal, also described by the constitution as ‘a superior court of record’, has 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High Court.299 Subordinate courts also have 
power to rule on constitutional matters but they have the right to refer issues of 
constitutional interpretation to the High Court. This right ceases to be an option as 
soon as a party to proceedings requests that a referral be made to the High Court, 
which the subordinate courts are obliged to do.300 Indeed, Kenyan courts enjoy the 
power of judicial review of administrative action, thereby effectively “monitor[ing] 
the exercise of governmental power”.301  
Kenya follows a market-oriented economic policy pursuing strategies of export 
diversification and enhancement through multilateral, bilateral as well as regional 
liberalization efforts.302 The President has power to negotiate, sign and ratify 
international treaties. However, international treaties signed and ratified by the 
executive can have legal effect internally only after they have been incorporated into 
municipal law by an act of parliament.303 This contrasts with the situation in, for 
example, Djibouti, where the 1992 Constitution “embodies the principle of the 
primacy of international legal instruments signed and ratified by Djibouti, … over 
internal legislation.”304 Kenya is a member of both Codex and the OIE and a founding 
member and an active participant of the WTO. 
3.2.2.2 Livestock-Related Laws and Institutions 
Kenya has a relatively well-developed regulatory framework governing the livestock 
sector.305 The key laws relevant to the livestock industry include the Animal Diseases 
Act,306 the Kenya Meat Commission Act,307 the Dairy Industry Act,308 the Hides and 
Skins Act309, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act,310 the Meat Control Act311, the 
                                                 
297  In reality, too, Kenya seems to suffer only a milder form of the taxation problem. Still Kenyan traders 
“complain of taxes they have to pay at source and en-route to the terminal markets” and the many 
roadblocks and the “extras” that need to be paid to get past them. Aklilu found “about 18 roadblocks 
between Moyale and Nairobi” alone. See Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, p. 7. 
298  See Section 60(1) of the Kenyan Constitution. 
299  See Section 64 of the Kenyan Constitution. 
300  See Section 67 of the Kenyan Constitution. 
301  See Victor Mosoti, “Reforming the Laws on Public Procurement in the Developing World: The 
Example of Kenya”, 54(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (July 2005), p. 624. 
302  For a general but critical look at Kenya’s trade strategies, see James Gathii, “A Critical Appraisal of the 
NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centred 
Development”, 13 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems”, pp. 179-210. 
303  See Ojwang, J. B., and Luis Franceschi, “Constitutional Regulation of the Foreign Affairs Power in 
Kenya: A Comparative Assessment”, 46(1) Journal of African Law (2002), p. 57.  
304  See WTO, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: Djibouti Revision, WT/TPR/S/159/Rev.1 (13 
April 2006), para. 6. 
305  See also Kenya Export Processing Zones Authority, Meat production in Kenya (Nairobi, 2005). 
306  See the Animal Diseases Act, Chapter 364 of the Kenyan laws.  
307  See the Kenya Meat Commission Act, Chapter 363 of the Kenyan laws. 
308  See the Dairy Industry Act, Chapter 336 of the Kenyan laws. 
309  See the Hide, Skin and Leather Trade Act, Chapter 359 of the Kenyan laws.  
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Cattle Cleansing Act,312 the Branding of Stock Act313 and the Veterinary Surgeons 
Act.314 In the words of the WTO Secretariat, Kenya is “the only EAC country with 
capacity to enforce” SPS standards,315 a statement that should easily hold true at the 
IGAD level as well.  
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) is responsible for the formulation, 
implementation, and coordination of Kenya’s trade policies. The Kenya Bureau of 
Standards (KEBS) is a statutory body under the MTI with a mandate that includes 
preparation and dissemination of standards, certification of industrial products and 
serves as Kenya’s notification authority and national enquiry point under the TBT 
Agreement. As the 2007 WTO Trade Policy Review report noted, since 1 January 2005, 
‘some of Kenya’s trade policy instruments, customs tariffs in particular, have been set 
at the East African Community (EAC) level.’316  
The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries is the principal institution responsible for the 
livestock sector in Kenya. Just like in Ethiopia today, the livestock sector was part of 
the Ministry of Agriculture until 1980, when a separate ministry of livestock was first 
created. This did not last, however, and it was only after several “splits and mergers” 
between these two ministries that Kenya finally established the present Ministry of 
Livestock and Fisheries in 2003.317 The Ministry has four departments (Veterinary 
Services, Livestock Production, Fisheries Development, Administration) and three so-
called parastatals (the Kenya Dairy Board, the Kenya Meat Commission, and the Kenya 
Marine and Fisheries Research Institute). The services provided by the Ministry include 
advisory/extension services in livestock and fisheries production, marketing and 
health; regulatory services aimed at quality assurance in livestock and fisheries inputs 
and products; surveillance, reporting and control of diseases and pests; animal 
movement control and quarantines; issuance of sanitary certificates for livestock, fish 
and their products; inspection and certification of abattoirs and fish processing 
establishments; inspection and certification of veterinary inputs; food safety and 
control of zoonoses; facilitation of international trade through linkages with the OIE, 
Codex, FAO, WHO, AU-IBAR and others, and provision of licences.318 These tasks are 
distributed among the four departments and a key department for our purposes is the 
Veterinary Services Department which is effectively the domestic counterpart to what 
the OIE aims to achieve at the international level. Under the Animal Diseases Act, the 
Director of Veterinary Services (DVS) has the power to, inter alia, declare areas 
infected with diseases and take remedial measures including isolation of the regions, 
disinfections and restrictions on the movement of animals, prohibit the importation 
and exportation of animals, and set quarantine procedures and certification criteria. 
The DVS is Kenya’s national enquiry point under the WTO SPS Agreement for animal 
health.319  
Another key player particularly in the exportation of Kenyan livestock products until 
the early 1980s was the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC). The KMC was established in 
                                                                                                                                                        
310  See the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, Chapter 360 of the Kenyan laws.  
311  See the Meat Control Act, Chapter 356 of the Kenyan laws.  
312  See the Cattle Cleansing Act, Chapter 358 of the Kenyan laws. 
313  See the Branding of Stock Act, Chapter 357 of the Kenyan laws. 
314  See the Veterinary Surgeons Act, Chapter 366 of the Kenyan laws. 
315  See WTO (2007), supra n. 28, p. viii. 
316  See Id. p. A1-47. 
317  See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 8.  
318  The service charter of the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, 2003, available at 
http://www.livestock.go.ke/images/stories/service_charter_may31.pdf. 
319  The Director of Medical Services is the national enquiry point for human health for Codex purposes. 
See WTO (2007), supra n. 28, p. A1-58. 
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1950 by the Kenya Meat Commission Act320 with near-monopoly powers. According to 
Section 8(1) of the KMC Act, only the Commission may “erect, establish or operate any 
abattoir, meat works, cold storage concern or refrigerating works for the purpose of 
slaughtering cattle and small stock, processing by-products thereof and chilling, 
freezing, canning or storing beef, mutton or other meat foods (excluding poultry), 
either for export or for consumption within Kenya”. Other individuals or firms may 
engage in such business only “under and in accordance with a licence which may be 
granted by the Minister, after consultation with the Commission, subject to such 
terms and conditions as the Minister may impose.” This already makes the KMC an 
important operator in the sector with significant regulatory powers over possible 
competitors. Most importantly, however, section 8(1)(b) goes further and stipulates 
that no person, other than the Commission may “export or supply to ships in the port 
of Mombasa fresh, chilled, frozen or canned beef, mutton or other meat foods 
(excluding poultry) except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the 
Commission subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission may impose.” 
Needless to say, when it comes to exportation, the KMC is not just to be consulted by 
the Minister prior to issuance of licences to others; the KMC is itself the licensing 
authority.321 The KMC was successful for quite a long time but gradually corruption 
and operational incompetence got in the way. The KMC stopped operations in 1986,322 
was closed in 1987, reopened in 1989, closed down again in 1992 and put into official 
receivership in 1998.323 While the collapse of the KMC may have been a blessing for 
private companies, which “proliferated in the major urban centers to supply meat to 
the local market”, Kenya’s livestock and livestock product exports also went down 
with the KMC itself. The KMC was reopened on 26 June 2006 by president Kibaki who 
not only “issued a stern warning to those who will misappropriate the parastatal’s 
funds” but also promised his Government “will also pursue those who mismanaged the 
parastatal leading to its collapse 15 years ago to ensure they pay back what they owe 
Kenyans.”324  
The Kenya Livestock Marketing Council (KLMC), which represents the interests of the 
private sector, is another important player in the livestock industry. KLMC is a 
membership organization and its key objective is to champion the interests of its 
members before relevant governmental bodies and to promote livestock marketing 
mainly internationally.325 However, KLMC officials stress that the interests of the poor 
pastoralist are a key element of their mission and their organizational structure 
already covers nearly all pastoralist districts in the country.326  
3.2.3 Sudan 
3.2.3.1 Highlights of the Sudanese Legal System 
The Sudanese legal system is very much in a state of flux at this particular moment in 
the country’s history. When the North-South conflict that had gripped the country for 
decades came to an end with the conclusion of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
                                                 
320  See Kenya Meat Commission Act, Chapter 363 of the Laws of Kenya. 
321  The chairman of the commission is appointed directly by the president of the country while its members 
include other high-profile figures from government, representatives of livestock producers and 
recognized independent experts. See section 3(1) of the Kenya Meat Commission Act.  
322  See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 2.  
323  See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 51, and See Munyao speech, supra n. 12. 
324  See Kibaki speech, supra n. 30. 
325  For information on the KLMC, see http://www.k-lmc.org/index.htm.  
326  Discussion with Mr. Abass Mohammed, CEO, and Mr. Qalicha Wario, Marketing officer, held in 
Nairobi 6 September 2006. The two officials confirmed that they have good access to the relevant 
authorities within the Government, including ministers.  
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Liberation Movement/Army, its implications for the Sudanese legal system were 
immense both for the immediate short term and possibly for the indefinite future. The 
CPA effectively determined the content of the Interim National Constitution (INC) of 
the Republic of the Sudan 2005,327 which is currently the supreme law of the land 
throughout the country for “the Interim Period”.328 According to INC Article 226(4), 
the INC remains the supreme law of the land for a six-year interim period that 
commenced on 9 July 2005 and will conclude with the referendum on self-
determination promised by the constitution to the people of Southern Sudan on 
whether to sustain the interim arrangement set up by the INC or to secede altogether 
and form their own independent state.329 The Government of National Unity 
established by the INC is charged with the responsibility of implementing the CPA. 
This section is thus largely based on the INC and other laws with particular relevance 
to the livestock sector focusing on the key regulatory problems identified during the 
field research and by the work of other researchers. Most of these problems revolve 
around the complex division of powers contained in or contemplated by the INC 
between the different levels of government.  
Article 24 of the INC sets up four levels of government – national, Southern Sudan, 
state, and local – the first three with their own legislative, executive and judicial 
organs. The easiest way to describe Sudan is to say that it is a federal state comprising 
25 states, but this does not say where the Southern Sudan government fits in, and the 
nature of the relationship between the national government and the state 
governments varies depending on whether a state is in Southern Sudan or Northern 
Sudan.330 Southern Sudan is a constitutional entity with ten states under it,331 while 
Northern Sudan is merely a geographical short hand to refer to all states of the Sudan 
outside the Southern Sudan region.332 Article 26(1) of the INC provides that the 
national government does not have direct links with the state governments within 
Southern Sudan, for which it must go through the government of Southern Sudan. 
Another crucial feature of the INC is the resource and revenue sharing mechanism that 
it has put in place between these levels of government.  
The constitutional set up is truly complex333 but, our main interest here is in the 
division of legislative and executive powers between the different levels of 
government as they affect the livestock sector from a trade-regulation perspective. At 
                                                 
327  The INC entered into force on 5 July 2005. The Peace Agreement has been explicitly incorporated into 
the INC as follows: “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is deemed to have been duly incorporated 
in this Constitution; any provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which are not expressly 
incorporated herein shall be considered as part of this Constitution.” INC Article 225. Murray and 
Maywald noted: “The CPA has had a significant effect on the substantive content of the national, 
Southern Sudan, and state constitutions. Indeed, when the Protocols on Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, 
and Security Arrangements are read together, it is apparent that little of political significance was left to 
be settled in the INC and the subnational constitutions.” Christina Murray and Catherine Maywald, 
“Subnational Constitution-Making in Southern Sudan”, 37 Rutgers Law Journal (2005-2006) p. 1212. 
328  See INC Preamble, last para.  
329  See Article 222 of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005. 
330  Note however that the word “federal” does not appear any where inn the INC. 
331  The ten states within Southern Sudan are Central Equatoria, East Equatoria, West Equatoria, North 
Bahr el Ghazal, West Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Warab, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. These states 
occupy the former three Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in their 
boundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956 (see Article 1 of the Interim Constitution of Southern 
Sudan, which entered into force on 5 December 2005). 
332  The 15 states in Northern Sudan are Gezira, Gadaref, Jonglei, Kassala, Khartoum, North Darfur, North 
Kordofan, Northern, Red Sea , River Nile, Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Darfur, and 
White Nile. 
333  Not much has yet been published in academic journals on Sudan’s interim national constitution. For 
useful preliminary reflections on the INC, and particularly on the development of state constitutions 
within Southern Sudan, see Murray and Maywald, supra n. 327. 
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the national level, Sudan has a bi-cameral legislature composed of the National 
Assembly and the Council of States334 while the Southern Sudan government and the 
states have unicameral parliaments.335 Members of the National Assembly are elected 
directly by the people while members of the Council of States are elected by the state 
legislatures and effectively come as representatives of their respective states.336 
While some of their legislative functions require them to sit jointly, each House is also 
an important player in its own right. The two Houses together, i.e. the National 
Legislature, are required to represent the will of the people and to “foster national 
unity”.337   
Among the powers of the National Legislature are amendment of the interim 
constitution, authorization of the annual allocation of resources and revenues 
proposed by the president, and promulgation of the Southern Sudan Referendum Act. 
The National Assembly has power to make any laws on matters that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the national government including ratification of international treaties, 
conventions and agreements, while the Council of States is competent to make laws 
on matters pertaining to the decentralized system and the interest of states as well as 
such powers as approval of appointment of justices of the constitutional court. In 
cases where bills considered by the National Assembly are likely to affect the interests 
of states, the constitution requires that they be first referred to an Inter-Chamber 
Committee that is composed of members of both Houses of the National Legislature.338 
The term of each chamber of the National Legislature is five years.339  
The INC contains three different schedules (A through C) that define legislative and 
executive powers reserved exclusively to the national government, the Southern 
Sudan government and state governments, respectively. This is then followed by three 
other schedules (D through F) containing respectively a list of powers that fall within 
the concurrent jurisdictions of all three levels of government, an agreed mechanism 
for dealing with residual powers, and a conflict resolution mechanism in case of 
contradiction between the laws of different levels of government regarding matters of 
concurrent jurisdiction. Each of the four schedules (A through D) contains such 
detailed lists of powers and function areas that administrative confusion and legal 
uncertainty at the implementation stage appears simply inevitable.  
Schedule (A) contains a list of 38 areas reserved exclusively for the national 
government, and the following are mentioned only as examples relevant for 
international trade in general and trade in livestock products in particular: foreign 
affairs and international representation; currency, coinage and exchange control; 
maritime shipment; national lands and national natural resources; customs, excise and 
export duties; signing of international treaties; international and inter-state transport, 
including roads, airports, waterways, harbours and railways; national economic policy 
and planning. Likewise, the 22 specific areas listed in Schedule (B) as reserved 
exclusively for the Southern Sudan government include the establishment of rules and 
standards on intra-state commerce; environment; agriculture; commercial regulation; 
control of animal diseases and veterinary services; consumer protection; and taxation 
                                                 
334  See Article 83 of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005. 
335  See for example Article 57 of the Southern Sudan Constitution on the establishment of the Southern 
Sudan Legislative Assembly.  
336  Each state is represented by two people in the Council of States while the number of members in the 
National Assembly depends on the population size of each state. See INC Articles 84 and 85. However, 
until an election takes place under the INC, the president has been given power to appoint 450 people as 
members of the National Assembly which he is required to do in consultation with the First Vice 
President (who must be a Southerner) and in accordance with a seventy-thirty ratio for the North and 
the South respectively. See Article 117 of the INC. 
337  See INC Article 91(1). 
338  See INC Article 91(3)-(5). 
339  See INC Article 90. 
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and raising of revenue from within Southern Sudan. At the sate level, too, the 
following are only a few of the many areas Schedule (C) reserves for their exclusive 
jurisdiction: regulation of state land and state natural resources; regulation of 
businesses and trade licenses; the development, conservation and management of 
state natural resources; making laws in relation to agriculture within the state; and 
direct and indirect taxation within the state in order to raise revenue for the state. 
Finally, the list in Schedule (D) on concurrent powers for all three levels of 
government includes regulation of trade, commerce, industry and industrial 
development; and the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of international and 
regional agreements on, inter alia, trade and investment with foreign governments; 
pastures; veterinary services and control of animal and livestock diseases; human and 
animal drug quality control; and regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of 
rights in land. The few provisions cited here suffice to show that such issues as 
taxation and revenue generation, regulation of commerce and management of land 
and other natural resources appear under each list, thereby exposing economic 
operators to the risk of over-regulation and double or even multiple taxation. We shall 
see below that these are not mere theoretical possibilities, but actual problems that 
are affecting producers and traders in the livestock product chain.  
The national executive organ is made up of the presidency (i.e. the president and two 
vice presidents) and the national council of ministers. The president is both the head 
of state and head of government. The president and the two vice presidents are also 
members of the council of ministers – its other members being appointed by the 
president in consultation with the vice presidents.  
The president has significant legislative powers; indeed, INC Article 108(1) stipulates 
that all bills normally require his assent before they become law. The president must 
make his position clear, and give his reasons in case he does not assent, within thirty 
days of the passage of the bill as otherwise the bill “shall be deemed to have been so 
signed.” This is a one off opportunity for the president to stop a bill from becoming a 
law. Once the president has given his reasons for withholding assent, the bill goes 
back to the National Legislature for reconsideration and, if the latter again passes the 
bill by a two-thirds majority of all the members and representatives of the two 
Chambers, the bill becomes law without requiring the assent of the President.340 
Finally, the president also has power to issue provisional orders with the force of law 
on matters of particular urgency that happen at a time when the National Legislature 
is not in session.341 This power does not extend to “matters affecting the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Bill of Rights, the decentralized system of 
government, general elections, annual allocation of resources and financial revenues, 
penal legislations, international conventions or agreements altering the borders of the 
State.”342 The power to ratify international treaties normally belongs to the National 
Legislature but it can delegate this power to the president for the time when it is not 
in session. Conventions ratified by the president during such period “shall not be 
subject to subsequent ratification by the National Assembly” although they are 
required to be deposited before it as soon as it is convened.343 Sudan is a member of 
the OIE and Codex and it has been negotiating its accession to the WTO since 1994 and 
currently stands at the stage of bilateral market access negotiations on the basis of 
revised offers on goods and services.344 
                                                 
340  An interesting legal issue would be whether this sequential logic is affected if the National Legislature, 
after considering the reasons given by the president, introduces changes to the original bill before 
passing it a second time.  
341  See Article 109 of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005.  
342  See Article 109(2) of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005. 
343  See Article 109(4) of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005. 
344  See WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_soudan_e.htm. See also Victor Mosoti, “The 
Legal Implications of Sudan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization”, 103 African Affairs (2004), 
pp. 269-282.  
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Sudan’s judicial system is also nearly as complicated as the country’s overall state 
structure. The INC has created a Constitutional Court345 that is separate from the 
national judiciary. The mandate of the Constitutional Court is limited to purely 
constitutional issues and some criminal jurisdiction on high state officials such as the 
president of the republic. It is a powerful organ that stands independent of both the 
Legislature and the Executive, and with the final say on the interpretation of the 
national, Southern Sudan and all state constitutions.346 The Constitutional Court is 
made up of nine justices, one of them its president, appointed by the country’s 
president subject to approval by the Council of States. The Constitutional Court also 
has power to decide on the constitutionality of laws and to adjudicate on 
constitutional disputes between different levels and organs of government in the 
country.347  
The National Judiciary, on the other hand, is the body vested with judicial authority 
and made up of the National Supreme Court, the National Courts of Appeal and Other 
National Courts. The national judiciary is headed by a Chief Justice who also serves as 
the president of the National Supreme Court. Apart from constitutional matters, the 
National Supreme Court is effectively the highest court on the land, described by the 
Constitution as “a court of cassation and review in respect of any criminal, civil and 
administrative matters arising out of, or under national laws, or personal matters”.348 
The president of the country appoints all judges and justices upon the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission which is headed by the 
Chief Justice. The INC also contemplates a parallel judicial system for Southern 
Sudan, with power to appoint the justices and judges given to the President of 
Southern Sudan.349  
3.2.3.2 Livestock-Related Laws and Institutions 
Livestock production and trade in Sudan is an old and traditional business that 
currently accounts for 20% of the national GDP and 30% of the non-oil export 
revenue.350 The first livestock laws were issued in 1902 by the British colonial 
administration relating to animal diseases while the second relevant law was issued in 
1913 relating to livestock exports. Both laws remained unchanged for nearly a 
century, the 1902 law having been amended and updated by the Animal Diseases Act 
2001, and the 1913 law replaced by the Hygienic Quarantine on Export of Meat and 
Live Animals Act 2004.351 This latter law on quarantine and export of livestock 
requires, inter alia, an ear-tagging system with different colours used for cattle 
originating from different parts of the country, allowing them to be traced back to 
particular regions although not to particular ranches or farms.352 There are also 
several other laws relevant to the sector applicable today, including the Animal 
Disease-Free Zone Act 1973, the Meat Inspection and Hygiene Act of 1974, and the 
Protection of Animal Genetic Resources Act 2004.353 There is also a presidential 
                                                 
345  See Part Five, Chapter I, of the INC. 
346  Note however that the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan has power to “adjudicate on the 
constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or provisions of laws that contradict the 
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan or the constitutions of Southern Sudan states.” See INC Article 
174(c).  
347  See INC Article 122(1). 
348  See INC Article 125. 
349  See INC Articles 132 and 172-175. 
350  Discussion with Dr Hassan Mohamed Nur, supra n. 7. 
351  Id. 
352  Id. 
353  Note that these are free translations from the Arabic original text, for which I am grateful to Dr 
Mahmoud Firoozmand here at CEPMLP, University of Dundee.  
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decree that prohibits the imposition of taxes on the movement of animals across state 
boundaries within Sudan but officials stress that, in practice, states impose taxes on 
such animals arguing that the animals have used up rare pastures and water and/or 
have ‘polluted’ the environment while passing through that land.354  
The Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (MARF) is the federal executive organ 
primarily responsible for the livestock sector. National priorities in the field of 
livestock were summarized in the Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime submitted by 
the government in 1999 as including control and eradication of livestock diseases, 
revitalisation of veterinary services, privatisation of veterinary services, expansion of 
disease-free zones and establishment of export facilities like quarantines and 
slaughterhouses in the ports and frontier points.355 Needless to say, these same 
priorities remain at the top of the government agenda today.  
Sudan enjoys a fairly well-established and qualified veterinary service.356 All 
veterinary activities are carried out under the auspices of MARF, which has several 
departments within it, the two most relevant for us being the department of Animal 
Health and Epizootic Diseases Control, and the department of Quarantines and Meat 
Hygiene. The Meat Hygiene Institute under the latter department, for example, 
inspects slaughterhouses and meat intended for both local and export markets.357 Just 
like in Ethiopia, the Meat Hygiene department assigns vets to each export 
slaughterhouse or meat processing plant “to undertake both pre-mortem and post-
mortem examinations”.358 The Ministry of Health is responsible for, inter alia, 
establishment and implementation of sanitary measures for foods and drugs. Sudan 
reported as early as 1999 that its standards for food products, additives, veterinary 
drugs and pesticides are “identical to codex”.359  
The Ministry of Foreign Trade then takes care of national trade policy, including 
‘representation of the Sudan in regional and international trade organisations’. The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade does not require a license as a condition for a person to 
engage in export trade. Any person can export products from the Sudan as long as 
they produce a contract for export (i.e. with an importer on the other side) together 
with an import permit from the destination country and they go to the Ministry for 
signature only for statistical purposes. 
Finally, Sudan had a Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation (LMMC), which was 
created in 1974 and started operation in 1976. This was a largely service-oriented 
corporation that was tasked with building information systems and creating new 
markets. However, this was abolished in 1992 by the government for cost reasons. The 
gap that was created as a result of its abolition has now been filled by the creation of 
the Animal Resources Service Company (ARSC) which is 20% government-owned and 
80% private.360 The ARSC’s main task is to organize open and transparent markets (of 
which they have 11 right now) in which the animals are put on a scale and the bidders 
publicly announce their offer prices for each animal depending largely on its weight. 
The ARSC charges about 10 to 15 Dinars per head of sheep and between 100 and 150 
                                                 
354  Discussion with Dr Hassan Mohamed Nur, supra n. 7. 
355  See WTO, Accession of Sudan: Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (WT/ACC/SDN/3, 26 
January 1999). p. 5. 
356  According to Aklilu, “Compared to its neighbors, Sudan has a formidable force of trained manpower in 
the animal health discipline, consisting of some 1,350 vets working in the public sector, about 750 in 
institutions and universities, some 1,075 private practitioners and 663 vets in various occupations.”  See 
Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, p. 74.  
357  See Mtula, PPLPI 2003. 
358  Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, p. 75. 
359  See WTO, Accession of Sudan: Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (WT/ACC/SDN/3, 26 
January 1999). p. 24. 
360  Discussion with Dr Mustefa Ismail Elhag, ARSC, 28 February 2007, Khartoum. 
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Dinars per head of cattle. The amount of charge they can levy is apparently set by 
federal law.  
3.3 Common Practices and Challenges in IGAD Livestock Trade Regulation 
The highlights of the three legal systems in the preceding section reveal that 
significant differences exist among these legal systems. While Ethiopia’s may be 
considered to be more of a continental law type, and Kenya’s of the common law 
type, Sudan’s is the product of three different legal traditions – common law, 
continental law and Islamic law. In terms of institutional capacity to set and enforce 
laws and standards, too, differences exist among these countries, Kenya being the 
obvious leader. Probably the same could be said about the degree of administrative 
efficiency, transparency and particularly access to the law.361  
However, as IGAD member states face increasingly similar challenges in the livestock 
sector, their policy responses and measures at the national level are also increasingly 
looking similar. Although the focus of this section will be on the legal and institutional 
problems shared in common among the three IGAD member states covered here, it is 
first useful to take a brief look at three areas where practical similarities are 
apparent: (1) similarities in export formalities and arrangements; (2) a common 
interest in adding value to their exports; and (3) signs of a lack of commitment to 
market-based policies in the sector.  
3.3.1 Common Practices  
Two of the three countries covered in the preceding sections already export a certain 
quantity of livestock products to the Middle East, particularly to Saudi Arabia. A look 
at the way these products are exported provides a glimpse of how the laws and 
institutions of both the exporting and importing countries interact to make the 
transaction possible. It is interesting to observe that these practices appear to be 
converging, which at least in part is a result of the fact that all IGAD member states 
are trying to export to the same countries in the Middle East for which compliance 
with the latter’s requirements is an absolute precondition.  
A randomly chosen application file submitted by a livestock exporter to Sudan’s 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade contains a copy of the conditions set by the Saudi 
Animal and Plant Quarantine department, which contains the following six 
requirements as conditions for the importation of live animals into Saudi Arabia:  
“The animals should be accompanied by a valid Health Certificate issued by the 
relevant authority and Certificate of Origin, and attested by the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in the country of origin. 
The Health Certificate should include the health condition and the dates of 
vaccinations against specific diseases and all the conditions required by the Ministry. 
The animals should be examined within 24 hours before loading and found healthy and 
free from any symptoms of infectious and epidemic diseases and external parasites. 
All imported consignments should comply with the Veterinary Quarantine Law of the 
G.C.C. States, its Executive Regulations and the relevant Ministerial and 
administrative directives. 
This permit is valid for (60) days from the date of issue and good for one consignment 
only. 
The Ministry may cancel this Permit in case of banning importation from the country 
above, before departure of the consignment from the country of origin.”  
(see a scanned version of the document in Appendix III) 
                                                 
361  Note that Kenya is the only country in the region whose laws are freely available on the internet.  
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The requirements set out in this document fully accord with the information gathered 
in Addis and Djibouti from exporters as well as the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Ethiopia. It 
is thus possible to take these requirements as an accurate, albeit incomplete, version 
of Saudi practice on the matter.  
Likewise, meat exports from Ethiopia and Sudan to Saudi Arabia are subject to 
sanitary controls by the importing country’s authorities in three main forms: (1) 
importing country approval of processing facilities within the exporting countries’ 
territories; (2) requirements to produce health and Hallal certificates issued by 
exporting government authorities, verified by the resident Saudi Embassies (in Addis 
Ababa or Khartoum); and (3) physical inspection and laboratory testing of imports on 
arrival in Saudi Arabia.  
A second feature relates to the shared interest among IGAD member states to add 
value to their exports in this sector. A good example here is the apparent policy 
convergence among the three countries in the area of leather exports, on which they 
share largely the same problems of traditional slaughtering practices,362 poor handling 
(sheering, skinning, etc.) practices, animal diseases, and inadequate technical 
expertise in the field. Ethiopia’s Raw Hide and Skin Marketing System Proclamation363 
and Kenya’s Hide, Skins and Leather Trade Act364 are in many ways similar; both 
require a license as a condition for engaging in the business of buying of hides, skins or 
leather for the purposes of resale, tanning, retanning or finishing or for the production 
of manufactured goods inside the country or for export. Ethiopia bans the export of 
raw hides and skins365 (which is vulnerable to challenge under the WTO, except of 
course that Ethiopia is not yet a member of the WTO) while Kenya and Uganda apply a 
tax of 25% and 20% respectively on the exportation of raw hides and skins.366 Given the 
natural interest of these countries to enhance their export revenues, these measures 
clearly look self-defeating. However, their mission is also equally clear. By restricting 
or prohibiting the export of raw hides and skins, the measures intend to encourage the 
domestic tanning and leather industries to invest in further processing within those 
countries.367  
Finally, it is interesting to observe that Ethiopia and Sudan in particular seem to share 
some regulatory anomalies in the livestock sector. Although Sudan has been following 
a clearly market-oriented economic policy since the early 1990s, in 2002, the 
                                                 
362  According to Abdissa Adugna, Secretary General of the Ethiopian Tanners, Footwear and Leather 
Garments Manufacturers Association, only 20% of animal slaughters in Ethiopia take place inside 
licensed abattoirs, thus leading to a waste of hides and skins due to poor slaughtering techniques. 
Interview held in Addis Ababa, 24 August 2006. 
363  See “Raw Hide and Skin Marketing System Proclamation No. 457/2005”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 11th 
Year, No. 45, 15th July 2005.  
364  See Chapter 359 of Kenya’s laws. 
365  The relevant proclamation does not say this explicitly; all it says is: “No person shall transport and sell 
raw hide and skin to areas not authorized.” Article 7 of the Ethiopian “Raw Hide and Skin Marketing 
System Proclamation No. 457/2005” (Federal Negarit Gazeta 11th Year, No. 45, 15th July 2005.) The 
proclamation does not define what is meant by “areas not authorized”, but Abdissa Adugna (supra n. 
362) considers it as a ban wisely imposed by the government to encourage industries and industry 
associations like his. It must be recognized, however, that such policies could adversely affect the poor 
livestock producers as that will give monopoly powers to the national leather processing industry.  
366  See Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, Vol. 1, June 2006, pp. 29-30, available at 
http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/uganda.htm.   
367  Kenya was asked to explain the policy objective of this measure during the EAC trade policy review at 
the WTO in 2006, and Kenya’s response was the following: “The leather industry has been one of the 
key sectors identified for restructuring in view of the poor performance in the past. In this regard the 
availability of raw materials to encourage value addition in the processing of leather has necessitated 
the need to impose an export tax for hides and skins.” See WTO doc. WT/TPR/M/171/Add.1 (20 
December 2006), p. 71.  
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Government signed an Exclusive Export Agency Agreement (EEAA) with the Gulf 
Livestock Company (GLC) which is owned by a Saudi prince. This agreement gave the 
GLC an exclusive agency to export all Sudanese livestock and meat to the Arab world 
for a period of five years. The arrangement, of course, faced opposition from 
different segments of Sudan’s livestock sector, particularly the exporters, and came 
to a premature end in 2004.368  
Interestingly, Ethiopia almost repeated this Sudanese act when, in 2005, the 
Government issued a law authorizing the Ministry of Trade and Industry to grant 
exclusive agency on certain export trade sectors for a limited period of time.369 
Although this law was not couched in sector-specific terms, it was de facto aimed 
particularly at the livestock sector. The idea was thus exactly the same as Sudan’s – 
i.e. if the Ministry granted such a privilege to one foreign company, other companies 
could enter the same export market only through such a foreign company. The reasons 
for this were said to include disappointment with the export performance of the 
sector, a belief that conferring privileged status on foreign companies would attract 
more foreign investment and enhance exports and to encourage ties between local 
producers and reputable foreign companies. The plan also faced serious opposition 
from different quarters and the Ministry has yet to exercise the power vested in it by 
this proclamation. 
3.3.2 Shared Legal and Institutional Problems 
Among the many problems identified by stakeholders in IGAD member states, some 
are either purely legal issues or have a strong legal dimension. The following issues 
will be discussed here: legal uncertainties (often due to lack of commitment to the 
principle of rule of law, and in some cases due to federalism), multiple taxation, 
inadequate regulatory/enforcement capacity (often exacerbated by inter-institutional 
rivalry or regulatory instability) and inability to tackle market failure. 
Legal Uncertainties  
The role of law in business is significant and multifaceted. It can encourage or 
discourage economic activities; a good law enforced properly is a force for stability 
and predictability in business relations as well as an instrument of managed change 
and transition. Business thrives in countries with a stable legal system in which 
property rights are respected, contractual promises upheld, courts are independent 
and efficient, and their verdicts recognized and enforced. It is impossible to pass a 
blanket judgement, based solely on the research carried out for this study, on 
whether or not the national legal systems of the IGAD member states under 
examination here live up to those and other similar standards. Most of the complaints 
made by business people in all countries however revolve around these issues.  
Interesting examples for this were recounted by Dr Mustefa Ismail Elhag, Deputy 
Director of Livestock Markets at Sudan’s ARSC. In an interview held in Khartoum in 
March 2007, Dr Mustefa said that federalism has created several problems in Sudan 
particularly for the livestock industry, and the main problem in his view was the 
uncertainty about the division of powers between the centre and the states, the latter 
often acting beyond their powers. He recounted stories of state measures against the 
interests of ARSC and mentioned two examples in which the ARSC had to take two 
states, Gezzira and White Nile, to court. The ARSC won both cases but it took the 
                                                 
368  For more on this, see Abubakr Ibrahim Hussein, Support to Livestock Production and Marketing in 
Traditional Rain-fed Farming Areas: Report on Livestock Markets and Marketing (unpublished; 
November, 2006).  
369  See The Granting of Exclusive Agency on Certain Export Trade Sectors for a limited period of time 
Proclamation No. 440/2005, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 11th Year No. 25, 21st February 2005.  
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courts over five years to reach a verdict. The cost to the company was however too 
much to justify the very process.370  
Another good example of legal uncertainty comes from the contrasting terminologies 
used, and justifications given, about the fees collected by the Sudanese government 
from livestock exporters at the port. Both the national Association of Livestock and 
Meat Exporters and the federal Ministry of Foreign Trade agree that exporters pay 1% 
of the value of their exports at the port of exit, but while the exporters call that an 
unfair export duty that only punishes them for engaging in the business, officials of 
the Ministry371 deny the very existence of export duties and explain that these are 
only business profit taxes, collected at the port merely for administrative 
convenience. According to the Ministry, the taxes thus collected are later deducted 
from the final tax paid by the concerned companies. Regardless of the truth or 
accuracy of either view, what is important is that, whatever the name given, the levy 
has an obvious export-discouraging effect; and the confusion in the name of the levy is 
an expression of the lack of clarity in the legal authority behind the practice. This is a 
matter of rule of law and the degree of transparency with which it is administered. 
Professor Peter Little also argues that cross-border trade (CBT) in the IGAD region 
suffers from inappropriate policies and laws but he goes further and discusses the 
problem of enforcement at the local level. According to Little, there is “a great deal 
of uncertainty about existing policies toward CBT; about what level of administration 
is responsible for regulating/licensing the activity; and about the rights of CBT traders 
to engage in trade of legal goods.”372 Little also mentions examples from Ethiopia 
where regional and local authorities in the eastern part of the country “often are 
unaware of policy changes at the federal level and, thus, some local actions may 
actually contradict existing laws and policies of CBT”.373 Yakob Aklilu also wrote on 
Ethiopia that the role of the Director of Veterinary Services was “undermined by the 
federal structure, as regionally-focused veterinary departments were not obliged to 
report to the federal DVS.”374 Ethiopia then started a restructuring process to 
overcome this problem, but it is interesting to note that the drive to do so “was 
initiated by a Saudi livestock and meat trading company which required a centralized 
and robust veterinary service before they would agree on a deal during trade 
negotiations in 2004.”375 On this point, it is worth pointing out that MARF officials in 
the Sudan are confident that the effect of federalism is nil when it comes to their 
disease control activities. According to Dr Hassan Mohamed Nur, Head of MARF’s 
Department of Planning and Livestock Economics, despite Sudan’s federal state 
structure, the laws on animal diseases are applied harmoniously and uniformly all over 
the country and, although states have power to issue such laws, whatever they do is in 
full compliance with the laws of the central Government.376  
                                                 
370  Dr Mustefa thinks that some of the problems could be overcome if the federal government were to pass 
an act clearly delineating the division of powers between the centre and the states regarding the 
production and marketing of animals and he says that the ARSC has already submitted a proposal for a 
Livestock Marketing Act to MARF and are awaiting action from the government. 
371  Meeting with Yousof Abdelkareem Mohamed, Export Director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, held 
28 February 2007, Khartoum.  
372  Little, supra n. 16, pp. 29-30. 
373  Id. pp. 29-30. 
374  Aklilu (2006), supra n. 24, p. 195. According to Aklilu, Ethiopia then requested a review the status of 
its DVS from AU-IBAR, which identified a number of problems, including “the disconnect between 
federal and regional veterinary services, the fragmentation of veterinary laboratory services, an 
uncoordinated disease surveillance system, the lack of an independent statutory body to control and 
regulate the veterinary profession, the poor quarantine services” and the like. Id.  
375  Id. p. 195. 
376  Discussion with Dr Hassan Mohamed Nur, supra n. 7. Almost the same view was echoed by Dr Naway 
Gubair Naway, Deputy Director of the Quarantine and Meat Hygiene Directorate of MARF.  
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In sum, legal uncertainty is a serious problem that affects all countries in the region, 
and not just those with a federal structure. Federalism only exacerbates the problem. 
For example, Kenya acknowledges that its legal and regulatory framework is 
“inadequate to address the current and future challenges in disease, pest and quality 
control”377 and is undertaking a law reform process to ensure that the laws of the 
country on livestock production and particularly those relating to disease control are 
up-to-date and fit for the purposes of the day. Ethiopian veterinary officials complain 
that the federal structure has made it totally impossible for them to discharge their 
obligations under the OIE.378 Likewise, it has been found in respect of Uganda that 
“the shift from centralized to decentralized government since 1997 has resulted in 
much confusion over animal health management. Currently, there is no harmonized 
livestock movement control system as each district has its own priorities, guidelines 
and livestock control program. … The old reporting system between the districts and 
the center has almost collapsed and, not surprisingly, discussions are underway to 
recentralize the animal disease reporting and control program.”379 Indeed, already in 
2004, Uganda reported to the OIE that it was “considering recentralising most aspects 
of veterinary services in the country in order to address animal disease problems more 
effectively.”380 
3.3.2.1 Multiple Taxation 
Related to the above is the problem of multiple taxation of animals on the move, 
which is a problem often, encountered by livestock traders in the IGAD region without 
exception. The problem appears to be rather acute in countries with a federal 
structure, Ethiopia and Sudan in our case. Aklilu wrote that “exporters from Ethiopia 
and Sudan have to pay myriad taxes and fees for live animals or chilled/frozen 
meat.”381 But, the problem is at its worst in the Sudan. Virtually everyone with 
interest in the livestock sector consulted in Khartoum agreed that multiple taxation of 
livestock products at both federal and state levels is the most pressing problem for 
Sudan’s livestock industry. Aklilu provides an excellent collection of the types of taxes 
that apply on a product from its state of origin in Sudan to the port of exportation.382 
According to Aklilu, “Sudan probably applies the most excessive and complex fees and 
taxation system on livestock trading in the region. Different sources vary but some 
studies suggest that taxes and fees constitute up to 27% of the cost of the exported 
animal and may go up to 40% if fodder is included. Most agree that there are over 20 
types of taxes and fees between points of purchase and Port Sudan.”383  
It is notable that Aklilu’s findings on Sudan here predate the complex constitutional 
structure that was introduced in 2005. But, the taxation problem was exacerbated 
after the introduction of the 2005 Interim National Constitution, and a 2007 World 
Bank-led mission observed that although the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) assigns exclusive competence over Sudan’s import tariff and customs duty 
collection to the national government, the national customs department “conducts 
operations at the Juba airport using the national tariff schedule” while customs 
                                                 
377  See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 27. 
378  Discussions with officials of Ethiopian federal veterinary officials, held August 2006.  
379  See Uganda Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, Vol. 1, June 2006, p. 62, available at 
http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/uganda.htm.  
380  See World Animal Health 2004, supra n. 147, p. 348, emphasis added.  
381  According to Aklilu, livestock are “the most repeatedly (and perhaps the most highly) taxed agricultural 
commodity in the region. In Sudan, livestock traders pay taxes and transit fees in about 20 places en 
route to the terminal markets/final destinations. In Ethiopia, livestock are taxed a number of times as 
transit commodities within the country, the amount paid per head varying from place to place. ... 
Livestock are less repeatedly taxed in Kenya.” Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, p. 2. 
382  See Id. pp. 70-71. 
383  See Id. p. 69. 
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officials from the Government of Southern Sudan “are still performing these duties 
and collecting customs using tariff rates set by the SPLM in 2000.”384  
This naturally affects the interest of businesses engaged in livestock trade in general 
and the exporters in particular. Members of Sudan’s Livestock and Meat Exporters’ 
Association complain that the lack of constitutional clarity in the division of powers 
between the states and the federation means that states in particular are very keen 
to try every possible source of revenue they can lay their hands on. They argue that 
the taxes are many in number and come in different names and guises – ownership 
taxes, grazing taxes, marketing taxes, transit taxes, etc. A table compiled by the 
Association lists over 20 different taxes and fees that are paid per exported animal 
throughout the entire production, transportation and marketing chain. According to 
the Association, the sum total of these taxes often comes to equal the initial purchase 
price of the animal from the farmer and sometimes even exceeds it, making it 
difficult for these animals to be priced competitively in foreign markets.  
It has been found, in the case of Sudan, that “the burden of livestock taxation falls 
mainly on traders” and elimination of all forms of internal taxation has been 
recommended by different studies. States and local authorities in Sudan levy such 
taxes because they lack the necessary resources to provide public services. An obvious 
way of overcoming that is for the national government to ensure that such budgetary 
issues are resolved by other means. Indeed, governments in the region must realize 
that their exports often compete against highly subsidized products coming from 
Europe and other developed countries and the question IGAD member states must ask 
here is not whether or not to reduce the burden of taxation on livestock exports, but 
whether exports should pay taxes at all. While exemption from taxation of only 
exports might in principle qualify as an export subsidy, the WTO SCM Agreement 
already provides that “the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes 
borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission 
of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not 
be deemed to be a subsidy.”385 Moreover, it is also worth remembering that the main 
livestock exporters in the region are not yet members of the WTO, and even then, 
LDCs benefit from certain flexibilities under the SCM Agreement. The main challenge 
therefore is not legality of such measures but rather their affordability – i.e. whether 
government revenue shortfalls resulting from forgoing taxes on exports can be covered 
from other sources. Given the small tax base and the poor tax collection capacity in 
these countries, this might be a difficult measure to take in the short term. However, 
ease of tax collection at the port of exit must not be allowed to kill the future of a 
potentially competitive industry.  
3.3.2.2 Access to Legal Information 
Accessibility of laws to the general public is another area of concern identified during 
the field research for this study. In general, access to the official gazette is a problem 
in virtually all the countries surveyed except Kenya. However, having difficulty 
accessing the laws of a country is one thing, asking relevant government authorities 
and being told that the laws are confidential and access to them requires 
authorization from above is quite another. This is almost exactly what happened in 
two of the four countries visited during this study. The confidentiality of laws meant 
to be enforced on a daily basis is difficult to reconcile with the idea of government by 
law.  
                                                 
384  See Sudan Integrated Framework Diagnostic Trade Integrated Study Aide Memoire on Second 
Technical Mission (February, 2007), p. 3, available at  
http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/sudan.htm.  
385  See footnote 1 to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
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3.3.2.3 Institutional Rivalry among Different Government Departments 
It is the unfortunate reality in many IGAD member states that a lot of time and scarce 
resources are lost due to inter-institutional rivalries within national governments, 
partly due to ambiguities in the allocation of powers and responsibilities among 
different government organs and partly because of a lack of stability and continuity in 
the institutional home of the livestock sector. Aklilu observed, regarding Ethiopia, 
that the relationship between the country’s Livestock Marketing Authority and the 
federal Department of Veterinary Services was strained because of a lack of clarity in 
the overlapping roles and responsibilities held by the two institutions (e.g., in the 
areas of quality control and licensing).386 An interview with a member of the Ethiopian 
Meat Manufacturing Exporters Association revealed that people from the Ethiopian 
Ministries of Agriculture and Health would often argue for power over inspection and 
certification of meat exports which often left the clients (i.e. the businesspeople 
seeking approval for their exports) mediating between the two ministries, and usually 
the exporters would end up paying to both ministries for effectively the same 
service.387 Similar problems have been encountered even in the more mature Kenyan 
legal system.388 Finally, the 2006 Integrated Framework Concept Note on Sudan stated 
that the country “faces an unusually fragmented trade policy-making process” in 
which EPA negotiations, WTO accession, and membership in COMESA are given to 
three different National Government bodies – the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the 
Commission on WTO Affairs, and the Ministry of International Cooperation.389  
3.3.2.4 Inadequate Capacity to Respond to Market Failures 
A legal system that allows the free interplay of market forces does not necessarily 
mean fewer rules than in regulated markets; it only means different types of rules and 
a different type of regulation. The most business-friendly legal systems are those that 
allow free competition but also ensure that such competition is fair. That is where 
competition law, also called anti-trust law, comes in. Its object is to protect and 
promote competition on the market with a particular focus on the structure and 
behaviour of private business enterprises. Competition law is a key element of 
virtually all advanced national legal systems based on free market principles. 
Competition law is concerned with the structure and behaviour of enterprises on the 
market. It aims to create a market in which producers and traders compete freely on 
the quality of products and services they offer and the prices they charge rather than 
through the improper exercise of market power, whether acquired unilaterally or in 
concert with others. The competition laws of almost all countries target and 
discourage or even prohibit two forms of practices by business enterprises: (1) 
concerted practices such as price-fixing and market-segmentation cartels (hereafter 
                                                 
386  See Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, p. 52. 
387  Interview held at the Association’s office in Addis Ababa, 28 August 2006. 
388  The Kenyan Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries recently wrote that enforcement of animal health and 
product quality standards has been “complicated by conflicting legal mandates, particularly between the 
Public Health Act (Cap 242) and the Meat Control Act (Cap 356). The Department of Veterinary 
Services inspects meat in 54 out of the 71 districts. Bodies responsible for control of veterinary drugs 
and pesticides are variously placed in the Ministries of Health and Agriculture (Cap 244- Pharmacy and 
Poisons Act and Cap 346-Pest Control Products Act). However, the Department of Veterinary Services 
has no control over these conflicting statutes on drugs or pesticides. There is, therefore, need for 
harmonizing these conflicting mandates in order to adequately address animal health and product 
quality standards.” See Draft Sessional Paper, supra n. 33, p. 11. 
389  See Sudan Integrated Framework Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (P090244): Concept Note 
(October, 2006) p. 15, available at http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/sudan.htm.   
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anti-competitive agreements); and (2) abuse of dominant positions such as monopolies 
(hereafter disciplines on dominant market positions).390  
It appears that several IGAD member states, including Ethiopia391 and Kenya392, have 
laws on competition. However, these laws are not being enforced fully, at least not in 
the livestock sector. For example, Aklilu found that, since the collapse of the KMC, 
the only Kenyan abattoir licensed to supply meat to Europe, many pastoralists and 
livestock traders lost from two sides. Firstly, they lost their quota-secured right of 
access to the EC market, which “greatly reduced the total volume of off-take from 
pastoral areas”. Second, the producers lost in the competition within their own 
market in favour of what Aklilu calls a cartel of butcheries.393 Aklilu argues that the 
absence of “facilities for livestock to stay overnight in the markets” has played into 
the hands of the butcheries. This has allowed butcheries to deliberately slow down 
the negotiation process for the price of animals so as to put pressure on the traders 
who have to sell their animals before dusk.394 The practice described by Aklilu appears 
to raise several issues of competition law, such as collusion and abuse of dominant 
position on the part of the butcheries, which could possibly fall foul of Kenya’s 1988 
law on restrictive business practices.395 Officials from Kenya’s Ministry of Livestock 
and Fisheries Development also confirmed that a de facto cartel of middlemen, 
retailers and abattoirs controls the livestock market at the expense of the 
producers.396 According to section 6 of Kenya’s law on restrictive business practices, 
any agreement or arrangement between persons engaged in a business “to buy, or 
offer to buy, goods at prices or on terms agreed upon between themselves” – exactly 
the sort of behaviour described by Aklilu above – is considered a restrictive business 
practice that normally is an offence punishable by imprisonment for up to two years 
or a fine up to one hundred thousand Kenyan Shillings or both. It is worth pointing out 
that similar practices were found by Aklilu in the Ethiopian market, raising effectively 
the same competition law issues under the 2003 Trade Practice Proclamation.397 This 
law regulates a wide range of what could be called anti-competitive business practices 
aimed at nurturing the free market economic policy of the present government. The 
new law covers three forms of anti-competitive practices: (1) concerted practices 
such as price-fixing, market segmentation and similar cartel-like arrangements among 
economic operators; (2) unfair commercial practices such as acts intended to damage 
the reputation of competitors or their products and services; and (3) abuse of 
dominant market positions such as impeding the market entry of new competitors or 
use of predatory pricing and similar techniques to drive existing competitors out of 
the market. Not only are such practices prohibited, their violations could also lead to 
administrative measures ranging from suspension or cancellation of the business 
                                                 
390  See e.g. EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 respectively together with the 1989 Merger Regulation (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, O. J. 1989, L 395, at 1-12). 
391  See “Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 9th Year, No. 49, 17th April 
2003. 
392  See for example Kenya’s Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act (Cap. 504 of 
the Laws of Kenya in 1988 and the Act was published in Kenya Gazette of Friday, 23rd December 
1988. 
393  See Aklilu (2002, Vol. I), supra n. 20, pp. 7-8. 
394  The butchers “make the best deals for themselves as the day progresses since livestock traders have no 
choice but to sell their animals. … The groups benefit from a law … mandating that livestock from 
high-risk areas … have to be slaughtered immediately.” Id. p. 9. 
395  See Kenya’s Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act (Cap. 504 of the Laws of 
Kenya in 1988 and the Act was published in Kenya Gazette of Friday, 23rd December 1988. 
396  Interview with Mr Samuel Yegon, Kenya’s Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, held in Nairobi, 6 
September 2006.  
397  See “Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003”, Federal Negarit Gazeta 9th Year, No. 49, 17th April 
2003.  
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licence to operate down to the imposition of fines worth up to about US$ 5,500. The 
presence of practices described by Aklilu, if proven in a legal sense, raises issues not 
of competition law and policy but of capacity to enforce laws that are technically so 
complex by nature. 
3.3.2.5 Inadequate Formal Communication Channels between Government 
and Private Sector Interest Groups 
An important feature of the legal framework applying to trade in livestock products, 
and indeed trade in all products, in the IGAD member states is the absence of a 
formalized process of communication between private business people who do most of 
the actual trading across borders and national governments. If we take the WTO 
system as an example, it is a system with teeth but it can bite only if the governments 
decide to make use of its mechanisms. Governments have the power but their officials 
rarely take direct part in the actual operation of the business that suffers, while those 
who suffer do not have the power to set the teeth of the system into action. Several 
WTO members, particularly the developed ones such as the EU and the US, have put in 
place an elaborate mechanism through which the grievances of the business operator 
will be taken up by the public authorities at the WTO level. This mechanism in the EU 
is contained in a law called the Trade Barriers Regulation398 while the US’s is called 
Section 301.399 This is not necessarily to suggest that IGAD member states must copy 
such sophisticated mechanisms from the EU or the US; but it certainly teaches the 
important lesson that talking to the businesspeople in the field of livestock is not a 
favour that government officials entertain out of good will, and that can be taken 
away at any time without legal consequences; rather, it must be an important part of 
the overall rule of law and accountability system that this study considers critical for 
these countries.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that although the three legal systems covered here are 
different from each other in significant ways, there are also signs of convergence 
dictated by the commonality of the challenges they face and the similar requirements 
they have to meet in order to participate in the international market for livestock 
products. The regulatory challenges they face are also increasingly similar and include 
legal uncertainties often signifying weak and inefficient judiciary, disregard for the 
rule of law in day to day administrative decision making, lack of effective 
coordination among different levels of government in the enforcement of laws, 
absence of established communication channels between livestock business operators 
and relevant government institutions and overall lack of capacity to use law as an 
instrument of implementing policy decisions. IGAD as a regional economic organization 
has the potential to resolve some of these issues, but this potential is currently under 
question due to the involvement of IGAD member states in other competing and/or 
overlapping regional and bilateral arrangements. Until the IGAD member states 
manage to put together common policies and rules in the sector with an effective 
implementation strategy, their trade interests will continue to suffer and the poor 
livestock producers will continue to bear the full brunt of it. The next chapter will use 
EU sanitary and food law to demonstrate how IGAD member states’ inability to satisfy 
international sanitary standards effectively excludes their livestock products from 
some of the most attractive markets in the world despite long-standing rights of 
preferential terms of market access. 
                                                 
398  Council Regulation 3286/94 of 22 December 1994, O.J. 1994 L 349/71. 
399  See United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974. For more on this, see Marco Bronckers 
and Natalie McNelis, “The EU Trade Barriers Regulation Comes of Age”, 35 Journal of World Trade 
(August 2001) 427-483, and Greg Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Participation in WTO 
Litigation (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 2003).  
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CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF SANITARY STANDARDS ON IGAD EXPORT 
OPPORTUNITIES: A CASE STUDY OF THE EC 
The EU is the most highly sought after market for sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural 
products in general, and IGAD member states have long-standing preferential access 
to this market. In this chapter, we shall look at the EU’s trade policy measures in 
general, and sanitary measures in particular, that affect the trade interest of IGAD 
member states. The purpose here is to emphasise the point that the fate of the 
livestock industry in the IGAD region depends fundamentally on its ability to raise its 
health and safety standards. 
4.1 European Trade Law and IGAD Livestock Products 
The EU is a highly coveted market for IGAD livestock producers and traders. The EU 
also has long-standing non-reciprocal preferences for goods originating from IGAD 
member states, which in principle also applies to livestock products. We shall see 
however that, despite the trade-friendly rules put in place by the EU for the benefit 
of IGAD member states, the EU livestock product market remains totally closed for 
IGAD producers.400 Indeed, as Christopher Stevens put it, the reason why the EU is an 
attractive market in price terms for IGAD products is precisely because it is heavily 
protected against competition from abroad with a view to maintaining prices at 
artificially high levels.401  
In order to understand the reasons behind this, a brief look at the EU trade regime in 
the livestock sector is provided, focusing mainly on the beef/veal sub-sector. This sub-
sector is chosen here for two reasons: (1) it is a sub-sector in which IGAD member 
states have significant export potential; and (2) there is already a beef/veal protocol 
to the Lomé-Cotonou agreements that aims to provide guaranteed access to the EU 
market for a handful of ACP countries, one of which is Kenya. An understanding of 
whether and how far this system has succeeded in opening the European market for 
the supposed beneficiaries is key to our search for the types of trade policy reasons 
behind the inability of IGAD member states to benefit from livestock exports thereby 
informing the type of policy recommendation that we will come up with in order to 
improve the situation.  
4.2 The EC Livestock Trade Regime: a Closer Look at the Beef/Veal Sub-
Sector 
Virtually all livestock products in Europe are subject to common market organizations 
which are often designed to stabilize markets and support producers in different ways 
                                                 
400  Indeed, EU export subsidies in the livestock sector are already making competition difficult for IGAD 
exporters in such attractive potential markets for IGAD countries as South Africa. The ACP-EU Joint 
Assembly recognized this problem as early as 1997, and its assessment was unusually frank and 
straightforward. It stated, inter alia, that between 1991 and 1997 alone, EU beef exports to South Africa 
rose tenfold selling at an average landed price for EU frozen boneless beef of Rand 2.66 per kg, “which 
in 1996 was 51% below the domestic South African wholesale price”. The Joint Assembly further 
recognized that “this massive expansion of subsidised EU beef exports to South Africa has resulted in 
income losses to South African, Botswanan, Swaziland and Namibian cattle farmers totalling hundreds 
of millions of Rand,” which they said constituted “a fundamental incoherence between EU development 
cooperation policy objectives in favour of rural development in livestock dependent economies and the 
current application of this particular instrument of the Common Agricultural Policy.” See Joint 
Assembly of the Convention concluded between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the 
European Union (ACP-EU) - Resolutions adopted on the impact of subsidized EU beef exports (ACP-
EU/2135/97/fin.), O.J. C 308, 09/10/1997 pp. 0050-0051. 
401  Private communication with Christopher Stevens.  
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as envisaged under Article 33 of the EC Treaty.402 As the EU Commission wrote in an 
action against Greece, provisions for intra-community trade in live animals are 
“completely harmonised. ... Member States may not impose any additional 
requirements to those provided for under EU legislation, nor can they unilaterally 
decide to interrupt imports from any third country which has been approved by the 
Commission for export to the EU.”403  
This is true of products from pigs,404 cattle,405 sheep and goats406 and poultry407 
(including eggs408). Although the common market organization for each sector is 
different, reflecting the differences in the very nature of the animals and the sub-
sectors, they share certain features in common.409 These include the provision of 
different forms of support to producers that are increasingly taking the form of direct 
income support;410 the requirement of a licence as a condition of importation and, in 
some cases, exportation; the imposition of specific and ad valorem tariffs on 
importation (which often vary depending on the quantity and origin of imports in the 
form of general or country-specific tariff quotas)411; and the use of export refunds on 
the exportation of these products equal to the difference between prices within the 
Community and on the world market.412 There are also other mechanisms by which 
                                                 
402  The objectives of the EC common Agricultural Policy are set by Article 33 of the EC Treaty and 
include: increasing agricultural productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community, stabilising markets, and assuring availability of supplies at reasonable prices for the 
consumer. 
403  See http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsdigest/2007/168.htm#cnt9.  
404  Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75 of the Council of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the 
market in pigmeat, OJ L 282, 1.11.1975, p. 1–9.  
405  Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in 
beef and veal OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 21–47.  
406  Council Regulation (EC) No 2529/2001 of 19 December 2001 on the common organisation of the 
market in sheepmeat and goatmeat OJ L 341, 22.12.2001, p. 3–14.  
407  Regulation (EEC) No 2777/75 of the Council of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of the 
market in poultrymeat OJ L 282, 1.11.1975, p. 77–83.  
408  See Regulation (EEC) No 2771/75 of the Council of 29 October 1975 on the common organization of 
the market in eggs, OJ L 282, 1.11.1975, p. 49–55, as amended. 
409  The European Commission describes what it calls the “classical elements of the Common Agriculture 
Policy” as “relatively high support prices sustained by subsidised withdrawal and storage of surplus 
product (‘public intervention’), subsidised schemes to dispose of surpluses on the EU market and export 
subsidies for disposal on world markets.” Although the key instruments of this classical system are still 
in place, several changes have taken place over the past few years which take European agriculture in 
the direction of market forces. See EC, Milk and Milk Products in the European Union (2006), p. 16, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/fact/milk/2007_en.pdf.  
410  For beef and veal, Council Regulation 1254/1999 provides for different forms of support to producers, 
including the so-called ‘special premium’ (Art. 4), ‘deseasonalisation premium’ (Art. 5), ‘suckler cow 
premium’ (Art. 6-10), ‘slaughter premium’ (Art. 11), ‘extensification payment’ (Art. 13) and ‘additional 
payments’ (Art. 14). For pigmeat, see Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75, Arts. 2-7; etc.  
411  For pigmeat, see Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75, Arts. 8-11; for beef and veal, see Council Regulation 
1254/1999, Arts. 29-32; etc.  
412  For beef and veal, see Art. 33 of Council Regulation 1254/1999; for pigmeat, see Regulation (EEC) No 
2759/75, Art. 13; etc. The language often used by relevant EC regulations in the case of export refunds 
is notable for its straightforwardness as to its trade distortive and protectionist purpose. The regulation 
establishing the common market for pigmeat states that its export refunds are designed so as to 
“safeguard Community participation in international trade in pigmeat”. See recital 11 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2759/75. The European Commission recently admitted in the context of dairy products as 
follows: “As the EU market price is higher than the world price for dairy products, exports generally 
take place with the aid of export subsidies. Following the 1994 multilateral trade agreement (known as 
the Uruguay Round) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), export subsidies have been restricted – 
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regulatory bodies could directly intervene in the market, such as the granting of aid 
for private storage and, in case of large price falls, even intervention buying by public 
agencies designated as such by member states.413 The Commission has issued a host of 
regulations implementing the often general disciplines contained in the Council 
regulations mentioned above.414 Finally, as we shall see below in more detail, the EC 
market in livestock products is fully and effectively protected from competition 
coming from most poor developing countries the likes of IGAD member states by the 
high and ever-rising health and sanitary measures that are neither negotiable 
multilaterally nor subject to any preferential treatment. In all cases, the regulations 
routinely stipulate that the common market organizations for specific products must 
respect Community obligations ‘resulting from agreements concluded in accordance 
with Article 300 of the Treaty or from any other act of the Council’ or some language 
to that effect. This reference often means the WTO disciplines in the agricultural 
sector, but also includes such bilateral arrangements of the EC with other countries 
and groups as the Lomé-Cotonou with the ACP countries, and a host of other free 
trade agreements with several other countries. It is worth noting however that the 
sheer number and technical complexity of EC agriculture legislation, not to mention 
the high speed with which changes are introduced to this law, make it particularly 
difficult for businesses and governments of most developing countries to work through 
the system and participate in the rich and potentially lucrative European market for 
livestock products.  
The effect of all these policy instruments is that the EU has been a surplus producer of 
meat products for several decades now. According to Eurostat data, EU production of 
livestock products for 2004 stood at 106% of domestic consumption. In terms of the 
different meat types, the degree of self-sufficiency of EU-15 in the same year was 
101% for cattle, 109% for pigs, 81% for sheep and goats, 107% for poultry and 38% for 
equidae.415 On the same data, “imports of meat and meat preparations to the EU-15 
from third countries increased from 910 thousand tones in 1995 to 1,481 thousand 
tonnes in 2004 …. In 1995, half of EU-15 imports came from New Zealand (24%), 
Argentina (15%) and Brazil (13%). In 2004, Brazil supplied more than one third of all 
EU-15 imports (37%), followed by New Zealand and Poland which supplied 14% and 10% 
of EU-15 imports respectively. Meat and edible offal of poultry corresponded to the 
type of meat most imported from third countries into the EU-15, 337 thousand tonnes 
in 2004, having increased on average by about 10% per year between 1995 and 
2004.”416 In the dairy sector, the EU maintains very high tariffs along with several 
country-specific and MFN tariff quotas.417 
                                                                                                                                                        
both the quantities exported and the amount of total subsidies paid out are strictly limited.” See EC 
Milk and Milk Products, supra n. 409.  
413  For pigmeat, see Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75, Arts. 3-5; for beef and veal, see Council Regulation 
1254/1999, Arts. 26-27. 
414  See for example Commission Regulation (EC) No 1745/2006 of 24 November 2006 beef tariff quotas 
in beef and their administration (OJ L 329/22, 25.11.2006); Commission regulation (EC) No 1344/2006 
of 12 September 2006 fixing the export refunds on pigmeat (OJ L 249/13,13.9.2006), Commission 
regulation (EC) No 1346/2006 of 12 September 2006 fixing the export refunds on poultrymeat (OJ L 
249/17,13.9.2006); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1048/2006 of 10 July 2006 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2185/2005 opening Community tariff quotas for 2006 for sheep, goats, sheepmeat and 
goatmeat (OJ L 188/3, 11.7.2006); and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1343/2006 of 12 September 
2006 fixing the rates of the refunds applicable to eggs and egg yolks exported in the form of goods not 
covered by Annex I to the Treaty (OJ L 249/11, 13.9.2006). 
415  See Lourdes Llorens Abando and Anna Maria Martinez Palou, Statistics in focus Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Eurostat 6/2006, Figure 3, p. 2.  
416  Id.  
417  As the Commission itself observed: “There are only minimal imports at full tariff. However, many of 
the EU’s trading partners benefit from special import arrangements – known as Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQs) – whereby imports can come in at lower tariffs. Some of the TRQs are specific to particular 
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4.3 IGAD Livestock Products under the EC-ACP Preferential Agreements  
As noted earlier, the EU has long-standing non-reciprocal preferences for goods 
originating from the IGAD member states. This is done through a combination of two 
different instruments – the unilateral initiative by which the EU allows duty- and 
quota-free importation of virtually all products from all least-developed countries 
under its GSP scheme,418 and the bilateral Lomé-Cotonou agreements between the EC 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The trade aspect of the 
Cotonou agreement is expected to be replaced by new inter-regional free trade 
agreements, called Economic Partnership Agreements, between the EC and each of 
the ACP sub-regions as of January 2008.419  
4.3.1 The Cotonou Agreement  
Under the terms of the Cotonou agreement, while non-agricultural imports from the 
ACP countries receive duty- and quota-free treatment, agricultural products are 
subject to less generous levels of preferences which depend on whether or not a 
particular product is subject to the EC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).420 For 
agricultural products falling under the latter category, the EU’s obligations are limited 
to providing a better-than-MFN treatment.421 In practice, however, the EC removed 
the ad valorem tariffs on beef already at the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement in 
2000,422 later incorporated into Council Regulation (EC) No 2286/2002 on the 
arrangements applicable to agricultural products and goods resulting from the 
processing of agricultural products originating in the ACP States.423  
                                                                                                                                                        
exporting countries; others are open to all under the most-favoured nation (MFN) system. TRQs are not 
always filled (i.e. fully utilised). Those for powders (about 70,000 tonnes) are hardly used; there are 
TRQs for several different cheese types – amounting to just over 122 000 tonnes – the average fill rate 
is 40%; the butter TRQs of approximately 89 000 tonnes are always filled.” See EC Milk and Milk 
Products, supra n. 409. 
418  See discussion on the EBA initiative, infra section 4.3.3. And it is worth noting that all IGAD countries 
except Kenya fall into this category.  
419  On EPAs, see Melaku Geboye Desta, “EC-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO 
Compatibility: An Experiment in North-South Inter-Regional Agreements?”, 43(5) Common Market 
Law Review (2006) pp. 1343-1379. 
420  See Article 168 of Lomé IV in particular. The first paragraph of this Article provided the principle that 
products originating in the ACP States shall be imported into the Community free of customs duties and 
charges having equivalent effect. However, paragraph 2 singled out agricultural products and stipulated 
that such products would be imported as follows: “(i) those products shall be imported free of customs 
duties for which Community provisions in force at the time of import do not provide, apart from 
customs duties, for the application of any measure relating to their import; (ii) for products other than 
those referred to in point (i), the Community shall take the necessary measures to ensure more 
favourable treatment than that granted to third countries benefiting from the most-favoured-nation 
clause for the same products. 
421  Article 1 of Annex V to the Cotonou Agreement provides: “For products originating in the ACP States 
listed in Annex I to the Treaty where they come under a common organization of the market within the 
meaning of Article 34 of the Treaty, or subject, on import into the Community, to specific rules 
introduced as a result of the implementation of the common agricultural policy, the Community shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure more favorable treatment than that granted to third countries 
benefiting from the most-favored-nation clause for the same products.” 
422  See special courier edition of the Cotonou Agreement.  
423  Council Regulation (EC) No 2286/2002 of 10 December 2002 further improved the duty levels for ACP 
agricultural products by providing that the tariff preferences applying to ACP countries under this 
Regulation “shall be calculated on the basis of the rates of the autonomous duty where, for the products 
concerned that duty is lower than the conventional duty as laid down in the Common Customs Tariff.” 
OJ L 348, 21.12.2002, Article 4, pp. 5-41. 
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The practical implications of this development can be illustrated by looking at how 
the Regulation treats ACP beef imports (CN Code 0201 (‘meat of bovine animals, fresh 
or chilled’) and 0202 (‘Meat of bovine animals, frozen’)) with a view to implementing 
the Cotonou promise. Accordingly, the ad valorem duties on these products have been 
eliminated in full, and this applies to beef and veal coming from all ACP countries. 
This in principle gives ACP countries a significant advantage over MFN suppliers that 
have to pay, according to the 2007 version of the EC customs tariff424 on these product 
categories, a 12.8% ad valorem duty. The specific duties normally charged on top of 
these ad valorem duties are the same for both ACP and non-ACP suppliers. For 
example, the duty applying to CN Code 0201 10 00 10 (high quality beef and veal) 
imported from Pakistan, a non-ACP country, would be 12.8% ad valorem plus 
€176.8/100 kg while the duty applying on the importation of the same product from 
Mauritius, an ACP country, would be 0% ad valorem plus €176.8/100 kg. This 12.8% ad 
valorem is effectively the preference margin that the ACP countries enjoy over the 
standard MFN suppliers.425 We shall see, however, that six ACP countries, including 
one from IGAD – Kenya – benefit from a special arrangement known as the beef/veal 
protocol under which they are allowed to import beef and veal subject to much 
reduced specific rates on top of the exemption from ad valorem duties that is 
available to all ACP countries.  
4.3.2 The Beef/veal Protocol 
Four agricultural products – bananas, rum, sugar, and beef/veal – have also been 
subject to protocols annexed to the Lomé agreements and provided duty-free (except 
on beef/veal) access for fixed quantities of the products under a tariff quota scheme 
and, in the case of beef and sugar, providing further access to guaranteed minimum 
prices similar to those applying to like EC products.426  
The beef/veal protocol was formally established as such in 1990 as part of the Lomé 
IV.427 Protocol 7 to Lomé IV provided, inter alia, for country-specific quotas for which 
                                                 
424  See Part Two of Annex I to EC Customs Schedules 2007, supra n. 41.  
425  Note however that the EC also allows limited quantities of beef imports from non-ACP countries on 
more favourable terms under its WTO minimum access commitments. Accordingly, there is a WTO 
tariff quota for ‘high quality meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen’ of 37,950 tonnes at the 
flat ad valorem duty rate of 20%, but this is allocated to five supplying countries as follows: Argentina 
(17,000 tonnes), USA/Canada (11,500 tonnes), Australia (7,150 tonnes), and Uruguay (2,300 tonnes). It 
is interesting to note that the EC also has a large quota for sheep meat and goat meat (CN code 0204), 
of which the Community is a net-importer and the IGAD countries a potentially competitive supplier. 
The size of the quota is set at 283,715 tonnes (of carcase weight) at the attractive duty rate of 0%. 
However, this quota is allocated to supplying countries as follows: Argentina (23,000 tonnes), Australia 
(18,786 tonnes), Chile (3,000 tonnes), New Zealand (227,854 tonnes), Uruguay (5,800 tonnes), Iceland 
(600 tonnes), Romania (75 tonnes), Bulgaria (1,250 tonnes), Bosnia Herzegovina (850 tonnes), Croatia 
(450 tonnes), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1,750 tonnes), Greenland (100 tonnes), and 
‘other’ (200 tonnes). The ACP countries are not to be found anywhere in this list. See Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1549/2006 of 17 October 2006 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, OJ L 301, 
31.10.2006, p. 33. For the WTO tariff quotas, see Annex 7 to this Regulation, p. 836.  
426  For commitments on sugar and beef, see Protocols 3 and 4, respectively, to the Cotonou Agreement. EC 
Commission statistics showed that 99.2% of imports from ACP countries in 1973, i.e. just before Lomé 
I, were “covered by the free access rule and the small residue is admitted on preferential terms.” See 
The Courier No. 31 – Special Issue, March 1975, p. 23. See also Simmonds, “The Lomé Convention 
and the New International Economic Order”, 13 CML Rev. (1976), 315-334. The latest estimate is that 
96.5% of all imports originating in the ACP enter the EC duty and quota free. See EC Commission, 
Opening the Door to Development: Developing Country Access to EU Markets 1999 – 2003, p. 22, 
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/august/tradoc_123305.pdf.  
427  There was of course a special arrangement for beef and veal under previous Conventions and Lomé IV 
only put it as “a proper protocol”. See The Courier, March-April 1990, no. 120, p. 15. 
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“import duties other than customs duties applicable to beef and veal originating in the 
ACP States shall be reduced by 90%.”428 Lomé IV not only formally established the 
beef/veal protocol but also raised the overall annual quantity of beef/veal benefiting 
from the special arrangement from 30,000 tonnes to 39,100 tonnes. This was later 
raised by another 13,000 tonnes for the benefit of Namibia, which followed that 
country’s independence in 1990 and its accession to the Lomé agreement soon 
afterwards. This brought the protocol total to its current quantity of 52,100 tonnes.429 
The Cotonou version of the beef/veal protocol raised the non-ad valorem tariff 
reduction commitment to 92%.430  
As noted above, Kenya is recognized as a “traditional exporter of beef and veal” and 
in principle benefits from a 92% reduction of the standard (MFN) non-ad valorem 
customs duties that would otherwise apply to the importation of ACP beef and veal 
within quantitative limits set for each qualifying ACP country.431 The annual quota for 
Kenyan beef and veal that can be imported at such reduced tariffs is set at 142 
tonnes, expressed in boneless meat.432 EU Council Regulation 2286/2002433 has 
implemented this international treaty commitment by doing exactly that – reduce the 
specific duties by 92% for a maximum annual quota of 52,100 tonnes of boneless meat 
from Kenya and five other protocol countries (Botswana with 18,916 tonnes, 
Madagascar 7,579 tonnes, Swaziland 3,363 tonnes, Zimbabwe 9,100 tonnes and 
Namibia 13,000 tonnes).434 This commitment remains unaffected even in situations 
where the EC may have to take safeguard measures in the beef and veal sector.435  
The implications of this commitment are obvious. The EC normally applies a mix of 
specific and ad valorem tariffs on the importation of meat of bovine animals, and the 
commitment mentioned above applies only to the non-ad valorem part of the duties. 
To take the same example used above, i.e. CN Code 0201 10 00 10 (high quality beef 
and veal), this product, when it comes to the EU from Pakistan, a non-ACP country, 
would be subject to 12.8% ad valorem plus €176.8/100 kg; the duty applying on the 
importation of the same product from Mauritius, an ACP country, would be 0% ad 
valorem plus €176.8/100 kg; the duty applying on the importation of the same product 
from Kenya, an ACP country benefiting from the beef/veal protocol for a specified 
amount of imports, would be 0% ad valorem plus €14.1/100 kg – i.e. €176.8 reduced 
by 92%.  
                                                 
428  Note that the phrase ‘import duties other than customs duties’ under EC law at the time was almost 
equivalent to non-ad valorem duties. See for example definition of import duties under Article 4:10 of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, as amended, OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1. 
429  Lomé IV is also credited for removing the old requirement that ACP exporters “levy an export tax” in 
exchange for the 90% reduction in non-ad valorem duties accorded by the Community. For more on 
this, see The Courier, March-April 1990, no. 120, p. 15. 
430  See Article 1 of Protocol 4 to Annex V to the Cotonou Agreement. 
431  Id. 
432  See Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Cotonou Agreement.  
433  OJ L 348/5, 21.12.2002 pp. 5-41, supra n. 423.  
434  See Council Regulation (EC) No 2286/2002, OJ L 348, 21.12.2002, Annex II, p. 41 together with 
Annex I, pp. 9-13. Note also that according to Article 2:5 of Regulation 2286/2002, “if an ACP State is 
not able to supply its annual allocation … as a result of an actual or foreseeable decline of its exports 
due to a disaster such as drought, or cyclone or due to animal diseases and it does not wish to benefit 
from the possibility of delivery in the current or following calendar year, it may request, by 1 
September of each calendar year at the latest, to reallocate the relevant quantities among the other States 
concerned, up to the limit of 52 100 tonnes, expressed in boneless meat.” Whether Kenya has ever 
attempted to make use of this option is not clear. The only legal hurdle here might be whether Kenya’s 
inability to supply beef to the European market following the collapse of the Kenya Meat Board would 
qualify as a “disaster” as this term is used here.  
435  See Article 6 of Protocol 4 to the Cotonou Agreement. 
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4.3.3 LDCs under the EU GSP Scheme: the Everything but Arms (EBA) Initiative 
The ‘everything but arms’ initiative refers to the unilateral measure introduced by the 
EU to allow duty- and quota-free importation of almost all products, except arms, 
from least developed countries (LDCs). First introduced in 2001 by EC Council 
Regulation No 416/2001,436 this law has later been incorporated into Council 
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences.437 As 
such, this is an instrument which applies equally to all LDCs both within and without 
the ACP group.438  
According to Article 12:1 of this regulation, “Common Customs Tariff duties on all 
products of Chapters 1 to 97 of the Harmonized System except those of Chapter 93 
thereof [arms and ammunition and parts and accessories thereof], originating in a 
country that according to Annex I benefits from the special arrangement for least 
developed countries, shall be entirely suspended.” Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the same 
Article then provide for temporary exceptions for rice, bananas and sugar, 
respectively. Of these three specific products, while the exception for bananas has 
been phased out since 1st January 2006, sugar is expected to become part of the rule 
as from 1st July 2009, and rice from 1st September 2009. Pending the final phase out 
of the duties on these products, LDCs benefit from tariff quotas of a fixed, but 
annually rising, quantities at zero duty rates.439 No such exceptions exist for livestock 
products. It is thus possible to conclude that, in general, the difference between the 
EBA initiative and the Cotonou Agreement in terms of immediate trade benefits for 
IGAD member states lies mainly in the treatment of agricultural products. While both 
arrangements allow duty- and quota-free importation for manufacturing products from 
their respective beneficiaries, only the EBA law guarantees such treatment for all 
agricultural products. Given that all but one of the IGAD member states are LDCs, this 
in principle means that six of the seven countries are entitled to duty-free treatment 
for their livestock exports to the EU market, while Kenya would be subject to the 
slightly less generous arrangement for such products under the general rules of the 
Cotonou Agreement, tempered down for Kenya by its designation as a beneficiary of 
the special protocol for beef/veal. To illustrate this with the help of the same 
products used above, the duty applying to CN Code 0201 10 00 10 (high quality beef 
and veal) imported from Sudan, an ACP LDC, or Bangladesh, a non-ACP LDC, would in 
both cases be 0% ad valorem and complete exemption from specific duties.440 But, this 
would not be the same for Kenya, an ACP non-LDC developing country that would have 
to pay €14.1/100 kg for the same products under the beef/veal protocol, again within 
its quota.  
4.4 EU Sanitary Regulations: How Far can IGAD member states Exploit the 
Preferences? 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The previous section has shown that the EU has put in place at least two types of 
preferential schemes for the benefit of IGAD member states in their status as LDCs 
and/or as parties to the Lomé-Cotonou agreements. We also saw that the schemes, 
and particularly the EBA initiative, could provide IGAD livestock exporters a significant 
competitive margin on the lucrative European market. We shall see, however, that 
these special commercial and regulatory attractions of the EU market have not 
                                                 
436  See OJ L 60/43, 28.2.2001.  
437  OJ L 169/1, 30.6.2005, hereafter the GSP Regulation or the EBA initiative depending on the context. 
438  Forty-one of the 50 countries in the current UN list of LDCs are ACP countries. See 
www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm. 
439  See Article 12:5 of the EU GSP law, supra n. 437. 
440  This is a result of Council Regulation (EC) No. 416/2001 (28 Feb. 2001) OJ L 60/43, 1.3.2001.  
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translated into actual export opportunities for IGAD member states largely due to the 
high, complex and ever-rising sanitary and other standards applying particularly to 
agricultural products coming to the EU. There is no sanitary equivalent to the 
preferential market access schemes described above, and all rules related to health 
and safety-related regulations fully apply to IGAD livestock exports. That is why 
Article 2 of Annex V to the Cotonou Agreement, which explicitly prohibits the 
imposition of quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect on goods 
coming from the ACP countries, also contains a reservation clause that this prohibition 
does not exclude measures designed to, inter alia, protect human, animal and plant 
life or health.441 The same applies to all goods coming from LDCs, i.e. the duty- and 
quota-free scheme of preferences put in place for the exclusive benefit of LDCs 
applies subject to full compliance with EU regulatory standards. Indeed, the 
preferential scheme becomes relevant only if such goods are able to meet the 
complex sanitary and other requirements set by European law. This section provides a 
synopsis of EU sanitary legislation that IGAD livestock exporters will need to comply 
with if they wish to access the European market regardless of the preferential scheme 
they might be eligible for. 
4.4.2 The Structure of EU Sanitary Regulations 
4.4.2.1 General 
Every country sets its own health and environmental standards at a level it considers 
appropriate for its needs and introduces rules and regulations to enforce them. The 
principal purpose in all cases is identical – to ensure that food is safe for consumers, 
and to prevent the spread of pests or diseases among animals and plants.442 We have 
seen in Chapter 2 that international law does not place any restrictions on the level at 
which countries can set their standards, and the principal interest of international law 
in general, and WTO law in particular, has always been limited to a desire to ensure 
that such standards are not used as disguised forms of restriction on international 
trade or as instruments of arbitrary discrimination between different trading 
partners.443  
                                                 
441  Article 2 of Annex V provides: “1. The Community shall not apply to imports of products originating in 
the ACP States any quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect. 2. Paragraph 1 shall 
not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals 
and plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption, or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property. ... 3. In cases where implementation of the measures referred to in subparagraph 2 affects the 
interests of one or more ACP States, consultation shall be held at the request of the latter, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 12 of this Agreement with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution.” 
This last paragraph confers a right to consultation on the ACP countries affected by any such measures. 
However, given the ubiquitous nature of standards-based restrictions on the importation of particularly 
agricultural products such as livestock products, it is possible to dismiss this provision as nothing more 
than a good will gesture without any legal obligation. 
442  See WTO Secretariat, “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (The WTO Agreements Series, Geneva 
1998), p. 5. 
443  We know at the same time that such regulations can easily serve protectionist ends, as was 
demonstrated in the EU law that banned beef from animals treated with growth promoting hormones. 
The prohibition applied to both domestic as well as imported beef. Its effect was however particularly 
severe on foreign beef producers, and particularly those located in countries where use of those 
hormones was permitted. For example, Alan Sykes found that “the initial impact of the hormone beef 
regulation was to reduce US exports from about $100 million annually to zero”. See Sykes, supra n. 60, 
p. 359. It is notable that such a protectionist effect occurred despite the fact that the measure was 
triggered by “an episode that raised bona fide concerns about the safety of growth hormones”. Sykes, 
Id.  
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The EU has set up a complex system of SPS rules and regulations intended to assure 
one of the highest levels of protection of human and animal life or health in the world 
today, including an explicit adoption of the precautionary principle.444 Indeed, the 
standards relevant to the livestock sector are such that they are currently the main 
barriers against the entry into Europe of IGAD livestock products. In the words of the 
EU Commission itself, “the role of customs is shifting away from the collection of 
customs duties, which have declined dramatically over the past 20 years, towards the 
application of non-tariff measures, including, in particular, those related to security 
and safety … and the application of sanitary, health, environmental and consumer 
protection measures...”.445 The US Department of Agriculture goes even further and 
accuses the EU of imposing sanitary barriers “unrelated to the spread of disease 
among animals.”446 This section describes how the EU sanitary system operates to 
protect the market against entry of livestock products from IGAD member states by 
providing a summary of EU sanitary measures in the beef sub-sector.447 
4.4.2.2 EU Food Safety Law 
The EC has long recognized that the development of a truly integrated common 
market would not be possible until national veterinary and other sanitary regulations 
were harmonized throughout the Community. Already in 1964, an EEC Directive set 
out to eliminate sanitary obstacles to intra-Community trade through the progressive 
harmonization of health requirements for meat in slaughterhouses and cutting rooms 
and during storage and transportation.448 To enforce this scheme, the Directive came 
up with the idea of a health certificate issued by an official veterinarian of the 
exporting country to accompany a consignment of meat to the place of destination 
which was then recognized by importing country authorities as proof of compliance 
with the Community’s sanitary standards. This Directive obliged member states to 
ensure that fresh meat sent from their territories satisfied several requirements, 
including that (1) it has been obtained from an approved and supervised 
slaughterhouse; (2) it comes from a slaughter animal inspected ante mortem by an 
official veterinarian; (3) it has been treated under satisfactory hygienic conditions; (4) 
it has been inspected post mortem by an official veterinarian; and (5) it is stamped 
and accompanied by a health certificate during transportation to the country of 
destination.449 Annex I to this Directive then provided detailed criteria that must be 
met before a slaughterhouse or cutting plant gets approval from the competent 
authorities, the hygiene of their staff, premises and equipment, criteria on ante 
mortem and post mortem inspection, stamping, certification, storage and transport.  
The harmonization process initiated by the 1964 fresh meat Directive has been 
pursued consistently and vigorously over the past four decades in the form of several 
regulations and directives. For example, a 1989 EEC Council Directive on veterinary 
checks in intra-Community trade pushed the integration process further so as “to 
                                                 
444  See Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31, 1.2.2002.  
445  See EU Commission, Implementing the Community Lisbon programme - Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Community Customs Code (Modernized 
Customs Code) {SEC(2005)1543}, COM/2005/0608 final - COD 2005/0246, p. 3. 
446  See Dyck and Nelson, supra n. 119, p. 12. 
447  That preferences do not apply to sanitary standards naturally means that the relevant EU rules in 
principle apply to all goods regardless of country of origin. There are however rooms for differentiation 
through bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of standards and the like.  
448  See Council Directive 64/433/EEC of 26 June 1964 on health problems affecting intra-Community 
trade in fresh meat, OJ L 21, 29.7.1964, p. 2012–2032, repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/41/EC 
effective January 2006. 
449  See Council Directive 64/433/EEC, Article 3.  
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ensure that veterinary checks are carried out at the place of dispatch only.”450 More 
recent laws have come up with an integrated approach in which one regulation lays 
down the general principles and requirements of food law and establishes the 
European Food Safety Authority451; a second one lays down the rules on food hygiene 
in general452; a third sets the rules on production, processing, distribution and 
introduction of food products of animal origin;453 and two others lay down specific 
rules for the organisation of official controls454 and hygiene rules455 on food products 
of animal origin. These regulations together constitute the core of EU law on food 
safety and, in principle, they apply to all food products and food business operators, 
including those importing from or exporting to third countries.456 But, of course, the 
manner of enforcement differs depending whether the food is imported or produced 
within the Union. 
Regulation 854/2004 provides the core of EU import law for foods of animal origin – 
that “products of animal origin shall be imported only from a third country or a part of 
third country that appears on a list drawn up and updated in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 19(2).”457 Among the matters considered for 
qualification to be included in the list are: (1) state of national legislation on products 
of animal origin, animal feed and use of veterinary products; (2) state of health of the 
cattle, the organisation, powers, independence and effectiveness of veterinary 
authorities; (3) the disease status of countries or parts thereof; (4) the hygiene 
conditions of production, storage and transportation of meat in the case of fresh meat 
imports; and (5) verification by EU inspectors that the third country adheres to the 
requirements set by relevant European regulations.458 Inclusion in this list is an 
                                                 
450  See Recital and Article 4 of Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary 
checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market. 
451  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January2002 laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31, 1.2.2002. 
452  See Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin, OJ L 226, 25.6.2004. 
453  See Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing 
the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human 
consumption, OJ L 18, 23.1.2003. 
454  Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament, and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying 
down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for 
human consumption, OJ L 226, 25.6.2004. 
455  See Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the hygiene of foodstuffs, OJ L 226, 25.6.2004. 
456  See for example Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004, and Chapter III of Regulation (EC) No 
854/2004. Note however that there are some differences in the treatment of food exports from the EU 
and food imports into the EU. Exports from the EU enjoy some flexibility in the sense that food that 
does not fully comply with Community food law could be placed on the market of another country 
provided, inter alia, that it complies with importing country food laws or the importing country 
expressly agrees. This does not allow exportation of food that is injurious to health. See recital and 
Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. Imports into the EU on the other hand are subject to a more 
rigorous regime and, in principle, such food must be in full Compliance with EU law. Failing that, the 
importer will need to satisfy EU authorities that it meets conditions recognised by the Community as 
“at least equivalent” to EU law. See Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. 
457  See Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004. 
458  Adapted from the recitals of Council Directive of 12 December 1972 on health and veterinary 
inspection problems upon importation of bovine, ovine and caprine animals and swine, fresh meat or 
meat products from third countries (72/462/EEC).  
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arduous task which only a few countries have so far managed to achieve.459 The 
lengthy process has been usefully summarised by DG-SANCO in a document that 
provides a step-by-step guide to what countries need to do in order to be listed as 
qualified sources of origin for live animal and animal product imports into the EU and 
the following is adapted from this document.460  
The country approval process involves a sequence of steps that starts with the 
national authority submitting a formal request for approval to the Commission 
services. The request normally includes “at least” the following information: (1) type 
of animal/product for which approval is sought; (2) anticipated volume of trade and 
main importing EU countries; (3) class of animals (breeding, fattening, slaughter, etc.) 
involved; (4) description of minimum treatment (heat, maturation, acidification, etc.) 
applied to the products; and (5) number and type of establishments considered to 
meet EU requirements (including confirmation that all proposed establishments satisfy 
EU requirements with specific references to the appropriate EU legislation). This is 
then followed by exchange of relevant documents and bilateral consultations that, if 
successful, should lead to an on-the-spot inspection by the EU Food and Veterinary 
Office (FVO). If a favourable report comes out of the FVO inspection and any other 
outstanding issues are resolved, the Commission then prepares draft legislation (1) to 
add the country to the list of third countries from which imports of the 
animal/product are approved; (2) to draw up if necessary animal health certification 
based on the country or part of the country’s health situation to accompany imports 
(a number of model health certificates are already laid down in Community 
legislation); (3) to approve the residues monitoring programme, i.e. a system to 
control the use of a range of veterinary drugs and other substances in animals and 
products intended for human consumption that often sets maximum residue levels; 
and (4) to set up an initial list of approved establishments. 
The list that is drawn up on the basis of this regulation is constantly updated. None of 
the IGAD member states, and indeed no sub-Saharan African country except the beef 
protocol countries of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe is included in the 
list of authorised Third Country Establishments. 461 No sub-Saharan country is 
authorised to export milk or milk products to the EU. The case of fresh poultry meat is 
even more discouraging for IGAD member states; the EU allows imports of this product 
only from the following nine countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Croatia, Israel, Switzerland and Thailand.462  
4.5 Conclusion 
We can see from the foregoing discussion of the EU preferential trade regime for IGAD 
member states, and its development-blind food safety laws, that:  
despite the MFN principle of the WTO system, the EU maintains a hierarchy of 
privileges for the benefit of developing countries, and IGAD member states are among 
the most preferred in this hierarchy; 
                                                 
459  Note that this has been EC practice for a long time. See Id., and Council Decision of 21 December 1976 
drawing up a list of third countries from which the Member States authorize imports of bovine animals, 
swine and fresh meat (79/542/EEC). 
460  See EC Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, General guidance on EU 
import and transit rules for live animals and animal products from third countries, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/guide_thirdcountries2006_en.pdf.  
461  A list of currently approved establishments is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/third_en.htm. Kenya and Uganda appear in the list for as 
authorised fish exporters to the EU. Note also that the reference here to Sub-Saharan Africa excludes 
South Africa, which is authorised to export livestock products to the EU.  
462  See list at http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/sanco/vets/info/data/listes/pm.html. 
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however, to the extent that EU food safety laws are designed and applied without due 
regard for the particular concerns and challenges of developing countries, this 
privilege remains only academic at least in the agricultural sector;  
the EU’s reservation of generous country-specific tariff quotas under the WTO for the 
likes of Brazil, Australia and the US only brings into question the EU’s commitment to 
support the development of poor countries such as the members of IGAD; and  
the EU’s provision of generous refunds on the export of surplus livestock products to 
IGAD member states elevates the question to one of whether the EU is at all genuine 
in its high-profile commitment to support the trade performance of these countries. 
Given the central role of the livestock industry for poverty alleviation in the IGAD 
region, it is high time that IGAD member states pull their efforts together and put 
pressure on the EU to translate its official commitments into concrete opportunities, 
not least by introducing some degree of consistency and complementarities between 
its trade and development policies. 
However, unlike the case of tariffs and other barriers, the EU cannot grant 
‘preferential’ standards for the benefit of the IGAD livestock industry. No matter how 
supportive the EU may want to be, its primary responsibility in this area is to protect 
its citizens and the environment against food-borne diseases and pests. Furthermore, 
even if the EU were to come up with differential and preferential sanitary standards 
for IGAD livestock products, that would automatically send the wrong signal to the 
European consumer – that IGAD livestock products are of a lesser quality or standard 
of safety. This is hardly what IGAD livestock producers would like to be associated 
with. Consequently, the only way the EU or any other country could support the IGAD 
livestock industry and the large number of poor people working in it is by helping 
governments and producers to enhance their production standards rather than by 
lowering import requirements on differential basis. A targeted assistance to the sector 
would be able to address some of the major disease and sanitary challenges faced by 
the livestock industry in the region. Given that many, if not most, of the challenges 
are common to many IGAD member states, an IGAD-wide rather than a member-state 
level approach may produce larger benefits relative to the amount of investment.  
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 General  
The IGAD region has one of the largest concentrations of livestock in the world. 
However, this resource wealth has not been translated into export revenues for the 
countries and the people who depend for their livelihoods on the sector. Although 
several factors may be responsible for this mismatch between actual resources and 
export revenues from those resources, this study has attempted to describe the 
problem and analyse it from one particular angle – the extent to which the regulatory 
framework governing livestock production and trade at all levels, i.e. national, 
regional as well as international, has contributed to this gap.  
An important objective of this study is to see whether the regulatory framework 
“encourages or discourages trade within IGAD as well as with third countries”. This 
calls for an investigation into the relationship between law and business transactions 
in general and import-export trade in particular. This relationship can be seen from 
different levels of generality – the relationship between the overall legal culture and 
tradition of a country and its implications for business in that country or the extent to 
which the general business and trade rules and regulations of a country are conducive 
for import-export business. This study has focused on the latter as related to the 
livestock industry. However, such specific trade rules and regulations cannot exist in a 
vacuum and their overall effectiveness entirely depends on the legal culture and 
traditions of the particular legal system in question. The role of such broad subjects as 
rule of law, the accessibility of laws, the transparency and predictability of their 
administration, and the efficiency and competence of the courts to administer justice 
will always have a bearing on the role of the regulatory framework in facilitating or 
hindering the growth of commerce. It is by now a well-established fact that the 
development of a sustainable business sector requires first and foremost a regulatory 
framework in which governments act “not only by law but also under the law”.463  
Many people working directly in the IGAD livestock industry have serious reservations 
about the extent to which the concept of rule of law is recognized let alone 
implemented in the administration of livestock production and trade policies in these 
countries. Indeed, it is sometimes worrying to learn that, in some of the IGAD member 
states, even the legal departments of the relevant government ministries may not 
necessarily have a list of laws relevant to their day-to-day operation.464 The capacity 
of the courts in virtually all of these countries is such that many businesspeople 
appear to prefer to give away their legitimate rights, or try to follow illegal routes to 
protect their rights, rather than take their cases to courts of law. Needless to say, 
there can be no rule of law in the absence of a strong, independent and efficient 
judicial system in a country. And on this, each of the IGAD member states has a great 
distance to travel.  
The livestock sector is subject to an intricate web of regulations and standards 
emanating from a multiplicity of sources. The two scientific institutions, the OIE and 
Codex, serve vital purposes in international economic relations – setting largely 
science-based standards on animal health and food safety as well as creating a 
                                                 
463  See E-U Petersmann, “How to Promote the International Rule of Law: Contributions by the World 
Trade Organization Appellate Review System” 1 Journal of International Economic Law (1998), pp. 
25-48, at 26. As Carothers put it, “[b]asic elements of a modern market economy such as property rights 
and contracts are founded on the law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without the rule 
of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions would not function, 
and the government’s many involvements in the economy—regulatory mechanisms, tax systems, 
customs structures, monetary policy, and the like— would be unfair, inefficient, and opaque.” Thomas 
Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival”, 77(2) Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998) p. 97. 
464  In one case, the only law I could find in the legal department of a ministry was the national constitution.  
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benchmark on the basis of which national standards could be developed and 
evaluated. While the importance of these twin services is beyond doubt, it is hardly 
surprising that many developing countries are struggling to cope with this system 
while their trade interests continue to suffer. The influence of the poorest countries 
on international standard-setting institutions has remained weak, and this is even 
more so of IGAD member states. The cumulative result is that many countries see the 
two standards institutions as the institutional embodiment of the use of science to 
exclude their products from rich country markets.  
The study has demonstrated this by analysing the effect of EU sanitary measures on 
IGAD livestock trade. However well-intentioned the EBA initiative or the Lomé-
Cotonou beef/veal protocol might have been, the EU market is effectively closed for 
IGAD livestock products, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, under 
such circumstances, all the rhetoric about using trade liberalization and the WTO 
system as a tool of poverty alleviation by creating agricultural market access 
opportunities for developing countries will remain an illusion. What is more, there is 
no reason to foresee any drastic change in the global approach to the relationship 
between trade liberalization and the protection of human, animal and plant health 
and safety. The choice of the EU, perhaps the most sophisticated system of economic 
regulation, to make this case is not intended to suggest that IGAD member states must 
immediately launch a programme to meet those sophisticated and costly 
requirements. This can only be a very long term goal at best. But, the prospect for 
livestock products in fast-growing markets in Asia and elsewhere is so promising that 
some are already writing about a new “livestock revolution”. The reputation of IGAD 
livestock products in their traditional Middle Eastern markets is still strong despite the 
frequent import bans that have been imposed on grounds of animal disease outbreaks. 
The sanitary and other standards in many of these emerging and established markets 
is almost certainly lower than the EU’s, and IGAD member states will be better off 
investing in their livestock sectors in the form of disease surveillance and control 
measures and monitoring and certification schemes, with a view to meeting the 
standards of these markets. As part of this strategy, IGAD member states should 
consider negotiating market access concessions with such emerging markets rather 
than focus on the developed country markets. Indeed, using development assistance 
from established development partners such as the EU to build livestock production 
and export capacity that would meet the requirements of the emerging markets might 
be a strategy worth considering.  
The challenge facing IGAD’s livestock industry is not just the unfavourable global 
regulatory framework whose terms are dictated by the rich countries; IGAD member 
states themselves have also contributed to their declining influence in the making of 
this global framework. The reasons are understandable, but so also are the solutions. 
It is clear beyond doubt that the financial, human and technical constraints faced by 
these countries can be too much for a single IGAD member state to resolve on its own. 
The amount of public sector investment required to establish a competent and state-
of-the-art system of veterinary laboratories and monitoring and certification 
mechanisms so as to meet importing country standards is often beyond the reach of 
most if not all the countries in the region.465 That is where a regional organization 
such as IGAD could be used to pool resources together and deploy them for the 
common goal, and this can be done at both the technical-scientific level as well as the 
level of diplomatic representation in the relevant global fora. The single most 
important first step should therefore be for IGAD member states to acknowledge that 
each individual IGAD member state is too small to matter while IGAD as a grouping 
could be powerful enough to push its agenda on the international stage. As suggested 
in Chapter 2 above, an IGAD-level collaboration in this field would enable them to: (1) 
identify sectors of common interest; (2) identify common challenges; (3) create a 
mechanism by which they can develop common positions; and (4) speak in one voice 
                                                 
465  See Josling et al, supra n. 103, p. 51. 
 93
at these organizations, ideally through a single representative with an IGAD-wide 
mandate. This might mean devising means by which a single institution could be 
accredited to represent all countries of the region, not an easy recommendation to 
implement. The immediate action point may thus be to study how countries could 
identify an area of common interest, such as livestock trade, and pool their resources 
to come up with a single autonomous institution that can effectively represent the 
interests of the sector in all countries of the region. This will also have implications 
for the way in which capacity building work is carried out in the region. 
5.2 Conclusions 
Law is only a tool for the implementation of policies. The content of laws is 
determined by the policy objectives and implementation strategies, rather than vice 
versa. There are a number of well-intentioned and well-thought policy ideas readily 
available to IGAD and its member states. Indeed, in many cases, we know what needs 
to be done and the problem often relates to the question of how to actually do it. It is 
here that an understanding of law and legal institutions as means of policy 
implementation becomes vital. We have seen that the regulatory framework within 
which trade in IGAD livestock products takes place has got problems at every level – 
international, regional, national as well as local. At the international level, the 
regulatory framework is designed and operated with little participation or influence 
from IGAD member states; animal diseases of particular economic significance to the 
region, such as rift valley fever, are a low priority in the international standard-
setting institutions. The COMESA level trade liberalization initiatives have yet to make 
any practical difference to trade in the sector. Different regional integration 
initiatives are competing for the already meagre human and financial resources in 
these countries. At the IGAD level, there is every intention to do the right thing but 
almost nothing in terms of concrete measures to identify and tackle common 
problems, harmonize policies, or facilitate intra-IGAD trade in livestock products. This 
needs only one thing – the political will to translate aspirations and declarations of 
intention into concrete and enforceable legal commitments. The few bilateral trade 
liberalization agreements between countries within IGAD are often unenforceable 
(e.g. the cross-border trade facilitation protocols), and sometimes outright 
meaningless (e.g. those bilateral agreements that impose MFN obligations on the 
parties). National veterinary and other regulatory systems suffer from capacity 
constraints in terms of financial resources, skilled manpower and scientific and 
laboratory facilities; laws are often inaccessible, unclear, outdated or simply 
discouraging to investment and exports; administrative systems lack experience in the 
use of rules of law as tools for the implementation of policy decisions.  
5.3 Recommendations 
Most of these problems do not have easy solutions and the following recommendations 
are intended only as possible first steps towards addressing this complex set of 
challenges. IGAD member states can do a great deal at IGAD level as well as 
unilaterally and bilaterally. 
• Externally, there is no doubt that the IGAD livestock industry is faced with an 
unfriendly international regulatory environment in the design of which its member 
states have virtually no say. But, their interests also suffer from possibly illegal 
measures taken by governments of actual or potential export markets for IGAD 
livestock products. IGAD member states could consider several options, including:  
(1) Accession to relevant international organizations: those IGAD member states that 
are not members of these organizations should actively seek accession and IGAD 
member states already within those organizations could use their powers to 
support the accession of their fellow IGAD member states, and  
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(2) Collective representation in relevant international organizations: while this might 
look rather unrealistic in the current political environment within IGAD, their 
collective interest would be best served if they speak with one voice at these 
organizations, ideally through a single representative with an IGAD-wide mandate.  
• At the national level, the single most important first step is to conduct a law 
review and possibly law reform process with a view to developing a coherent, up-
to-date, complete, accessible and enforceable set of sanitary and food safety 
regulations for the livestock industry. Kenya, the country with relatively the most 
advanced legal system in the region, is already doing that while the countries that 
need it most are not.  
• Likewise, the law review and reform process suggested above can also be used to 
address the problems of multiple and excessive taxation of the livestock sector and 
any other laws and practices that discourage business and investment in the sector. 
While taxing exports is an easy and tempting way of collecting government 
revenue, we need to realize that export taxes are a thing of the past and the real 
competition among livestock exporting countries has largely been on the amount of 
overt and covert subsidies they can provide to their livestock exporters. IGAD 
members may not need, nor afford, to provide export subsidies, but they can at 
least abstain from actively discouraging businesspeople who may want to operate 
in the field.  
• At a more general level, IGAD member states must look at rule of law as part and 
parcel of the effort to encourage economic activity and achieve economic 
development and poverty reduction. This requires, among other things, cultivating 
an administrative culture in which every decision is based on clearly articulated 
legal authority, and ultimately subject to review by an independent and competent 
administrative or judicial organ. These are complex developmental issues that can 
only evolve over an extended period of time, but we must start somewhere. Two 
actions that can be taken immediately in this respect are:  
(1) compilation of all relevant laws and making them available to stakeholders within 
these countries (preferably in hard copy) as well as publishing them on a dedicated 
web site to make them available more widely, and  
(2) provision of basic legal training to relevant government officials and private sector 
people working in the livestock sector.  
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APPENDIX I: IGAD MEMBER STATE DELEGATES TO CODEX COMMISSION 
ANNUAL MEETINGS 
 
 
Codex Commission Session Country Delegates Affiliations 
29th Session 
(July 2006) 
28th Session (July 
2005) 
27th Session 
(28 June–3 July 
2004) 
26th session (30 
June–7 July 2003) 
24th Session 
(July 2001) 
Tekleab 
MESGHENA 
Director-
General, Codex 
Contact Point, 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
X X    Eritrea 
Yohannes 
TENSUE 
First Secretary, 
Alternate 
Permanent 
Representative 
to FAO, 
Embassy of 
Eritrea 
 X  X  
Mesai GIRMA Director-
General, Quality 
and Standards 
Authority of 
Ethiopia 
 X    Ethiopia 
Fortuna DEBACO Senior 2nd 
Secretary, 
Embassy of the 
Federal 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Ethiopia 
   X  
Daniel MUNGAI Senior Fisheries 
Officer, 
Ministry of 
Livestock and 
Fisheries 
Development 
X     
Maurice OTIENO Senior Fisheries 
Officer,  
Ministry of 
Livestock and 
Fisheries 
Development 
X     
Japhet 
M'ANAMPIU 
Fisheries 
Officer, 
Ministry of 
Livestock and 
Fisheries 
Development 
X     
Evah ODUOR General 
Manager, 
Standards 
Development 
Division, Kenya 
Bureau of 
Standards 
X X X   
Alice ONYANGO Senior Standards 
Officer/Codex 
Office, Kenya 
Bureau of 
Standards 
X     
Hannah ODIPO Senior Industrial 
Development 
Officer, 
Department of 
Industry, 
Ministry of 
Trade and 
Industry 
     
Ntayiai RHONEST Chief Chemist, 
Kenya Plant 
Health 
Inspectorate 
Service 
X     
Kenya 
 
Tom OLIELO Head of the 
Agrochemical 
Department, 
Secretary of 
National Codex 
Committee, 
 X X X  
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Kenya Bureau 
of Standards 
Gladys MAINA General 
Manager - 
Quality 
Assurance, 
Kenya Plant 
Health 
Inspectorate 
Service 
 X  X  
Joseph MUSAA Assistant 
Director, 
Department of 
Veterinary 
Services 
 X    
Joseph MBURU Attaché 
(Agricultural 
Affairs), 
Alternate 
Permanent 
Representative 
to FAO, 
Embassy of the 
Republic of 
Kenya 
 X    
Chagema 
KEDERA 
Managing 
Director, Kenya 
Plant Health 
Inspectorate 
Service 
  X   
Christian 
LANGAT 
Trade Mark 
Examiner, 
Kenya Industrial 
Property 
Institute 
  X   
J.W. JALANG'O Assistant 
Director of 
Veterinary 
Services, 
Ministry of 
Livestock 
Development, 
Veterinary 
Research 
Laboratories, 
Veterinary 
Public Health 
Divison 
   X  
       
Samuel YEGON Agricultural 
Attaché, 
Alternate 
Permanent 
Representative 
to FAO, 
Embassy of the 
Republic of 
Kenya 
   X  
E.L. Songole General 
Manager, 
Standards 
Development, 
Kenya Bureau 
of Standards 
    X 
J.P. Nthuli Deputy Director 
of Veterinary 
Services, 
Veterinary 
Research 
Laboratories 
    X 
       
Abbas EL FADIL Director of the 
Regional 
Training Centre 
for Meat, 
Inspection 
Hygiene and 
Grading, Federal 
Ministry of 
Animal 
Resources and 
Fisheries 
 X    Sudan 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbasher 
KHALID 
Director, 
Quarantines 
Department, 
Ministry of 
  X   
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Animal 
Resources 
Abdalatief 
MOHAMED 
AHMED 
Food Safety, 
Head 
Department, 
National 
Chemical 
Laboratories, 
Federal Ministry 
of Health 
 X    
Abdelgadir 
ABDELGADIR 
Director 
General, SSMO 
   X  
Ahmed YOUSIF Director 
General, 
General 
Administration 
for Planning 
Federal Ministry 
of Animal 
Wealth and 
Fisheries 
   X  
Cinzia 
MINGIARDI 
Assistant to 
Permanent 
Representative, 
Embassy of 
Sudan 
   X  
Hamdi IBRAHIM Director, 
Standards and 
Quality Control 
Unit, Federal 
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry 
X X X X  
Husina 
Mohammed 
Ministry of 
Animal 
Resources 
    X 
Ismail 
ALKAMISH 
Director, Food 
Control 
Administration, 
Federal Ministry 
of Health 
X     
Kamal 
MOHAMED 
ECHADI 
Executive 
Manager, 
Sudanese 
Standard 
X     
Mohamed EL 
HASSAN 
Under Secretary, 
Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture 
and Forestry 
 X X X  
Mohamed HARBI Director-
General, 
Sudanese 
Standards and 
Metrology 
Organization 
X X  X X 
Omer ABDALLA Under-
Secretary, 
Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture 
and Forestry 
X     
Suad SATTI National 
Chemical 
Laboratories and 
Food Safety 
Coordinator, 
Federal Ministry 
of Health 
  X X  
Yassin BABIKER Director-
General, 
Sudanese 
Standards and 
Metrology 
Organization 
 X X   
Yousif 
ABDALRAZIG 
Head, Exports 
and Imports 
Unit, Quarantine 
Department, 
Federal Ministry 
of Animal 
Resources 
X     
       
Uganda 
 
 
E. Kasirye-Alemu Executive 
Director, 
Uganda National 
Bureau of 
Standards 
    X 
 98
Sam Balagadde Standards 
Officer, Uganda 
National Bureau 
of Standards 
    X 
William SSALI Chairman, 
National 
Standards 
Council, c/o 
Uganda National 
Bureau of 
Standards 
X     
Terry KAHUMA Executive 
Director, 
Uganda National 
Bureau of 
Standards 
X X X X  
Ben MANYINDO Deputy 
Executive 
Director 
(Technical), 
Uganda National 
Bureau of 
Standards 
X X X X  
Hope KABIRISI Special 
Presidential 
Assistant 
(Science and 
Technology), 
State House 
X     
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APPENDIX II: ACCORD SUR LES TARIFS POUR LES PRESENTATION DE 
SERVICE DU CENTRE D’EXPLOITATION REGIONALE DU BETAIL 
(DAMMERJOG DISTRICT D’ARTA)
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Appendix III: Conditions to Import Livestock into Saudi Arabia (sample document 
obtained from Sudan) 
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APPENDIX IV: UAE IMPORT CONDITIONS OF LIVESTOCK FROM 
DJIBOUTI (UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENT OBTAINED FROM THE RQF)  
 
 
